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AFRICA N. Vol. III
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Freeman - Elwood

Honolulu —
Lt Col Chandler
Chief Umpire

Bonfarik

—

Maelna - adv. CP

2nd

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c. Squad and half-squad rushes may be used to advance rapidly over comparatively open ground, not exceeding 50 yards across, in order to close with the enemy, to gain an assaulting position or to rapidly cross an open space enroute to an intermediate objective. This method of advance is tiring and is only used for short distances.

On reaching the near edge of an open space, the leader may cross it in one rush of the entire squad or in two rushes of one-half squad each. To move the entire squad simultaneously, the squad leader commands: 1. Prepare to rush. 2. FOLLOW ME. To move by half-squads, the leader designates which half of the squad is to make each rush; the corporal leads the first rush and the second-in-command leads the second rush. Individuals in the designated unit spring up at the command of execution and follow their leader at top speed. The rush terminates after closing with the enemy or when the leader commands or signals "down". Half-squad rushes permit fire with movement, and are more frequently used than squad rushes.

d. Side-slipping.--When confronted with an exposed, fire-swept area in his zone of advance, the squad leader must use his initiative to advance his squad without incurring excessive losses. Where adjacent squads are advancing, he may assist them by fire or he may side-slip temporarily to advance in their zone, until his own zone of advance permits passage. A squad habitually side-slips to outflank enemy resistance, when lack of cover or the strength of the enemy fire prevents continued forward movement in its assigned zone of advance. The platoon leader normally directs such maneuvers. Adjacent squad leaders must be forewarned of this maneuver, by prearranged signals or by messages.

It is far better to side-slip and use a covered approach, if one is closely available, than to risk losses by advancing straight to the front by rushes or even by infiltration."

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COLLECTIVE USE OF COVER IN COVERT

9. GENERAL.—The collective use of cover embodies the use of terrain and appropriate combat formations by group leaders; it is a vital responsibility of all commanders, beginning with the squad leader. Unnecessary exposure of personnel is frequently due to the failure of commanders to use the terrain to best advantage.

Offensive action.—Initiative must be used by all commanders in selecting the most favorable covered routes of approach that the terrain affords and the tactical situation permits. Small units, attacking as a part of a larger unit, cannot always choose the terrain over which they will attack. They must be trained to make the best use of any terrain.

Defensive action.—Covered approaches, where the enemy is likely to attack, are more strongly defended than exposed areas, where the enemy is less likely to attack. Defensive groups are inconspicuously located, with proper regard to fields of fire and concealment. The utmost use is made of cover, concealment, and camouflage, that tactical requirements permit.

10. METHODS OF ADVANCE BY RIFLE SQUADS.—(Paragraph 311, FM 2-5.) During the dismounted approach march, rifle squads are conducted in squad column or in line of 1/2 squad columns, by their respective squad leaders, in accordance with directions of the platoon leader. During the actual fire fight (following the dismounted approach) rifle squads are led by their squad leaders against objectives assigned by the platoon leader. In doing so, they advance from one intermediate objective to another.

The actual methods of advance, employed by each squad in the fire fight, are left to the initiative of the squad leader. Terrain, enemy resistance and the proximity of the next objective determine the method used. Every advantage must be taken of all available cover. Squad formations must be irregular and inconspicuous and suitable to the terrain. Rifle squads may advance during the fire fight by infiltration, by using a covered approach, by rushes, or by side slipping.

a. Infiltration is suitable for crossing terrain affording intermittent cover for the deployed squad, while it is advancing to a forward position. This method involves a minimum of exposure to enemy artillery or small-arms fire, and is very frequently used.

The squad leader commands or signals, ON THAT LINE (indicating the line) RE-FORM. He then directs individuals by name to move forward, directing the scouts to move out first. After 3 or 4 men have moved forward, the squad leader advances. The second-in-command directs the forward movement of the remaining individuals and is the last to advance.

The scouts work forward first to the indicated line. The remaining riflemen work forward on separated routes, opposite their approximate location in the squad. Teamwork and use of cover are essential. Care must be taken to avoid bunching or following in trace in exposed areas, which are crossed by creeping, crawling or individual rushes. The squad leader directs individuals to firing positions upon their arrival on the new line and transmits firing data received from the scouts, if fire is to be delivered from the new line.

b. Using a covered approach is applicable when the ground affords a covered route (ravine, ditch or similar approach). Long circuitous routes must be avoided, to prevent delay and loss of control. This method of advance should be used whenever possible.

The squad advances as a unit in column of squad column at varying distances. The squad leader, preceded by one or two scouts, leads the squad. The second-in-command follows in rear. Exposed areas in the route of approach are crossed by creeping, crawling, or short individual rushes.

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PLATE NO. 3

CREEPING

Keep Knees Behind the Buttocks

Avoid Elevating the Buttocks

CRAWLING



Keep the Body and Legs Flat on the Ground and Pull with the Hands

Pull up the Right Leg Slightly and Push the Body Forward

PLATE NO. 4

INDIVIDUAL USE OF COVER

Correct

Incorrect



Correct Observing Position. From Right Side of Tree.

Correct

Incorrect



Correct

Incorrect



Correct



Incorrect

PLATE NO. 5

On hard ground scout advances foot and places toe carefully, then lowers heel. He then shifts weight to advanced foot and proceeds.

In walking silently on any ground keep entire weight balanced on rear foot until advanced foot is firmly planted.

In grass or weeds the scout raises foot so that it clears top of grass. Puts heel down first, then lowers toe gently.

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by and lower [illegible], [illegible] from the hip, lower his outstretched foot, heel first, and then put the ball of the foot on the ground slowly and softly.

On hard ground, the scout should place the toe first and then gently lower the heel into place.

Through grass, the scout should raise his foot above the grass before carrying it forward and lowering it, heel first, as on soft ground. (See Plate 6 and note Page 6, Paragraph 8 (a), Volume I, Chapter 9, SFM, Scouting and Patrolling, Dismounted)

6. OBSERVATION:-(Paragraph 222 h, FM 21-100, Paragraph 201 b, FM 7-5, and Paragraph 7 c, Chapter 9, SFM, Volume I.) Individuals must be thoroughly trained in the proper methods of observation. Basic principles for skillful observation are as follows:

Extreme stealth and the maximum use of cover are essential.

Unless the field of view is obstructed, the soldier observes from the prone position, with his head close to the ground.

When firing, the soldier habitually observes from the right side of his concealment or cover; when not firing, he preferably observes from the shady side of his concealment or cover, so as to cast no shadow which might reveal his position. He only observes over the top of his concealment or cover when it has a broken or bushy top line or when it blends well with the landscape. He always avoids skyline exposure. In observing from doors or windows, he stays well back in the shadows. (See Plate #4)

All movements must be extremely deliberate in order not to attract attention. The soldier remains motionless while actually observing.

(1) Visibility may be diminished by staining face with mud.

(2) Cloaks made of gunny sacks or sandbags covered with leaves may be used to conceal a man in a fixed position.

(3) Observation over a sandbag parapet may be facilitated by the use of sandbags drawn over head.

(4) White garments are useful in snowy terrain.

(5) The hat or helmet should be removed or camouflaged while observing.

The area to be observed must be systematically searched, in order to pick up indistinct objects, whether moving or motionless. The soldier first looks at the ground nearest him for the most dangerous enemy will be there. He searches a narrow strip close to him from right to left, parallel to his front. He then searches from left to right, parallel to his front. He then searches from left to right a second strip, farther away but overlapping the first. He continues in this way until the entire field of view is covered. If he thinks he sees a suspected enemy, he should look a little to one side of the suspected spot, for in this way the eye responds more quickly to slight movements.

7. FIRING:-The soldier habitually fires from the right side of his concealment or cover, to avoid unnecessary bodily exposure.

8. CONCEALMENT FROM AERIAL OBSERVATION:-If enemy airplanes are active, individuals and groups seek concealment from overhead observation. If exposed, they must avoid movement, keep dispersed, and must not look up except to fire. The face must be kept down and the hands covered, since these parts of the body are readily distinguished from the air. Papers, white handkerchiefs, etc., are kept under cover from aerial observation.

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

Dropping down.--The soldier drops to the ground quickly in the most convenient manner. For ease of execution, the following method is prescribed:

Upon arrival at a firing point, advance the left foot, turning it across the front of the body. Drop forward on the outside of the left knee and at the same time extend the rifle, grasped in both hands and held vertically, so that the butt strikes the ground at full arm's length directly in front of the left knee. Pivoting on the left knee and the butt of the rifle, roll forward onto the left elbow and left side. Grasp the small of the stock with the right hand and place the right elbow on the ground.

b. Creeping.--(Paragraph 215 a, (7), FM 7-5) is slow and tiresome. It is employed from the prone position for short advances, when close to the enemy and low cover (such as a shallow ditch, low wall or tree trunk) is available. When creeping, the body rests on the knees, the elbows and the forearms. The head and buttocks are kept down. The knees are always behind the buttocks. (See Plate #3)

The soldier rests his body on the lower legs, elbows and forearms. The chest and stomach are lifted slightly off the ground. The soldier drags his body forward by alternately pulling with either arm. With practice rapid movement can be attained with very little exposure.

c. Crawling.--(Paragraph 215 a, (8), FM 7-5) is slower and more tiresome than creeping, but involves less exposure. It is employed from the prone position for short advances, when close to the enemy and little or no cover is available. (See Plate #3).

From the prone position flat on the ground, the soldier slowly brings his hands back beside his head, keeping the elbows down. He draws up either leg and with it pushes the body forward. When not too close to the enemy and when slight cover permits, he may crawl faster by raising slightly on his forearms and pushing alternately with each leg.

Crawling differs from creeping in that the body is not raised

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4. [illegible] (Paragraph 5, (2) Chapter 9, BAR, Volume I.) When stationary, individuals must remain motionless, except for movement necessary in firing, observing or transmitting signals. When the soldier stops in the open or behind slight cover, he must lie motionless in the prone position, with his body stretched out as close to the ground as possible. The body is flat. The left cheek is on the ground. The legs are extended and spread out. The heels are turned in and touch the ground. The arms are extended to the front, flat on the ground. The rifle is grasped in the right hand, at the balance. (See Plate #1)

5. INDIVIDUAL METHODS OF ADVANCE: Methods of advance for individuals include running, creeping and crawling. Individuals must be trained to execute these movements with precision, vigor and minimum exposure.

a. Running.—(Paragraph 215 a, (9), FM 7-5.) Riflemen advance by running when the squad advances by rushes or when individuals advance rapidly, by individual rushes, from cover to cover. They must be trained to run at top speed and to drop down and see cover and concealment instantly. Individuals must select points to rush to that provide cover before starting the rush.

Preparing to rise.—Being in the prone position, to prepare to rise, the soldier draws in his arms until his hands are opposite his head. He keeps his elbows away from the body and down, and keeps his head down. Careless movements that betray his preparations to rise must be avoided. (See Plate #1)

Jumping up.—The soldier next quickly raises his body by straightening his arms, shifts the weight of his body to the left arm and left leg, throws his right leg forward and jumps off the right front. Slowness in rising prolongs exposure. (See Plate #1)

Running forward.—While running, the soldier bends his body forward as low as is consistent with maximum speed. The left shoulder is held forward. The rifle is held in both hands, left hand near the balance, right hand at the small of the stock. Single advances in individual rushes should not normally exceed 15-30 yards, when under fire. Slowness in running prolongs exposure. (See Plate #1)

PLATE NO. 1 RISING FROM PRONE POSITION



Prone Position



Starting to Rise, Draw Hands Back



Next Extend the Arms



Next Throw Right Leg Forward

Next Jump off to the Right Front - Run Bent Over with Left Shoulder Forward.

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USE OF CONCEALMENT AND COVER FOR INDIVIDUALS AND RIFLE SQUADS

SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL:-Unnecessary exposure and conspicuous grouping of individuals result in excessive casualties in battle. The use of extended, open formations and the maximum use of cover will minimize casualties. The use of concealment and cover applies to both individuals and groups.

Training in the use of concealment and cover must be given early in recruit instruction, preceding instruction in the Technique of Rifle Fire; it also applies during instruction in scouting and patrolling and dismounted combat.

Concealment hides the individual from enemy sight or observation. Cover protects individuals and units from hostile fire.

(Note: This pamphlet is based on extracts from FM 7-5, FM 22-5, FM 23-5 FM 5-20, FM 21-100, Chapter 13 Section II, and from Chapter 9, BFM, Volume 1.)

SECTION II
INDIVIDUAL USE OF COVER

2. GENERAL:-(Paragraph 157, c, FM 23-5.) The individual use of concealment and cover is essential for self-protection and also because the exposure of individuals endangers others. The man who neglects to use concealment and cover will be seen and hit. His squad not only loses the fire effect of one rifle, but its position is unnecessarily disclosed and other casualties may follow. Proficiency in the individual use of concealment and cover requires intensive instruction in the following:

Basic principles of concealment and cover.
Avoidance of unnecessary movement.
Individual methods of advance.
Methods of observation and firing.
Concealment from ground and aerial observation.

3. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONCEALMENT AND COVER:-(Paragraph 201, FM 7-5)

Analyze the terrain from the enemy's point of view. Consider the terrain from two aspects:

Concealment from enemy observation. (Can the enemy see you?)
Cover from enemy fire. (Can the enemy's fire hit you?)

Seek covered approaches. Avoid open ground. When necessary to cross small clearings or open ground not under enemy fire, do so cautiously. When the clearing or open ground is under fire, the crossing should be made rapidly and in open formation.

AVOID THE SKYLINE and contrasting backgrounds, that cause individuals to stand out conspicuously. Avoid taking concealment or cover behind isolated trees or bushes, or occupying any positions which stand out against the skyline or are in sharp contrast to the surrounding terrain.

Appreciate that the slightest ground folds and obstacles may afford a surprising amount of concealment and cover. Learn to use such cover to best advantage.

Select your next point with cover before moving.

Conspicuous cover and concealment draws enemy fire rather than offering cover and concealment.

AVOID BUNCHING

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X FIRST Infantry Div Sig
X Manual

HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO #1 - U. S. ARMY

23 November 1942

OFFENSIVE COMBAT

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

NOTE: This is a brief outline of the general principles of infantry offensive combat. It applies to all units and will be used as a general guide for combat training.

1. GENERAL.--The successive steps of infantry offensive combat are summarized by the expression: "FIND 'EM, FIX 'EM, AND FIGHT 'EM." The enemy must be located and his dispositions ascertained by aggressive reconnaissance. He must then be fixed by the quick application of supporting fires and the prompt attack of one's leading elements. He must be fought by continued FIRE and MOVEMENT. Effective communications are vitally necessary to properly exercise command and control.

SECTION II
RECONNAISSANCE

2. GENERAL.--Extensive and aggressive reconnaissance must be initiated without delay in order to locate the enemy, to ascertain the enemy's tactical dispositions and to ascertain the most favorable routes of approach. Reconnaissance must be continuous thereafter. When contact with the enemy is once gained, it must be retained. Normal methods of reconnaissance for infantry units include motorized and dismounted patrols.

a. Reconnaissance is covered in the Division "Reconnaissance Pamphlet", now in use as a training guide within the Division. All commanders and all units must be thoroughly familiar with its contents.

SECTION III
SUPPORTING FIRES

3. GENERAL.--Fixing the enemy by fire is a primary function of supporting weapons. These weapons must be placed in action early and kept in action late.

a. The need for early fire support makes it vitally necessary that the commanders of weapon units be given the earliest possible information. They must be afforded every opportunity for early reconnaissance, in order to assure the proper disposal of their weapons.

b. Supporting fires cannot completely destroy the enemy. They can only assist in neutralizing the enemy's fire and thus permit assault rifle units to close with and complete the destruction of the enemy.

c. Supporting weapons within the infantry division include the light machine gun, cal. .30; the heavy machine gun, cal. .30; the 60-mm mortar; the 81-mm mortar; the 37-mm gun; self propelled weapons of the cannon companies and the weapons of the artillery battalions. Air bombardment may also be secured.

4. THE LIGHT MACHINE GUN.--The Weapons Platoon of each rifle company includes a section of two light machine guns, which is employed by the company commander for close support of the rifle platoons, usually at close ranges.

a. Light machine guns are used for direct fires against enemy

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personnel, preferably from flank positions and where they can be fired through gaps in the line, to place flanking fire across the front of the assault rifle platoons. These guns are particularly useful for flanking fires against enemy groups which are holding up adjacent units.

b. The guns operate under section control and are normally sited about 30 to 50 yards apart. They are placed in action early and are displaced forward, when their fires become masked, to maintain continuous close support.

5. THE HEAVY MACHINE GUN.--The Heavy Weapons Company of each infantry battalion includes two platoons of heavy machine guns, each including two sections of two guns each, which are normally employed under battalion control. They may be attached by platoons to separate rifle companies when such companies are widely separated or when terrain conditions do not favor central control. Guns within the platoon are operated by sections, as directed by the platoon commander.

a. The heavy machine gun platoons, with the 81-mm mortars, furnish the base of supporting fire for the infantry battalion. They are preferably used for direct, enfilading fire against enemy personnel. They are also used for flank protection of the battalion, for anti-aircraft protection andto protect the reorganization of the battalion when necessary.

b. These guns are effective for direct fires up to the limits of observation, seldom more than 1,500 - 1,800 yards, and for indirect fires up to greater ranges. They are capable of sustained automatic fire.

c. In order to furnish continuous machine gun support, the guns must be displaced forward by echelon as the action progresses. Their maximum effective use necessitates active reconnaissance by the machine gun personnel for more advanced firing positions, observation posts, expected enemy targets and covered routes of approach for weapons carriers. There must be very close liaison between the machine gun platoons and the supported infantry units.

6. THE 37-MM GUN.--Each infantry battalion has in its Battalion Headquarters Company, a platoon of four 37-mm guns, organized in two sections of two guns each. Each infantry regiment has an Anti-Tank Company (twelve 37-mm guns), organized in three platoons of similar organization. The Anti-Tank Company is used as a unit or by platoons, as prescribed by the regimental commander.

a. The 37-mm gun is a high velocity, flat trajectory weapon with high mobility, normally used for anti-mechanization fires. It is accurate at 1,000 yards; its rate of fire is about 15 aimed rounds per minute; its projectile penetrates 1-1/2 inch armor plate at 1,000 yards.

b. These 37-mm guns are normally employed by platoons and sections for protection against enemy armored vehicles. They are used to cover the most probable routes of approach of enemy mechanization and their continuing use should be closely coordinated. They are also useful for the destruction of definitely located enemy weapons and against concrete emplacements. Firing positions are selected on high ground affording wide fields of fire, cover and concealment and with guns located in slight defilade. Guns with missions covering roads must be located in positions off the roads so as not to be over-run by approaching armored vehicles. Vulnerability of the gun and its prime mover requires them to displace forward by bounds from one terrain mask to the next as the attack progresses.

7. THE 60-MM MORTAR.--Each rifle company has in its weapons platoon a section of three 60-mm mortars. The mortar section is employed as directed by the company commander in general support of the rifle company.

a. These mortars are used for high angle fire against

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definitely located enemy troops and enemy weapons opposing the advance of the company. They are primarily used for close-up and prompt support against targets which can not be reached by the flat trajectory weapons of the rifle company. The 60-mm mortar is highly mobile; it has a practicable, effective range of about 1,000 yards and a radius of burst of about 15 yards. It is highly destructive against personnel and weapons.

b. These mortars are emplaced in close-up defiladed positions, preferably providing adequate observation and maximum concealment. The 60-mm mortars are normally operated under section control, with sufficient dispersion to insure minimum losses from enemy fire without loss of control. The section advances by bounds in close support of the assault rifle platoons.

8. THE 81-MM MORTAR.--Each infantry battalion has one platoon of six 81-mm mortars in its Heavy Weapons Company. This mortar platoon is employed as directed by the battalion commander, to furnish a base of fire with the heavy machine gun platoons, for the maneuver of the assault rifle companies of the battalion. The 81-mm mortar platoon operates by sections; it includes three sections of two mortars each.

a. The 81-mm mortars are used for high angle fire against enemy groups (including those on reverse slope or in covered areas), against definitely located enemy weapons and for searching covered areas by fire. These mortars should be emplaced in well defiladed positions offering the maximum concealment and the best facilities for observation of fire.

b. The 81-mm mortar has a highly destructiveeffect (equal to that of the 75-mm shell) and a fair degree of mobility; it can be manhandled for short distances in forward movements by bounds. Motor transportation is necessary for a sustained advance. The platoon should be displaced forward behind the assault rifle companies to maintain the maximum continuous support.

9. THE CANNON COMPANY.--Each infantry regiment has a Cannon Company composed of two platoons of half track 75-mm howitzers (3 per platoon) and one platoon of full track 105-mm howitzers (2 per platoon). It is employed as directed by the regimental commander for close-up support of assault battalions. Its high mobility, combined with heavy caliber fire power, adapts it for immediate direct artillery fire support.

a. The Cannon Company uses "Hit and Run" tactics. It takes advantage of covered routes of approach to work up to forward defiladed positions from which it fires, until located by the enemy. Its mobility then permits it to hastily withdraw to other positions, thereby avoiding enemy counter battery fires. Its normal targets include personnel, emplacements, enemy occupied buildings, and armored vehicles. It normally uses direct fire but can use indirect fire. Ammunition should preferably be reserved for profitable targets of opportunity.

10. FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT.--Field artillery is the most powerful fire support element in the division. To render timely and effective artillery support, the artillery commander must have early information of the infantry Scheme of Maneuver and front line locations, and must be kept informed regarding the conduct of the action. All infantry commanders, to include platoon commanders, must know the availability and capabilities of the supporting artillery and how to obtain such assistance.

a. Availability.--Organic artillery in the infantry division includes three battalions of light artillery (105-mm howitzers) and one battalion of medium artillery (155-mm howitzers).

(1) Under the 1st Infantry Division Standing Operating [illegible], each infantry regiment in action has a light artillery battalion [illegible]. Under certain conditions, the Combat Team (infantry [illegible]) may have this light artillery battalion attached. In either event, the fire of this light artillery battalion is available

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at the call of the infantry regimental commander. The division artillery battalion and any artillery battalions attached, normally operate in general support, under divisional control. The Division Commander, through his Artillery Commander, should be able if necessary, to manipulate the fire over all parts of the battlefield within range, in concentrations of from one battery to that of all available artillery.

b. Capabilities.--Single batteries can effectively neutralize 200 x 200 yard areas in five minutes, or about six to eight such areas in an hour. The four battalions can effectively neutralize an area of 1,200 x 400 yards in the same time. The hammer blow of a large mass of fire in a concentration is most effective for the neutralization of a target. The complete destruction of a target requires very accurate adjustment and considerable time and ammunition.

c. How to obtain artillery support.--With each infantry regimental and each assault infantry battalion headquarters, there is an artillery liaison party from its direct support artillery battalion. In addition, each artillery battery and battalion has one or more forward OP's with the assault elements. All liaison and OP details are in direct communication with the batteries or the battalion Fire Direction Center. Fire support may be pre-arranged or obtained on call. If any infantry commander needs support, he can request it through infantry channels or by contact with the nearest field artillery party in his vicinity. Such requests should include the nature of the enemy target, its most accurate possible location, its effect on the execution of the infantry plan, and if possible, what time requirements are imposed by the local tactical situation. It may take from three to fifteen minutes to obtain this support, depending on the efficiency of communications. The artillery commander determines the priority of requests for artillery support in accordance with the desires of the infantry commander whom he is supporting. The amount and kind of fire will be determined by the artillery. If screening is desired, it should be so stated so that smoke shells may be employed.

11. AIR SUPPORT.--Air support in the infantry division must be furnished by a higher headquarters. When air support is made available, one or more air support parties (consisting of an Air Support Officer and certain communication personnel) are attached by higher headquarters to the division. The air force unit which has been designated to furnish close support answers the calls of the air support personnel attached to the infantry division.

a. An Air Support Party may be attached to a CT or regiment; very rarely to a lower unit. Requests for air support follow normal channels to the Air Support Party at Division Headquarters. From there such requests go to Air Support Control (usually located at Corps or Army headquarters), which actually directs the air support missions.

b. Air support is best used to deepen the zone of artillery fires, by taking over those targets beyond the range of artillery. It reconnoiters distant roads and areas and executes offensive missions against targets of opportunity. It is especially effective against approaching enemy reserves. Less frequently it is used to augment artillery fires. This requires dive bombing and close-in support of infantry units and is costly in pilots and machines. When this type of support is required, coordination of ground and air must be perfect in timing and means of identification. Requests for reconnaissance missions are coordinated by the division G-2.

SECTION IV
MANEUVER

12. GENERAL.--The plan of attack is normally based on the use of a maneuvering or main attack, assisted by a fixing or secondary attack, and all available fire support. BOTH ATTACKS MUST BE PRESSED VIGOROUSLY, and should be within supporting distance of each other. Surprise is

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attained by quickness in formulating and executing tactical decisions, by rapidity of maneuver, by skillful use of cover and concealment and by deception as to the direction of attack.

a. The attacking force is grouped into three major elements; the force executing the maneuvering or main attack; the force executing the fixing or secondary attack; and the reserve element. Terrain influences the plan of attack. Each element formulates its own plan of action, according to the principles prescribed below.

b. The maneuvering or main attack is the decisive attack in which all available means are concentrated toward a decisive, definite objective; it should be directed at the enemy's weakest point. It is usually executed by enveloping or turning a hostile flank. Envelopment must be sufficiently wide so as to completely pass the enemy's flank and strike the enemy in rear of the flank. This is done to avoid being pinned down by the concentrated fire of enemy weapons and to maintain freedom of maneuver. This sometimes necessitates a quick side-slipping by the best available covered route, directly toward the maneuvering flank. Close-in envelopments are seldom effective and frequently incur unnecessary casualties. Units in the main attack are disposed in depth and with a relatively narrow frontage to assure strength for a deep advance.

c. The fixing or secondary attack assists the maneuvering or main attack by fixing the enemy in position, by neutralizing the enemy's fire and by attracting enemy reserves away from the main attack. It is launched prior to or simultaneously with the main attack. It may be a frontal attack or a partial envelopment. It should converge with the main attack towards the final objective. Units in the fixing attack are disposed in less depth and with a greater frontage than those in the main attack.

d. The reserve is a force held out by the commander to meet later developments of the action. It is a maneuvering element, preferably used to further success where enemy resistance is weakening, rather than to assist where the enemy is offering stubborn resistance. It may be used to continue the attack or to exploit any success attained. It should be prepared to repel an enemy counter-attack.

(1) The company usually retains a reserve or support element of one rifle platoon, the battalion a reserve of one rifle company, and the regiment a reserve of one battalion or less. The obscurity of the enemy situation, the resistance expected, the terrain, and the distance to the objective directly influence the strength of the initial reserve.

(2) The reserve is initially disposed under cover, near the area of its expected future employment, generally in proximity to the main attack. It is moved by bounds from one covered position to another, as directed by the commander of the force to which it pertains. The reserve commander maintains close contact with his commander.

SECTION V
THE FIRE FIGHT

13. GENERAL.--The fire fight follows the approach march. It commences for any unit when it becomes necessary for that unit to deploy to return the enemy's small arms fire (with its own close supporting weapons), in order to continue the advance. In order to close with the enemy without delay, the approach march should be continued as long as the enemy fire, the tactical situation, and the terrain will permit. The fire fight for larger units commences earlier than it does for smaller units, because they require more time for complete deployment and their longer range supporting weapons are placed in action earlier. Subordinate units do not necessarily initiate the fire fight simultaneously.

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14. CONDUCT OF THE FIRE FIGHT.--The fire fight is conducted by FIRE and MOVEMENT, which is based on the prompt, intensive application of supporting fires and the rapid maneuvering of rifle units. Artillery and infantry supporting weapons furnish a base of fire, to cover the movement of the rifle units.

a. Coordination of FIRE AND MOVEMENT is obtained by designating successive objectives and using successive bases of fire. Successive unit objectives are determined by the terrain and the range of each unit's supporting weapons. Continuous fire support is effected by the rapid forward displacement (by echelon) of field artillery and infantry supporting weapons.

b. Movement of rifle units should be continuous and rapid and must be initiated prior to or simultaneously with the opening of supporting fires. Maximum use must be made of the protection furnished by supporting fires and the cover and concealment afforded by the terrain, to close with the enemy without delay.

c. Long range, indecisive rifle fire fights must be avoided. Any attempt to secure fire superiority by building up a rifle firing line at long ranges results in delay and in unnecessary exposure to enemy fire. Rifle fire should be withheld until within practicable combat range of the enemy, preferably less than 300 yards.

d. Assisting an Adjacent Unit.--Advancing units assist adjacent units by pushing forward aggressively in their own zone of advance. They thus expose the flanks of enemy resistance and are able to assist adjacent friendly units by fire and maneuver. Supporting light machine guns are very effective for this purpose.

15. ASSAULT PLATOONS.--After the fire fight has started, the conduct of the advance rests largely with the leaders of the assault platoons. The platoon leader assigns objectives to each squad. He drives his platoon on its objective; he personally leads it when necessary to do so. He coordinates the advance of the squads and reorganizes the platoon when necessary. Squad leaders prescribe their squad methods of advance, select firing positions, and designate squad targets. Company and battalion commanders influence the action by the application of supporting fires and by committing support and reserve elements.

16. SUPPORT PLATOONS.--The support platoon is the element with which the company commander influences the action by maneuver. It is used as a unit. It follows the assault echelon by bounds under best available cover, in appropriate formation, close enough to afford a quick support without being prematurely involved in the combat of the assault platoons. Its freedom of maneuver must be maintained. The support platoon commander maintains close contact with his company commander and keeps himself informed of the tactical situation. Missions of the support platoon include:

To outflank enemy resistance. The platoon is best used as a maneuvering force to out-flank enemy resistance which is holding up the company.

To reinforce the assault platoons. It is better to outflank the resistance than to merge the support platoon with assault platoons.

To occupy gaps in the line. The platoon leader maneuvers to approach the gap directly from the rear.

To protect the flanks. Small patrols may be sent to the exposed flank or the platoon may occupy a flank position.

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To assist adjacent units. The support platoon may be used to attack in flank or rear any enemy resistance which is holding up adjacent units.

SECTION VI
CONCLUSION

17. Active reconnaissance, effective security, prompt supporting fires and the proper use of FIRE and MOVEMENT are essential for offensive action. All commanders and all units must be imbued with an aggressive offensive spirit.

Terry Allen

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Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION
Fort Benning, Georgia

June 13, 1942

INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE

CHAPTER I
RECONNAISSANCE IN GENERAL

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1. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE:-Reconnaissance is the operation of obtaining military information in the field. When assigned a combat mission, the commander usually receives some general information of the enemy. This must be augmented by more detailed information gained by reconnaissance.

Early information of the terrain and of the enemy is necessary as a basis for tactical decisions and is a primary requisite to security. Characteristics of the terrain and enemy information must be ascertained by extensive and rapid reconnaissance. Reconnaissance agencies are used boldly to gain early contact with the enemy. When contact is once gained, it must be maintained.

As contact approaches, reconnaissance becomes more intensive. Detailed information will be required concerning areas of importance in the contemplated scheme of maneuver.

2. DISTANT RECONNAISSANCE:-Distant Reconnaissance procures information upon which the commanders of large forces base their initial decisions. Observation aviation and army and corps mechanized units are used to secure early information of enemy air-dromes and principal air-fields, of enemy main columns, concentration areas, reserves and supply bases, and the general characteristics of the terrain. Distant Reconnaissance starts when hostilities commence and is continuous thereafter.

3. CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE:-Close Reconnaissance furnishes the commander with the detailed information upon which he bases his tactical decisions when he engages the enemy. Observation aviation and all motorized reconnaissance units are used for this purpose. For larger forces, Close Reconnaissance starts when the opposing forces are within a few days march of each other, since the enemy's mobile mechanized elements are always a distinct threat. For small forces, it starts when contact is more imminent. It continues until Battle Reconnaissance becomes effective.

4. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE:-Battle Reconnaissance starts when contact is imminent. Immediately preceding and during combat, continuous, close observation must be maintained by all reconnaissance agencies, to ascertain the strength, composition and tactical dispositions of enemy forces in contact and of enemy reserve elements and to ascertain the characteristics of the terrain.

5. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:-A commander considers the following factors in formulating a tactical plan:

Mission.
Capabilities of his own troops and his supporting troops.
Terrain.
Capabilities of the enemy.

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The mission and the capabilities [illegible] known. The terrain and the enemy's capabilities are [illegible] ive. Items of information [illegible] Elements of information [illegible] future course of information from the units [illegible] plan.

Essential elements of terrain information inform the commander how terrain affects the capabilities of an enemy and how it affects his own. Reconnaissance instructions usually include specific questions regarding essential elements of terrain information, such as:

Are certain bridges intact? What is their capacity? Do [illegible] fords or by-paths exist?
Are certain roads passable for certain vehicles?
Are obstacles present which influence the tactical plan?

Essential elements of enemy information.--The commander should be informed of those capabilities of the enemy which may be used to oppose him in executing his mission. Items of information concerning these enemy capabilities are termed essential elements of enemy information. As contact progresses, new enemy information becomes increasingly important. The enemy situation should be confirmed as of the time that the commander executes his action. Negative information is as valuable as positive information. The [illegible] selection of essential elements of information vary with the tactical situation. For example:

In an advance by the enemy, information regarding the strength, location and the direction and rate of movement and type of transportation of enemy columns is essential.

In an attack by the enemy, information regarding the direction and strength of the enemy main effort is essential.

In a defense by the enemy, information regarding his strength and composition, the location of his flanks and the location of his reserves is essential.

In a pursuit by the enemy, information regarding the strength, composition, and direction and rate of movement of enemy encircling forces is essential.

Information regarding the type, location and movements of enemy mechanized units is always essential.

Reconnaissance instructions usually include specific questions concerning essential elements of enemy information, such as:

What is the location, composition and direction of movement of enemy main columns, last reported advancing south on Highway 50 and Highway 6?

What is the type, location and direction of movement of mechanized elements, last reported near Smithtown?

6. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.--Sources of information include observation of terrain and enemy troops, the examination of inhabitants, prisoners, documents and other captured material, information from one's own units in contact with the enemy, from adjacent units and from higher units.

7. ECONOMY IN RECONNAISSANCE.--Economy in the use of reconnaissance troops is effected by:

Seeking only that information which applies to the situation.
Assigning definite priorities for reconnaissance missions.
Restricting the number and strength of reconnaissance detachments to the minimum required by the situation.
Regulating the detachment of reconnaissance units in accordance with the expected need for future reconnaissance, in order to be able to retain adequate reconnaissance when necessary.

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8. RECONNAISSANCE AGENCIES:--Reconnaissance agencies in the infantry division include:

Attached Aviation (when available).
Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized).
Reconnaissance Sections (Motorized) of Infantry Regimental Intelligence Platoons.
Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Detachments, motorized. (May be improvised as directed.)
Infantry Battalion Intelligence Sections.
Field Artillery Intelligence Sections.
Engineer Reconnaissance Platoons.
Tank Battalion (if attached) Reconnaissance Platoons.
Specially detailed reconnaissance patrols.
All combat units in contact with the enemy.

9. RECONNAISSANCE INSTRUCTIONS:--Reconnaissance directives are simplified when normal, routine items of information are indicated by pre-arranged code numbers. The following items will normally be designated by numbers only in Reconnaissance Instructions.

(1) First hostile contact; location and time.
(2) Enemy mechanized units; type, location, movements and time observed.
(3) Hostile aviation; type, location, strength, direction of flight and time observed.
(4) Enemy parachute or air-borne troops; location, action, strength, composition and time observed.
(5) Enemy main columns; location, strength, composition, direction of movement and time observed.
(6) Enemy defending forces; location, strength and composition, type of defensive organization, location of flanks, reserves, etc.
(7) Enemy reserve units; location, composition and time observed.
(8) Roads and bridges; type and condition.
(9) Enemy road blocks; location and type.
(10) Air-plane landing fields; location and suitability.
(11) General terrain reconnaissance; condition and type of roads and bridges, fordability of streams, obstacles to cross-country movements, terrain facilities for concealment, cover and observation, and general aspect of towns, villages, etc.
(12) Enemy supplies; location and type.
(13) Gassed or mined areas.

NOTE: Enemy identifications are vitally necessary to completely fulfill the requirements of enemy information.

This procedure will greatly simplify the transmission of reconnaissance instructions by radio; it will be a Standing Operating Procedure within the division. Its use does not preclude calling for additional items of information.

CHAPTER II

THE CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP (MECHANIZED)

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION

Paragraph

Composition 10

10. COMPOSITION:--The reconnaissance troop must have sufficient mobility and fire power to overcome small enemy covering detachments, adequate means of communication and sufficient supply and motor maintenance facilities to be self-sustaining while on mission of long duration. Its exact composition may vary according to special or [illegible] is subject to change. Motorized detachments of engineer, infantry or artillery supporting weapons are attached when necessary.

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The Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop [illegible] a troop headquarters and three Reconnaissance Platoons. (See Chart "A").

The Troop Headquarters includes a command element and a service element. The command element includes a command group, a liaison group, a security squad and a small anti-aircraft group. The service element includes a supply section and a motor maintenance section.

Each Reconnaissance Platoon includes two reconnaissance sections, a mortar squad and a pioneer and demolition squad.

SECTION II

COMMUNICATION

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Special Motor Messengers 16
Air-Ground Communication 17
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11. GENERAL:-Information is relayed to division headquarters through the troop message center. Means of communication available include radio, motorcycle messengers, special motor messengers, visual signals, pyrotechnics, dropped messages and panel messages. All practicable means of communication are used to assure the prompt transmission of important information.

a. Messages must be brief and explicit. FACTS only are reported. Information based on personal observation is preferred. Where other reliable sources are used, the source must be stated. Accompanying sketches or overlays are used to clarify written messages.

12. RADIO:-Radio is the primary means of communication in the reconnaissance troop. When the reconnaissance troop is operating beyond the range of radio communication, the division signal officer should establish a forward radio equipped message center (in a radio equipped car) to relay radio messages between division and troop headquarters.

a. The command group of troop headquarters must maintain continuous radio communication to the front with its reconnaissance platoons and to the rear with division headquarters. It must be able to communicate by radio with the service element of troop headquarters. It must maintain frequent radio communication with division or corps observation aviation and must be able to "listen in" on the reconnaissance net of the Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment.

b. The command group of troop headquarters requires four long range radio sets, to maintain effective radio communication. It operates one radio set in the troop net and one set in the division reconnaissance net. It should have one set to work in the air-ground net and to "listen in" on the corps reconnaissance net. It should also have a reserve set, in case any one set should break down. When all four sets are funqtioning, two sets are used to "listen in" on the corps reconnaissance net and to communicate in the air-ground net.

c. The present Table of Organization provides only two radio equipped cars in the command group of troop headquarters, the troop commander's car (with an SCR 245 set) and the troop executive's car (with an SCR 193 set). Therefore, when available, two radio equipped cars in the reserve reconnaissance platoon (the platoon commander's car and the platoon sergeant's car), are used to assist in radio communication at troop headquarters.

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d. Normally, the reserve reconnaissance platoon is closely available to troop headquarters and can furnish the two additional sets needed for radio communication. In any case, one section of this platoon (with the platoon sergeant's car) is habitually maintained as a last reserve. Thus, the radio set in the platoon sergeant's car (of the reserve reconnaissance platoon) should almost invariable be available for use in the air-ground net and the corps reconnaissance net.

e. The troop commander must use every possible expedient to fulfill the needs of radio communication. In actual campaign, he must not hesitate to "forage" for radio sets, bantam cars, spare parts, etc., necessary to enable him to maintain effective radio communication. Special liaison agents may be needed that are not provided in the Table of Organization.

f. Radio cars at troop headquarters are habitually grouped (with due consideration to the need for dispersion, cover and concealment) during tactical operations, so that information may be quickly distributed.

13. RADIO NETS:-The system of radio communication must be simple and flexible and must assure effective communication between all commanders concerned.

a. Communication with forward reconnaissance platoons is maintained by the command group at troop headquarters, through the radio set in the troop commander's car, which operates in the troop radio net. This net includes all forward reconnaissance platoons.

b. Communication with reconnaissance sections.--Each reconnaissance platoon includes two reconnaissance sections, a mortar squad and a pioneer and demolition squad. The first reconnaissance section includes the platoon commander's group, operating in a scout car or an armored car (with an SCR 193 set and an SCR 511 set), and a reconnaissance squad, operating in bantam cars (one of which is equipped with an SCR 511 set). The second section includes the platoon sergeant's group, operating in a scout car or an armored car (equipped with an SCR 245 set and an SCR 511 set) and another reconnaissance squad, equipped with an SCR 511 set. The mortar squad and the pioneer and demolition squad are each equipped with an SCR 511 set.

The platoon commander normally controls both reconnaissance squads by voice radio (with his SCR 511 set). When either reconnaissance squad is beyond the range of its SCR 511 set, the platoon sergeant operates with this distant squad and keeps the platoon commander informed of their activities, through his own SCR 245 set. The mortar squad and the pioneer and demolition squad are controlled by the platoon commander, by oral messages, by signals or by voice radio.

The service element of troop headquarters maintains one SCR 193 set at the headquarters of the Maintenance Section. This set operates in the troop radio net, in contact with the troop commander and the platoon commanders. The need for this communication is intermittent.

Communication with division headquarters is maintained by the command group at troop headquarters, through the radio set in the troop executive's car, which operates in the division reconnaissance net, in direct communication with division G-2. Messages sent through this net are restricted to tactical information.

The reconnaissance troop liaison officer remains in close proximity to the division command post. His car is equipped with an SCR 193 set. He assists in the reception and transmission of information. He operates in the troop radio net, in contact with troop headquarters. This channel of communication is used to relieve congestion in the division reconnaissance net. It also furnish division headquarters with first hand information regarding the forward reconnaissance elements, since he operates in the troop radio net.

Communication with Division or Corps Artillery is normally maintained by the command group at troop headquarters, through the radio set in the platoon commander's car, which operates in the forward reconnaissance platoon, operating in the air-ground net. If this set is not available, other expedients must be used. (See par. 14).

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Troop headquarters must be kept informed of the radio frequence used in the air-ground net. Information from observation aviation must be promptly transmitted to the reconnaissance troop commander, since it may affect the scheme of reconnaissance.

Communication with the Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment.—Normally it is only possible to "listen in" on the corps reconnaissance net; it is only permissible to enter this net by special authority. The command radio of troop headquarters "listens in" on the corps reconnaissance net, through the SCR 245 set in the platoon sergeant's car, of the reserve reconnaissance platoon. (See Paragraph 12.)

Troop headquarters must be kept informed of the radio frequency used in the corps reconnaissance net. It is necessary for the troop commander to keep himself informed of all information passing through the corps reconnaissance net.

It is desirable to detail a special liaison officer (with a radio equipped car, a bantam car for messenger service and motorcyclist messenger) with the headquarters of the Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment. This liaison officer operates in the reconnaissance troop radio net to interchange important information between the commanders of the two reconnaissance units.

14. RADIO CODES:-Coded messages are used for transmitting information which might be useful to the enemy, particularly vital information concerning friendly troops. Simple, prearranged codes are devised to facilitate radio communication for special operations. Simple, geographical codes are useful for transmitting geographical data. The rapidi of open warfare necessitates sending many messages in the clear, particularly in transmitting enemy information.

a. Communication personnel must be trained and provided with the necessary equipment for encoding and decoding messages.

15. MOTORCYCLE MESSENGERS:-Motorcycle messengers are used for short distances, when the radio is ineffective, or when its use would be slow or impracticable. They are frequently used to supplement radio communication, particularly when the need for secrecy limits the use of radio. They are usually faster than radio messages for short distances. Sketches or overlays may be transmitted by motorcyclists or motor messengers, which could not be transmitted by radio.

16. SPECIAL MOTOR MESSENGERS:-Special messengers are frequently sent by motor vehicles. Officer messengers may be used for important missions.

17. AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION:-Communication is maintained with observation aviation by radio, dropped messages and panels.

a. Successful cooperation between observation aviation and the reconnaissance troop depends largely upon the degree to which the pilot-observer teams are acquainted with the reconnaissance plan. Whenever opportunity exists, attached air units should be completely informed and instructed before leaving the ground.

b. All personnel will be constantly resourceful in maintaining this liaison. If radio fails, planes are signalled to drop messages. Planes are shown exactly where to drop messages by marking the ground with identification panel.

18. VISUAL SIGNALS:-Visual signals are used for short distances, particularly between the cars of each section. Flashlights and other devices are used for night signals. Pyrotechnics may be used to transmit data by prearranged signals between reconnaissance elements. The personnel must be alert to observe, transmit and rely signals.

19. TELEPHONE:-Commercial telephone facilities are used when practicable. The reconnaissance troop should be equipped with telephone wire, test clips, and a telephone set. Communication personnel should be trained in tapping commercial and field wire lines. Signal Corps personnel may be attached when necessary.

NOTE: The following additional personnel and equipment are needed to fulfill communication needs of the troop:

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(3) One additional liaison officer (with radio equipped car and motorcyclist) for duty with the Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment. (See paragraph 13.)

(2) Two additional radio equipped vehicles, each with motorcyclist attached, for use with the command group at troop headquarters. (See Paragraph 12.)

(3) The substitution of SCR 193 sets for the SCR 245 sets, in order to secure the needed additional range.

(4) A limited amount of telephone equipment with each reconnaissance troop headquarters. (See Paragraph 19.)

SECTION III

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP (MECHANIZED)

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Cooperation with the Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment.	23
Reconnaissance Missions	24
Reconnaissance Instructions from Division Headquarters.	25
Security Missions	26
Employment	27
Operating Procedure	28
Procedure in Reconnaissance	29
Combat	30
Night Operations	31

20. GENERAL:-The cavalry reconnaissance troop is employed primarily for reconnaissance. Its secondary missions may include distant security. It should be used on appropriate missions, which are within its capabilities.

The divisional RECONNAISSANCE PLAN prescribes the employment of the reconnaissance troop and all other reconnaissance agencies in the division. This plan must be coordinated to assure the best use of all reconnaissance agencies and to avoid unnecessary duplication of reconnaissance missions. It is based on the Intelligence (G-2) Plan, which indicates Essential Elements of Information, necessary for the division commander to know.

21. LIAISON WITH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS:-Prior to the initiation of tactical operations, the commander of the reconnaissance troop should be in close contact with division headquarters. He must fully understand the requirements of the Intelligence (G-2) Plan. He must know how all reconnaissance agencies of the corps and the division are to be employed. He recommends how the reconnaissance troop should be employed, in cooperation with other reconnaissance agencies. During tactical operations, he maintains a liaison officer at division headquarters, in direct contact with Division G-2. At intervals during tactical operations, it may be advisable for him to send an officer to division headquarters with a detailed summary of information secured.

22. COOPERATION WITH OBSERVATION AVIATION:-Observation aviation should provide early information of the enemy's general dispositions and movements. This information is used as a basis for directing motorized reconnaissance.

Observation aviation has greater range than motorized reconnaissance. It is excellent for locating large enemy troop concentrations, but not for obtaining accurate information or detailed information of small units. It can keep division headquarters informed of the progress of motorized reconnaissance. Since the capacity of air reconnaissance is limited, motorized reconnaissance must be used to greatest advantage.

23. COOPERATION WITH THE CORPS CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT:-The reconnaissance troop commander may make [illegible] what is to be reconnoitered.

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33. COOPERATION WITH THE CORPS CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE (MECHANIZED):—The Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment normally operates beyond the limits of divisional reconnaissance units. When the opposing main bodies are considerably separated, it initially operates up to about 125 miles in advance of the leading infantry elements. Its normal zone of reconnaissance is about 50 miles in width and about 30 miles in depth. The divisional reconnaissance troop initially operates up to about 50 to 75 miles in advance of the leading infantry elements, between the infantry and the corps cavalry regiment. Its normal zone of reconnaissance is about 12-15 miles in width. As contact approaches, care must be taken to prevent confusion caused by the merging of the two reconnaissance units.

The reconnaissance troop supplements the reconnaissance of the corps cavalry regiment. Its reconnaissance missions are based largely on information received from corps aviation and the corps cavalry regiment. In a flank division, the reconnaissance troop frequently extends the corps zone of reconnaissance, in order to protect the flank of the division. When the cavalry regiment has been held up, the reconnaissance troop contacts the corps cavalry units in its zone of reconnaissance and works in conjunction with them.

There must be close coordination between the Corps and Division Staffs and a working agreement between the two reconnaissance units. The reconnaissance troop may reinforce or relieve elements of the corps cavalry regiment engaged in holding bridges, defiles or other vital terrain features, essential to our forces. It may be required to reconnoiter specific areas, not included in the areas of reconnaissance of the cavalry regiment. Team work is necessary to avoid duplication of reconnaissance missions.

A special liaison officer from the divisional reconnaissance troop (with a radio equipped car, an additional bantam car and a motorcyclist) should be attached to the corps cavalry regiment. He maintains personal contact with the S-2 and S-3 of that regiment. He operates in the reconnaissance troop radio net and interchanges information of vital interest to both reconnaissance units. He particularly reports information secured regarding mine fields, demolitions or other barriers to retrograde movements of forward reconnaissance elements.

NOTE: Tables of Organization do not provide this special liaison group. Special provisions will be required to secure the necessary personnel and equipment. (See paragraph 13.)

34. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS:—The division commander may assign a zone of reconnaissance, an area to be reconnoitered, or assign routes of reconnaissance.

A zone of reconnaissance is assigned when the enemy is operating on a broad front or when his location is doubtful. Boundaries are prescribed as guiding lines rather than as rigid limits. The terrain, the road net, the strength of the reconnaissance unit, the enemy situation and the mission of the main forces regulate the width of the zone. (The reconnaissance troop can normally reconnoiter a zone of about 12-15 miles in width at a variable rate, which decreases as contact approaches; the rate may vary from 5 to 20 miles per hour, depending on the terrain and the activity of the enemy.)

Areas are assigned for detailed reconnaissance, when the enemy is known to be within a certain area.

Routes are assigned for reconnaissance when the enemy is known to be operating on indicated routes or when the terrain necessitates this type of reconnaissance.

35. RECONNAISSANCE INSTRUCTIONS FROM DIVISION HEADQUARTERS:—Instructions to the reconnaissance troop include:

Warning orders (Issued orally, in time for adequate preparations):

Extent, duration, and type of reconnaissance.
Special supplies and maps needed.
Time and place of starting (Must permit a reasonable time for executing the reconnaissance).

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General instructions (Usually oral):

Such available information of the enemy, of our own troops, of the contemplated general plan and of friendly reconnaissance detachments, as the reconnaissance troop commander should know.

Special instructions (Oral or written, depending on the amount of detail necessary. Written data must not include information of value to the enemy. Map overlays are used to supplement these instructions):

WHAT information is required? (Stated as specific questions concerning Essential Elements of Information, in the desired order of priority.) WHAT enemy identifications are desired?

WHEN is the information required? (Information must be received in time to be acted upon. Positive or negative reports are habitually required by specified times.)

WHERE is the reconnaissance to be conducted? (Definite objectives, limits of reconnaissance and routes or zones are assigned. Phase lines may be assigned, to be reached at specified times.)

WHERE must messages be sent?

26. SECURITY MISSIONS:-The reconnaissance troop provides certain security in executing normal reconnaissance missions, since early information of the enemy is initself a form of security. In exceptional cases, special distant security missions may be assigned (such as distant flank security, temporarily holding bridges, defiles, or other critical terrain features, etc) in conjunction with normal reconnaissance missions. But when dual missions are assigned, definite priorities must be specified.

When so used, the reconnaissance troop may be reinforced by detachments of engineers, motorized infantry, and sometimes by additional supporting weapons. Enemy routes are denied by road blocks and demolitions. Forward reconnaissance elements (particularly corps reconnaissance units) must be notified where and when such demolitions are used. Care must be taken to avoid being committed to a close defense.

27. EMPLOYMENT:-Methods of employment vary with the situation.

When the division is making an extended motor movement, the reconnaissance troop reconnoiters prescribed routes of advance and alternate routes, checks on probable routes of enemy approach and protects the designated detrucking area.

When a flank division or an independent division attacks, its reconnaissance troop operates to the front and on the flanks, to locate enemy reserves and weak points.

In defensive action, the reconnaissance troop operates on the front and flanks, to determine the direction of the enemy main attack.

During withdrawals or delaying actions, the reconnaissance troop is employed to ascertain the direction of advance of enemy pursuing forces, and frequently to execute harassing actions by fire against the flanks of enemy pursuing columns.

28. OPERATING PROCEDURE:-The command group of Troop Headquarters directs the operations of all elements of the troop.

The service element of Troop Headquarters (Supply Section and Motor Maintenance Section) functions as directed. At times it may accompany the infantry trains; at other times it may follow the troop by bounds, on routes affording the best available cover and concealment. Its disposition depends on the situation and the mission and upon the security of the supplies. The Supply Section and the Motor Maintenance Section operate together, except [illegible] from their operation. Communication is maintained [illegible] group.

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The platoons are controlled by assigning definite missions to them, by prescribing routes or zones of advance, by requiring them to check in by radio at stated hours or at prescribed localities, and by prescribing their general limits of reconnaissance.

The troop command post moves by bounds along the axis of movement. Its location should permit satisfactory radio communication and rapid motor liaison to all elements concerned and must afford the best available cover and concealment. All elements are kept informed of its location and route.

Each reconnaissance platoon operates as directed by the troop commander. Circumstances may necessitate the temporary attachment of an additional mortar squad or a pioneer and demolition squad from one platoon to another, depending on the type of platoon missions. It may be desirable to operate all mortar squads temporarily under troop control, when necessary to concentrate all available fire at one point.

Reconnaissance elements must not be prematurely dissipated. It is desirable to initially hold one platoon in reserve. Rotation of the platoons in troop reserve permits an opportunity for maintenance and repairs and for resting the personnel. If the reserve platoon is committed, one of its sections is usually retained as a last reserve. The reserve platoon accompanies the troop command group.

The security squad is employed on normal security missions, such as for protection of the troop command post when halted, for dismounted security patrols, for temporarily holding bridges or other defiles and for similar security missions. The troop and platoon anti-aircraft groups furnish anti-aircraft protection as needed.

29. PROCEDURE IN RECONNAISSANCE:-Emphasis is placed upon initiative and aggressiveness in securing information. The reconnaissance troop operates well in advance of the division, usually at a distance of 15-75 miles, depending on the situation. It is preceded by small mounted patrols, dispatched to the front and flanks from the leading reconnaissance platoons, which are assigned routes or zones of reconnaissance.

The troop (less forward reconnaissance elements) follows on a central axis. It is preceded by an advance guard (usually one reconnaissance squad from the leading section of the reserve reconnaissance platoon); the leading bantam car and a motorcyclist usually constitute a point for the advance guard. The main body of the troop follows by bounds, usually about 5-10 minutes behind the advance guard. This time-distance varies with visibility and the terrain.

Reconnaissance is initiated on a broad front, while still maintaining a strong reserve. This enables the troop commander to reinforce the leading reconnaissance elements or to extend the zone of reconnaissance, after contact is gained with the enemy.

Elements of the reconnaissance troop must not hesitate to use the cross-country mobility, afforded by their bantam cars, to operate rapidly across country when necessary to do so.

NOTE: In actual campaign (until mobile, armored cars are available as command cars to replace the present scout cars) it will be necessary to substitute bantam cars (with improvised equipment) for the present scout cars, because of the lack of maneuverability and cross-country mobility in the scout cars.

30. COMBAT:-The reconnaissance troop operates by the combined use of mobility, stealth and combat; aggressive tactics are used when necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Aggressive tactics are used against enemy covering detachments, while seeking to gain contact with the enemy main force. Where their need can be foreseen, motorized infantry detachments and additional supporting weapons may be attached to the reconnaissance troop.

The general rule in meeting resistance is to TAKE COVER, RECONNOITER and then ACT. Supporting fires are promptly brought to bear by leading elements. Your units maneuver to place flanking fires against the enemy encountered, from direction(s) least favorable to the enemy. Dismounted action [illegible]

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Where a strong enemy covering detachment is encountered, it is frequently possible to contain this enemy force with a portion of the troop, while the remainder works around the flank to continue its reconnaissance mission.

31. NIGHT OPERATIONS:-Night movements are frequently conducted by reconnaissance units to distant localities, from where active reconnaissance is started at daybreak. Actual night reconnaissance is usually restricted to limited observation of highways. Extensive night reconnaissance is not generally practiced, because of the danger of ambush at night. However, during the night, small motorized patrols may move to certain localities, from which to conduct dismounted reconnaissance.

SECTION IV

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

OF THE

CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON (MECHANIZED)

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Reconnaissance Missions	33
Reconnaissance Instructions	34
Security Missions	35
Operating Procedure	36
Movement	37
Conduct of Reconnaissance	38
Combat	39

32. GENERAL:-The Reconnaissance Platoon includes two reconnaissance sections, a pioneer and demolition squad and a mortar squad. Each section includes one reconnaissance squad and an anti-aircraft group (one bantam car). (See Chart "A") The platoon commander directs the operations of all elements in the platoon. The platoon sergeant assists him and supervises both reconnaissance sections.

33. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS:-The zone, routes or areas of reconnaissance, assigned to the reconnaissance troop, are subdivided among its reconnaissance platoons. The width of the platoon zones of reconnaissance will depend on the road net, the terrain, and on enemy resistance. Greater strength is assigned to units operating in critical zones where important information is expected to be found. One platoon can normally reconnoiter a zone of about 5 miles in width (on terrain with a normal road net of several axial roads and frequent lateral roads) at the rate of 5 to 15 miles per hour, the rate decreasing as contact approaches.

34. RECONNAISSANCE INSTRUCTIONS:-On receipt of orders, the troop commander issues a warning order, to start preparations for the reconnaissance. He then plans his reconnaissance and issues oral instructions (supplemented by map overlays) to his assembled officers. Provisions for mutual support and cooperation must be thoroughly understood.

General instructions include:

Such available information of the enemy, of our own troops, of the reconnaissance plan and of friendly reconnaissance detachments, as the platoon leaders should know. Information regarding the probable location of first contact with the enemy and the type of resistance expected is emphasized.

Special instructions include:

What information is required? (Stated as specific questions [illegible] Answers are desired in the order of priority.) WHAT [illegible] the enemy identifications are [illegible]

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WHEN is the intersection reached? (It must be reached in time to be acted upon.)

WHERE is the reconnaissance to be conducted? (Objectives, limits, and routes or zones are assigned to each platoon. Phase lines are sometimes assigned, to be reached by certain hours.)

WHERE will the platoons reassemble?

WHERE will the troop command post be located and what route will it follow?

35. SECURITY MISSIONS:-Platoons are assigned sectors of responsibility, when the reconnaissance troop operates on a security mission. Such missions are executed by establishing road blocks at critical points and by denying enemy approaches with long range fires. Ambushes are used against enemy reconnaissance detachments.

36. OPERATING PROCEDURE:-The platoon commander directs the operations of both reconnaissance squads (one in each section). He controls them by voice, radio and by motorcycle messengers. These squads may be widely separated, but should remain within supporting distance. The platoon sergeant supervises their functioning and maintains contact with the platoon commander.

The platoon commander directs the employment of the pioneer and demolition squad. It may be used for laying anti-tank mines, for demolitions, for road or bridge repair tasks, etc. The mortar squad is used as directed by the platoon commander, wherever its fire power may be used to best advantage. Anti-aircraft groups in each section are used as directed.

37. MOVEMENT:-Principles noted herein apply for the platoon acting alone on reconnaissance and for the platoon acting as an advance guard for the troop.

Elements of the reconnaissance troop must not be "road-bound." Platoons and separate squads must operate rapidly across country in open, echeloned formations, whenever conditions favor their doing so.

The reconnaissance squad of the leading section is used as a forward security patrol for the platoon. It employs a "point" on the axis of advance.

The main body of the platoon follows the forward patrol by bounds. It usually marches in the order: Platoon Commander's car with motorcyclist, anti-aircraft group of 1st Section (Section Sergeant's car), 2nd Section (led by Platoon Sergeant), Mortar Squad, Pioneer and Demolition Squad. Distance between cars and sections must be sufficient to avoid ambush and close enough to maintain contact and to cover the movement of those in front.

The rear section must be prepared to side-slip and maneuver to either flank. At a halt, it provides security to the flanks and rear.

Where contact is imminent, the "point" of the forward patrol approaches curves and crests of hills cautiously. If resistance is suspected, the "point" commander conceals his car and the forward patrol conducts a dismounted reconnaissance, covered by vehicular weapons of the leading cars. (This particularly applies when approaching cross-roads, bridges, or other localities believed to be occupied by the enemy.)

In passing over a bridge or through a defile, leading cars are covered by the rear cars. The rear section should wait until the forward elements have cleared the far end. Where an ambush is suspected, dismounted patrols precede and cover the passage of the leading cars.

38. CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE:-Reconnaissance is largely conducted by the reconnaissance squads, to obtain the desired information. Actual methods of reconnaissance will depend on the initiative of subordinate leaders.

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specific [illegible] of reconnaissance are listed below:

Road reconnaissance.—In approaching a suspected road block, the forward patrol proceeds cautiously. It uses a combination of mounted maneuver and dismounted patrolling. It is better to take time for dismounted scouting than to rush blindly into the enemy's trap. When information on road blocks has been specifically called for, it is necessary to report the nature of each obstacle, whether it is isolated or one of a series, and how it is defended.

The reconnaissance of a village is preceded by a distant visual reconnaissance. Exposed roads and approaches are avoided. The crew of one car observes from cover and concealment, while the remainder advance by the best available covered routes. If covered routes are not available, the position is approached cautiously from different directions. In passing through a village, rear cars cover the advance of leading cars. For a detailed reconnaissance of buildings in the village (post office, telephone station, railroad station, etc.) one squad operates dismounted, while the remainder of the platoon maintains a mounted patrol of the principal streets. Care must be taken to avoid ambush.

Reconnaissance of a hostile column is conducted from successive flank positions. Dismounted reconnaissance is usually necessary. The platoon leader conceals his cars and sends the information obtained to his command car by runner, for transmission by radio.

Reconnaissance of a hostile bivouac is conducted from the flanks and rear, by dismounted patrols. All cars are concealed and placed for rapid withdrawal. Radio messages should be transmitted cautiously.

39. COMBAT:-The reconnaissance platoon operates by the combined use of mobility, stealth and combat. It avoids combat where possible to do so, but acts aggressively when necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Dismounted combat is used whenever necessary.

Prompt use is made of the mortar squad, when fire support is needed, particularly to reduce road blocks or to overcome dismounted enemy security detachments. It is employed from the best available defiladed position.

Should the enemy be sighted before the platoon is seen, care is taken to prevent disclosing the platoon's presence. The forward patrol halts under cover and informs the platoon leader. He signals other elements of the platoon and makes a personal reconnaissance. The rear section is prepared for quick maneuvering. The mission, the enemy's apparent strength, the terrain, and the road net determine the plan of action. Offensive action is executed by fire and maneuver, against the hostile flank or rear. Defensive action is executed by occupying a firing position.

If a strong enemy detachment is unexpectedly encountered, the forward patrol uses its automatic weapons and seeks cover from which to continue its fire fight. The platoon leader arranges for additional fire support, provides for flank and rear protection, and decides whether to attack, defend or retire. If ambushed by a stronger force, he should break off the action and retire. The sections may become separated, but should combine to render mutual support, wherever possible to do so.

Road blocks are detoured if possible to do so, otherwise they must be reduced by attack. The "point," if unexpectedly blocked, should open fire with its machine guns on the suspected location of the defenders, and seek the best available cover. The forward patrol protects the deployment or the maneuvering of the platoon. The platoon commander reconnoiters and decides whether to attack or change his route of advance. The mortar squad is employed promptly if the road block is to be reduced.

In [illegible] actions, reconnaissance platoons occupy successive [illegible] against the hostile force and its objective, this forcing the hostile [illegible] early opportunity for attack. Sections mutually support each other [illegible] successive [illegible]. The mortar squad is used from successive [illegible] (dismounted). This procedure may be combined with [illegible] from favorable [illegible] on the hostile flanks. Close [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] are available.

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In harassing fire [illegible] flanks and rear. Positions are dispersed in width and depth and remain close supporting distance. Special attention is given to [illegible] The mortar squad is used against enemy personnel.

Pioneer and demolition missions include the [illegible] of bridges or other enemy installations, the laying of mines, the [illegible] and bridge repair tools. The pioneer and demolition squad operates under protection of the platoon. Where extensive tasks are required, an engineer detachment may be attached.

General principles of combat.--

In enemy territory, platoons maintain sufficient depth to minimize the effect of hostile fire and to permit maneuver.

In hostile territory, halt periods are made as brief as possible. Cars must not be halted in exposed positions or in areas where their movement is restricted; they must be disposed under cover and must be prepared to move quickly in any direction. Dismounted patrols and mortar patrols are immediately disposed as a march outpost at every halt.

Continuous alertness is necessary to avoid ambush. Guns are kept trained on likely positions for enemy targets.

It is better to maneuver around a hostile group or road block or to attack from the flank or rear, than to engage in a frontal fire fight.

Observe every precaution for security.

SECTION V

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUAD

	Paragraph
General	40
Instructions	41
Operating Procedure	42

40. GENERAL:-Reconnaissance squads (one in each section) are employed primarily as reconnaissance patrols, to secure information. Each squad operates as directed by the platoon commander. Control is maintained by voice radio, by motorcycle messengers and by supervision of the platoon sergeant. The reconnaissance squads may be separated, but normally operate within supporting distance of each other.

41. INSTRUCTIONS:-On receipt of orders, the platoon commander checks his cars and equipment, plans his reconnaissance and issues oral instructions to his assembled non-commissioned officers. He explains his instructions in detail, to insure teamwork and cooperation. His orders include:

New information of the enemy, of friendly troops and of other reconnaissance detachments.

WHAT information is required of each reconnaissance squad and WHEN is it required?

WHERE must each reconnaissance squad reconnoiter?

WHEN are designated phase lines to be reached?

WHEN and WHERE must each squad rejoin?

HOW must the mortar squad and the pioneer and demolition squad and the anti-aircraft groups operate?

WHERE must messages be sent?

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42. OPERATING PROCEDURE.- Reconnaissance squads preferably operate by stealth but should act aggressively when necessary to accomplish the mission. Principles regarding Movement, Operation and Combat, explained for the Reconnaissance Platoon, also apply to the Reconnaissance Squad. (See Paragraph 37, 38, and 39.)

The following principles have special application:

The platoon commander must be kept informed of the enemy situation and the terrain.

The squad leader avoids any unnecessary action that interferes with his mission.

In conducting a patrol, the route of return should vary from the route of departure, in order to avoid ambush.

Use all available cover and concealment.

Avoid hostile detachments if possible, but when contact is unavoidable, act boldly in engaging such units.

Patrol members must be constantly alert, with all weapons ready for action.

Before emerging from a woods, the squad leader should visually reconnoiter the terrain ahead, from a concealed position just inside the woods.

Hostile motorcyclists encountered should be captured or destroyed by fire.

A destroyed bridge should be immediately reported and a prompt search made for detours or fords.

CHAPTER III

DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

	Paragraph
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Use of Cover	45
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Patrol Messengers	48

43. GENERAL.- A dismounted reconnaissance patrol is a dismounted detachment of two or more riflemen (rarely exceeding a squad), sent to secure detailed information of the enemy and the terrain. Patrols are reliable agencies for securing detailed information in any weather, during daylight or darkness and on any terrain; they are the best means of securing negative information (assurance that a certain locality is not occupied by the enemy). Active patrolling must be continuous, when contact with the enemy is imminent. Vigilance must never be relaxed.

Patrols are more efficient than individual scouts, since they operate under responsible leaders; are capable of combat; offer mutual protection; cover, by both observation and movement, a greater area and can return information secured while continuing the assigned mission.

The completion of its mission by a motorized reconnaissance unit frequently depends upon the use of dismounted patrols, operating from their vehicles. Motorized units, in close contact with the enemy, depend largely on dismounted reconnaissance patrols for detailed information.

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44. TRAINING.-Efficient patrol leading must be stressed in the training of all company officers, non-commissioned officers and selected privates. Officers frequently lead patrols on important missions. Patrol leaders must be active, intelligent, and well-trained. They must be qualified:

In the use of the compass, map reading, ground orientation and simple sketching.
In the use of cover and concealment, patrol methods of advance and in patrol leading.
In observation.
In writing field messages.

The patrol leader's individual equipment should include wire cutters, watch, compass, message blanks, pencil, flashlight, field glasses, and, if available, a map or sketch of the area to be reconnoitered. A second-in-command assists the patrol leader. He must know the task at hand and should be equipped the same as the patrol leader.

Patrol members must be qualified:

In patrol formations and combat signals.
In the individual use of cover.
In observation.
As patrol messengers.

45. USE OF COVER.-The cover afforded by woods, hills, heavy underbrush and buildings is easily recognized. But to use the cover and concealment afforded by slight folds in the ground and by short vegetation and shadows requires careful training. The patrol leader must conduct his patrol with the least possible exposure to enemy observation. Patrol members must be skilled in the individual use of cover.

46. OBSERVATION.-Information must be based on positive facts; this necessitates skillful observation. Patrol leaders and patrol members must see without being seen, and must note all details of the terrain and moving objects. Enemy movements should be quickly noted and investigated sufficiently to insure an accurate report on the approximate strength, composition, dispositions and movements of the hostile force under observation. Patrol leaders must be able to estimate the strength and composition of hostile units on the march, in combat, or in bivouac.

Observation in daytime should be conducted from the prone position, preferably from the right side of any available concealment (for right-handed men). The observer only looks over the top of the concealment if its outline is broken. He avoids abrupt movements. In making a detailed reconnaissance of an area, he looks first at the ground to his immediate front. He first searches a narrow strip, from right to left, close in and parrallel to his front. He then searches a second strip, from left to right, farther away but overlapping the first. He continues in this manner until his field of view is covered.

At night information is secured by very close observation and by listening. Observation is conducted from the prone position, so that the field of view is against the skyline. Observers must properly interpret sounds of enemy truck movements, mechanized movements, mounted and dismounted movements, and other activities.

47. PATROL MESSAGES.-Information must be returned in time to be acted upon. The patrol leader is primarily interested in answering the questions contained in his patrol order. He adds any other definite information secured, applicable to his reconnaissance missions. FACTS only are reported.

Written messages are preferably used. They must be legible, concise and clear, and should conform to the requirements of the Field Message Book. An accompanying sketch or overlay will frequently clarify the messages. A written message should be read and explained to the messenger, in case he must destroy it to prevent its capture. Written messages normally include:

WHAT the patrol has SEEN. For example, an enemy of what strength and composition was seen, when and where it was seen, and what it was doing.

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WHAT the patrol has HEARD. Transmit only accurate information from a reliable source and state the source.

WHAT the patrol will DO. For example: The patrol will remain in observation, move to a certain locality, or continue on its mission, etc.

Oral messages may be used for simple messages, when time is vital. Preferably, they should contain but one thought. They must be transmitted by intelligent individuals, competent to explain the message. The messenger repeats the oral message to the sender before departing.

LR. PATROL MESSENGERS:-Patrol members must be kept oriented to insure their being able to return with messages. Single messengers are used for short distances, if no enemy is likely to be encountered; otherwise two messengers should be sent, if sufficient are available. The two messengers may be sent by different routes or at different times, to insure one of them getting through. Messengers are told:

Who is sending the message.
Where and to whom to deliver it. Route and rate of travel.
If in danger of capture, the messenger carrying a written message is directed to destroy it. If he gets through, he repeats it from memory to the officer to whom it is sent.

SECTION II

GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE

TO

DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

	Paragraph
General	49
Orders to Patrol Leaders.	50
Patrol Leader's Order	51
Passage of the Outpost Line	52

49. GENERAL:-The function of reconnaissance patrols is to FURNISH INFORMATION. They operate by stealth, avoiding combat unless it is necessary to accomplish the mission.

Reconnaissance patrols must be limited in number and strength to the minimum required by the situation. Their number depends on the number of localities to be reconnoitered. Their strength depends on the resistance expected, on the expected number of messages required and on the strength of the unit which sends them out. Small patrols are frequently more effective than large patrols.

In detailing patrols, the integrity of units should be preserved. Patrols of two men, half squads or squads (with their regularly assigned personnel) should normally be used.

Individuals from the intelligence sections of higher units may accompany reconnaissance patrols to get first hand information and to advise the patrol leader as to the information desired.

50. ORDERS TO PATROL LEADERS:-Reconnaissance patrols may be detailed by orders from higher authority or by their unit commander. Orders to patrol leaders include a warning order, general instructions and special instructions. Such orders are usually oral.

Warning orders include:

Strength and composition of the patrol.
Designation of the leader. (In some cases.)
Time and place of assembly.
Equipment.
Time of departure (When necessary).

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General instructions include:

Such available information of the enemy, of friendly troops and of friendly patrols as the patrol leader should have.
Particular purpose of the reconnaissance mission.

Special instructions include:

WHAT information is required? (Stated as specific questions, in the desired order of priority.)
WHEN is the information desired?
WHERE must the patrol reconnoiter? (Definite, limited objectives are assigned.) WHERE must the patrol rejoin?
HOW must the patrol operate? (Under what conditions must it engage in combat? Are identifications required?)
WHERE must messages be sent?

51. PATROL LEADER'S ORDER:-On receipt of orders, the patrol leader plans his reconnaissance, designates a second-in-command, inspects the patrol and issues the necessary orders. His initial order (issued orally to the assembled patrol) includes:

Such available information of the enemy and friendly troops as the patrol should know.
Mission and general plan of the patrol leader.
Initial formation -- Security measures -- Conduct in ambush of attack -- First assembly point -- Provides one man to escape in case of capture.
Equipment.
Control signals -- Where the patrol leader will march.

52. PASSAGE OF THE OUTPOST LINE:-On leaving the bivouac area, the patrol leader informs the nearest out-guard commander of his departure, asks for new information of the enemy and of friendly patrols and informs him when and where he expects to return.

SECTION III

CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS IN DAYLIGHT

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Patrol formations in Daylight	53
Security in Daylight	54
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Methods of Operations in Daytime	57
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53. PATROL FORMATIONS IN DAYLIGHT:-Daylight patrol formations must be irregular and inconspicuous, must conform to the terrain, provide security and assure control. In open terrain, extended diamond-shaped formations are normally used. In wooded or broken terrain, flexible, elongated, arrow-shaped formations are used, with the main body of the patrol in single file or in column of twos and spaced in depth. Distances and intervals depend on visibility and the terrain.

54. SECURITY IN DAYLIGHT:-"All-around" protection is provided. The leading man, or the leading two men, constitute a "point" for forward security. Flank protection is provided by having individuals watch to the flanks (by detailing flankers); the method used depends on the terrain facilities for observation. The rear man watches to the rear and constitutes a rear guard. When halted, precautions are taken to insure all-around protection.

55. MOVEMENT IN DAYLIGHT:-The patrol advances by bounds to selected observation points. In approaching dangerous areas, the patrol advances by bounds from one covered position or point of observation to another. The bounds are longer on open terrain than on wooded or broken terrain and decrease in length as contact with the enemy becomes imminent. After each halt, the patrol leader sends one or two men forward to the next position while the

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cover his advance; the leading man then cover the advance of the remainder. The return route should vary from the route of departure.

56. CONCEALMENT AND COVER IN DAYLIGHT.--The need for caution increases as contact with the enemy becomes imminent. But there must not be any unnecessary delay in gaining contact with the enemy to be reported.

The patrol leader observes the following precautions:

Use formations suitable to the terrain.

Avoid the skyline. Use the best available covered routes. Use detours to avoid exposed areas or hostile detachments.

When forced to halt in the open, individuals seek such cover as the ground affords and then remain motionless.

Avoid unnecessary exposure to aerial observation.

Patrol members observe the following precautions:

Rattling or cumbersome articles are removed. Clothing should blend with the landscape as far as possible. The headdress may be camouflaged with grass or leaves.

Avoid the skyline.

When using standing cover, such as hedges or bushes, keep in the shadow where possible.

When halted, seek the best available cover, assume the prone position, avoid unnecessary movement and exposure to aerial observation.

57. METHODS OF OPERATION IN DAYTIME.--The following methods apply:

Cross roads.--The patrol halts while flankers reconnoiter the sideroads. It then continues on its route.

Streams.--To cross a stream, the patrol leader looks for a bridge or ford and watches for signs of the enemy on the other side. One or two men cross to reconnoiter the far side, swimming if necessary, while the others remain concealed, ready to protect them by fire. The others then cross individually and the advance is resumed.

Defiles.--In the passage of ravines or narrow defiles, flankers are sent to observe from the high grounds on either side while the patrol passes through, usually in single file at increased distances and close to either side.

Houses or enclosures are avoided unless the mission requires their investigation. Before approaching a house or enclosure, the patrol watches for signs of the enemy from concealed positions. One or two men then reconnoiter while the others cover their advance.

Villages and towns.--When passing through a village, patrols are deployed in squad column (at extended distances) on each side of the same street. Each man watches the opposite side of the street and along cross streets. It may be necessary to advance one man at a time, with the rest of the patrol covering his advance.

Woods.--In approaching a woods, the patrol waits under cover until a covering detachment (deployed at wide intervals) enters the woods. The patrol follows in a formation suitable to the terrain.

Reconnaissance by fire may be used when other means are impracticable. It may be necessary to reconnoiter a wood, village, or other covered area, the approaches to which are so exposed that reconnaissance by stealth is not possible. If the patrol leader believes that the particular area may be occupied by the enemy and information to that effect is required, reconnaissance by fire may then be used to advantage. The "point," or any other individual, fires into that area, while the remainder are concealed. This may draw the enemy's fire sufficiently to indicate to what extent the area is occupied.

58. COMBAT IN DAYLIGHT.--Combat is avoided unless necessary to accomplish the reconnaissance mission. In case of attack, when returning with information, the men is detailed to return with the information secured. Successive assembly points are designated. In case the patrol becomes scattered during combat, fighters and their scouts when identifications are required; they are preferably [illegible] by [illegible] individuals or groups.

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SECTION IV

CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE PATROL AT NIGHT

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59. GENERAL:--Night reconnaissance is important, because of the frequent use of hostile night movements. Dismounted patrols are frequently used at night to maintain contact with the enemy.

60. PATROL FORMATIONS AT NIGHT:--Night formations are definitely prescribed; they must be compact and flexible and assure control by voice or sound signals. Arrow-shaped formations are normally used, with the main body of the patrol in single-file, or in column of twos. Distances and intervals vary from a few feet to a few yards, depending on visibility and the terrain.

61. SECURITY AT NIGHT:--"All-around" security is provided, closer than in daytime. A "point" of one or two men is used for forward security. Flank protection is closer than in the daytime. The last man or the last two men to the rear constitute the rear guard.

62. METHODS OF OPERATION AT NIGHT:--Definite, limited objectives are assigned for night reconnaissance. Close contact must be gained with the enemy to be reported.

Orientation.--Before starting, the patrol leader determines the location of his objectives and the route thereto, the compass directions of his course and the location of intermediate landmarks. He depends on his compass, his knowledge of the stars, and on predetermined landmarks for guiding his movements. Patrol members are instructed regarding the route.

Route.--Circuitous or difficult routes are avoided. Rough terrain makes it difficult to move silently and to maintain direction and control. The skyline is avoided. Enemy outposts are avoided. The return route should vary from the route of departure.

Movement.--SILENCE, CONTROL and maintenance of DIRECTION are vitally necessary. Night patrols move on a predetermined route instead of moving by bounds, because of limited visibility. The patrol leader closely follows and directs the "point." The second-in-command leads the main body of the patrol, following closely behind the patrol leader. Communication is maintained by voice, by sound signals and by physical contact. Halts are made frequently to check the patrol and the route.

Identifications.--Special insignia, such as white arm bands or white patches on the back, may be used for identification at night. Pass words may be used to distinguish friends from enemies.

63. CONCEALMENT AT NIGHT:--The patrol leader must maintain control without noise or confusion. The patrol depends on darkness for concealment. The direction of the wind affects the disclosure of night movements. The following precautions are observed:

Rattling, cumbersome or luminous articles of equipment are removed. Faces and hands may be blackened to assist concealment.

Lights, loud talking, smoking and unnecessary noise are prohibited.

Individuals must move lightly and with the least disturbance of underbrush. They must crouch low when silhouetted against the sky. If exposed to enemy flares, individuals remain motionless until the flare has burned out.

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close to the enemy, it may be necessary to crawl or crawl.

d. COMBAT AT NIGHT.-Combat is avoided unless it is necessary to accomplish the reconnaissance mission. However, night patrols should have a pre-arranged plan to use in case of sudden contact with the enemy. In case of combat when returning with information, one man is detailed to return with the information. If surprised by an equal force, the leading individuals promptly close in and engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. The remainder engage the enemy group from the flanks. Rifle fire at night is dangerous. The bayonet is the primary weapon for night combat.

By command of BRIG. GENERAL ALLEN:

HAROLD C. MANDELL,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

NORMAN COTA,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
A. C. of S, G-3.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, CASE A.C. of S. G-2
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
A.P.O. 464
U.S.ARMY

Aug. 19
1943

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan, Director,
From: D.C.Downes

SUBJECT: GENERAL REPORT

1. As decided in our converstaion at Hdqts. FIFTH Army on July 24th, I am sending you directly and personally a report on a number of matters upon which you requested that you be kept informed by me.

2. SECURITY IN THE TERRITORY QUITTED BY FIFTH ARMY. This has not been adequately provided for in my opinion. When we withdrew from the Oujda, Taza, Guercif, etc frontier zone the C.I.C. also withdrew and without adequate provision for the taking over of their posts and agents. We left behind Lieut. Callanan, a small office force, and two extremely capable French officers, Capts. Bourgoin and Bachelot, who have been detached to O.S.S. for the duration.

We initiated a conference between the French S.M., B.S.T., Bureau des Affaires Indigenes, OSSORAN(Rounds and Leger), a representative of the departing C.I.C., and the local French Military. Arrangements were made to turn over all OSS local agents and courrier service into the Spanish Zone to the appropriate French authority. In many cases because of scarcity of French funds we made arrangements to continue our funds for some time. This amounted to some sixty agents including border Cheiks and Caids in both zones.

Vis-avis the French political and Military set-up the situation was much improved with the removal of General Salbert and his clique, the disappearance of Gen. Beuchler from the scene, and the arrival of the new Controlleur Civil at Oujda, changes largely due to suggestions made to the new Resident of Morocco by Fifth Army.

On the bad side of the leger stands the open and impertinently pro-Axis espionage and propaganda done by the Spanish Consulates. In Fez, Oujda, Oran, and Sidi Bel Abbes the Spanish Consulates collect military information, spread Goebbels rumors, run infiltration undergrounds, and deal in Blue Dollars without fear and often with the passive assistance and moral encouragement of the S.O.L., P.P.F., pro-Vichy elements firmly established in office and grown bold with the knowledge that we Americans are impotent to call them to account.

These same French elements form the second serious danger on the bad side of the leger. French North Africa is at best a corrupt society based on the ruthless exploitation of the Native by the European. Add to this that the Vichy regime carefully weeded out the uncorrupt and pro-democratic functionaires and we have held them in office their pro-Axis successors and you have a field ripe for espionage, plotting, sabotage, and extremely effective F.O. work against us.

The only E-W Railway and road between the Atlantic and the mid-Mediterranean combat zones runs within a few kilometers of the weakly held and poorly controlled Spanish Zone frontier. Given the climate of opinion mentioned above, the handy frontier, and the wholehearted cooperation the Germans are receiving from the Spanish Military, and the result is a potentially dangerous situation at any time that the Germans may become desperate and decide to play their desperate Spanish card. UNTIL WE HAVE AN ATLANTIC PORT IN EUROPE SUCH AS CASABLANCA, THIS FRONTIER ZONE IS A VERY REAL DANGER SPOT WEAKLY DEFENDED AND DOUBLY VULNERABLE BY THE PRESENCE OF A DETERMINED FIFTH COLUMN.

The measures we were able to take seem to me wholly inadequate.

4. [illegible] TO GET THE COOPERATION OF THE BRITISH. You told me at

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Algiers in July that I must continue to attempt to cooperate with the British SIS. I am persuaded that this is impossible because they will not deal with us honestly, will not honor agreements made by their men in the field, and finally want a hopelessly weak and dependent OSS at the time of the cessation of hostilities. I do not make this charge lightly nor without some concrete evidence although there is much more intangible evidence than factual.

The history of our relations with them here since I arrived on January 3rd is a long series of evasions, knifings, broken agreements, and grudging, help often refused when it [illegible] been most vital to our establishing a real and independent intelligence service on a permanent basis. Some of their broken agreements which have personally affected me and my work are

a) Agreement with Maj. Paulson of SOE on recruiting and wages broken in March on SIS(Foreign Office) orders.

b) Agreement not to do SI work in Morocco broken by Col Ellis of Tangier

c) Agreement to transport agents by water made on the theory that all facilities are pooled in the Theatre. Broken on 12 hours notice by orders from the Foreign Office to the R.N. when our resupply expidition was read[illegible] go, the reception committee arranged and out of reach for being called off; this stranded and probably has imperiled if not killed an American chain with [illegible] in Spain. They are now without money, supply, and with a broken receiver so we cannot talk to them. 5th Army valued these Spanish reports highly as flank protection

d)After their agreements with Jimmie Murphy, they are even now sniping to make it impossible for us to Service C.I. of 5th Army in the hopes that their own S.I.(b) groups may have the field to themselves.

e) The Fifth Army much valued the reports from our "Army-group" in the South of France. SIS is strangling this by seeing to it that we have no resupply air-transport.

Worse than this is the atmosphere of hostility. American officers are again and again reporting to me that the "British services are out for the skin of SIS". Our facilities, our recruiting strength, American popularity in Europe are then the SIS gains by allowing us to play along; they are determined, I believe, to have all this and leave us unable to stand alone when the Peace conference comes so that only the British Foreign office will be well informed in [illegible] important days. In short, what I am really charging, is that SIS is putting Empire Building ahead of Cooperation for Victory in their schedule of priorities.

4. COMING OPERATIONS. These you probably know of. We, OSS Fifth Army, are reasonably well prepared in personnel. The Services Branch of Col Mann has done a superb job in our material equipment and the Communications Branch has made a major contribution to 5th Army's forthcoming operations.

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SECRET

2 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

Following is a report of our representative on security in the territory quitted by the Fifth Army:

"Security in the territory [illegible] the Fifth Army has not been [illegible] for [illegible] the [illegible] over the [illegible] for the [illegible] and to [illegible] capable friends, both [illegible] and Arab and Berber, who have been detached to us for the duration.

We initiated a conference between the [illegible] and Legal, a representative of the [illegible] and the local French military. [illegible] over all [illegible] into the Spanish Zone to the extent [illegible] in many cases because [illegible] to continue our [illegible] Cheikh and Caid [illegible] home.

[illegible] the French political and military [illegible] to

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"On the bad side of the ledger stands the open and impertinently pro-Axis espionage and propaganda done by the Spanish Consulates. In Fez, Oujda, Oran, and Sidi Bel Abbes the Spanish Consulates collect military information, spread Goebbels rumours, run infiltration undergrounds, and deal in Bue Dollars without fear and often with the passive assistance and moral encouragement of the S.O.L., P.P.F., pro-Vichy elements firmly established in office and grown bold with the knowledge that we Americans are impotent to call them to account.

"These same French elements form the second serious danger on the bad side of the ledger. French North Africa is at best a corrupt society based on the ruthless exploitation of the Native by the European. Add to this that the Vichy regime carefully weeded out the uncorrupt and pro-democratic functionaires and we have held in office their pro-Axis successors and you have a field ripe for espionage, plotting, sabotage, and extremely effective M.O. work against us.

"The only E-W Railway and road between the Atlantic and the mid-Mediterranean combat zones runs within a few kilometers of the weakly held and poorly controlled Spanish Zone frontier. Given the climate of opinion mentioned above, the handy frontier, and the wholehearted cooperation the Germans are receiving from the Spanish Military, and the result is a potentially dangerous situation at any time that the Germans may become desperate and decide to play their desperate Spanish card. UNTIL WE HAVE AN ATLANTIC PORT IN EUROPE SUCH AS BORDEAUX, THIS FRONTIER ZONE IS A VERY REAL DANGER SPOT WEAKLY DEFENDED AND MADE DOUBLY VULNERABLE BY THE PRESENCE OF A DETERMINED FIFTH COLUMN.

"The measures we were able to take seem to me wholly inadequate."

SECRET

William J. Donovan
Director

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Général W. E. Bedell Smith

Chef de la Mission Militaire Française aux Etats Unis

avec les compliments

Washington D C

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LES EVENEMENTS DU 8 NOVEMBRE AU MAROC

PAR LE GENERAL BETHOUART

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[illegible] Commission allemande, auprès de laquelle j'avais
[illegible]. Les Allemands s'étaient à plusieurs reprises plaint
de moi et je savais que tôt ou tard ils exigeraient mon rappel.
C'est alors que je fus envoyé à Vichy avec une Mission de liai-
son et que j'eus l'occasion de rendre visite à l'Amiral Darlan.

L'Amiral Darlan m'expliqua fort en détail la politique qu'il
suivait à cette époque, mais il ajouta qu'il était prêt à la
modifier et que peu de jours auparavant il avait dit à l'Amiral
Leahy que si les Etats-Unis pouvaient lui garantir des cen-
taines d'avions et de chars à Marseille, il serait prêt à la
changer radicalement.

Au cours de cette visite j'exposai à l'Amiral mes difficul-
tés avec les Allemands et j'ajoutai que si je devais être relevé
de mon poste, je préférerais que ce fut sur l'ordre des Fran-
çais et non à la suite d'une démarche allemande. Il approuva
mon point de vue et ajouta qu'il avait depuis quelque temps déjà
l'intention de me confier un commandement. Plus tard, je vis
son chef d'état-major, qui m'offrit la division de Casablanca.

Ce commandement comportait entre autres attributions la
défense de la majeure partie de la côte atlantique du Maroc.
Je déguisai pas mes sentiments au Chef d'état-major de l'Amiral
et je lui dis qu'au cas où l'on me confierait ce commandement je
ne pouvais qu'entretenir et développer chez les officiers et
les hommes les aspirations vers la reprise de la lutte contre
l'Allemagne sans laquelles, à mon sens, l'armée de l'armistice
ne pouvait même pas justifier son existence.

Il fut entièrement d'accord avec moi, et quelques jours
plus tard je fus nommé à Casablanca. Je conservai mon comman-
dement jusqu'au 8 Novembre.

J'avais exercé ces fonctions depuis quelques mois - on était
alors en Juin - lorsque Monsieur Lemaigre-Dubreuil vint me rend
visite. Je n'avais jamais eu l'occasion de le rencontrer aupa-
ravant. Il m'entretint des établissements industriels qu'il
[illegible] à se transférer en Afrique du Nord, à Dakar et en France.
[illegible] de la conversation il mentionna le Général Giraud et
[illegible] qui pourraient soutenir à
[illegible] en Afrique du Nord.

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[illegible] général [illegible] de cette question en vue, inutile de le dire, d'intéresser personnellement.

Il serait [illegible] de voir de temps à autre, afin de me tenir au courant de certains projets plus ou moins officieux de rassemblement clandestin de l'Afrique du Nord, en vue d'une reprise éventuelle des hostilités.

Dès les premières visites je m'étais adressé à un officier que je savais être en liaison avec le Général Giraud pour lui demander si Monsieur Rigaud était effectivement un homme de confiance du Général et j'avais reçu une réponse affirmative.

Au milieu de Septembre, le Général Juin, commandant en chef des troupes françaises en Afrique du Nord, fit une tournée au Maroc, au cours de laquelle il réunit dans chaque garnison tous les chefs de corps et leur tint à peu près ce langage:

"L'Allemagne actuellement a dépassé son plafond et sa puissance commence à décliner. Il est indispensable que la France rentre dans la guerre un jour ou l'autre et participe aux opérations, mais il faut que le moment soit bien choisi. Préparez vous à cela, mais ne faites rien, ayez confiance et ayez confiance dans vos chefs. Actuellement nous avons encore l'ordre de résister en cas de tentative de débarquement des Alliés. Il est possible que, dans un mois ou deux, nous ayons l'ordre inverse."

Un mois plus tard, l'Amiral Darlan venait à son tour au Maroc sous prétexte d'inspecter la défense des côtes, mais le peu d'intérêt qu'il manifesta pour cette défense me confirma dans l'opinion que nos chefs militaires étaient préparés à un changement de politique radical.

Par ailleurs je croyais savoir que le Général Noguès, encore que vis-à-vis du Gouvernement il parut adopter une politique de conciliation à l'égard des Allemands, était au fond de son coeur anti-allemand et anti-nazi, comme il l'avait montré par ses premières réactions au moment de l'armistice.

[illegible] Général Béthouart, qui commandait la Division au Maroc, [illegible] était [illegible] avec [illegible] de ses [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible] et il avait pleinement en mesure de les juger. Il avait pris comme Chef d'Etat-Major l'Amiral Miroffe dont les deux fils servaient chez le General de Gaulle, qui ne cachait pas ses sentiments anti-allemands et qui affirmait que c'etaient ceux de son chef.

On avait ainsi nettement l'impression que tout le monde nourrissait l'espoir de reprendre la lutte et j'etais dans ces dispositions d'esprit quand je recus, le 2 Novembre, la visite de Monsieur Rigaud, qui me parla d'un projet de debarquement massif des troupes americaines en frique du Nord, au Maroc et en Algerie, projet qui faisait l'objet de discussions avec le General Giraud. Il m'expliqua que, d'apres le General Giraud, l'operation devait se faire au printemps, mais qu'actuellement les Americains declaraient vouloir l'avancer et la faire prochainement.

Les operations devaient etre conduites en accord avec le General Giraud, qui avait conclu avec le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis des conventions politiques, economiques et militaires. Il arriverait en Afrique du Nord au moment meme du debarquement et prendrait a ce moment le commandement de toute l'Afrique du Nord et des troupes alliees. Monsieur Rigaud me demanda de la part du General Giraud si j'accepterais de prendre le commandement des troupes du Maroc pour faciliter le debarquement au moment ou il se produirait. J'acceptais immediatement.

Bien que la reprise de la lutte repondit aux espoirs secrets de tous on ne pouvait prejuger absolument des reactions du Haut Commandement lie peut etre par des engagements a l'egard du gouvernement. Il fallait donc le mettre devant le fait accompli et on pouvait esperer qu'il se laisserait faire une douce violence. Quelqu'un devait en prendre l'initiative et se compromettre.

Bien que n'ayant aucun gout pour le complot et ayant toujours ete parfaitement discipline, je le ferais avec joie considerant que dans des circonstances aussi graves et dont dependait l'avenir de la France, toute autre consideration

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[illegible] de Strasbourg de Maroc et
[illegible] Général Noé, commandant la division d'Alger,
[illegible] qu'il représentait le Général Giraud en Afrique du
[illegible] jusqu'à son arrivée, que le Général Giraud me désignait
effectivement pour prendre le commandement au Maroc et me
remerciait de l'avoir accepté. En me quittant, comme j'essay-
ais d'avoir une précision sur la date, Monsieur Rigaud me
confia que le convoi était déjà parti d'Amérique et que la
traversée demandait trois semaines.

Monsieur Rigaud avait, de son côté, pris au Maroc un cer-
tain nombre de contacts avec les éléments civils, mais il
était obligé de repartir précipitamment à Alger et il ne put
ni me mettre en liaison avec ces éléments civils, ni me four-
nir les renseignements dont j'aurais pu avoir besoin en par-
ticulier les réseaux de transmission. concernant

Il me restait donc très peu de temps pour préparer l'opé-
ration et j'avais extrêmement peu de moyens. J'étais sûr des
troupes de ma division, qui avaient la garde de la plupart des
côtes du Maroc et j'étais sûr des sentiments du Général
Martin, qui commandait la division de Marrakech et qui avait
été contacté par Rigaud. A Meknès le Général Dody semblait
favorable, je n'aurais d[illegible] aucune difficulté du côté de
l'armée de terre, sauf de la part du Général Lascroux, comman-
dant les troupes du Maroc. Le Général Giraud m'avait fait
donner l'ordre de le remplacer et Monsieur Rigaud avait, de son
côté, pris des dispositions pour l'éloigner de Rabat au moment
du débarquement. Je n'avais donc qu'à prendre le commandement
en temps voulu.

Par contre, je n'avais aucun moyen d'action sur la Marine,
ni sur le Résident. En ce qui concerne le Résident, j'avais
été encouragé par Monsieur Rigaud à le remplacer de gré ou de
force, mais croyant connaître les sentiments du Général Noguès,
il me semblait qu'il serait assez facile de le convaincre et
[illegible] exécution serait absolue.(1)

(1) [illegible] du Général Giraud [illegible]
[illegible] sur Alger, mais ne
[illegible] Général

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[illegible] d'Etat-Major et le Commandant [illegible] du Bureau, que j'avais mis dans le secret [illegible] nous commencames a faire un plan d'action.

Le 6 Novembre dans la soiree je recevais la visite du Colonel Dewinck, chef d'Etat-Major de la division de Meknes qui, ayant ete contacte par Rigaud, venait me parler de l'operation et me demander des instructions. Il etait 19 heures environ et le Colonel Dewinck etait dans mon bureau quand mon officier d'ordonnance m'annonca la visite d'un Monsieur Dimari. Monsieur Dimari etait sous le coup d'une demande d'expulsion du Maroc, que j'avais signee quelques jours auparavant, parce qu'il s'etait introduit dans autorisation ni raison valable a la reunion des officiers de la garnison tenue par l'Amiral Darlan lors de son voyage recent au Maroc. Monsieur Dimari entra dans mon bureau et me remit simplement un petit papier, specifiant que l'operation prevue aurait lieu dans la nuit du 7 au 8 Novembre a 1 h. du matin G.M.P., soit 2 h. heure locale.

Je remerciai Monsieur Dimari de sa commission, le rassurai sur son expulsion possible et convoquai immediatement mon chef d'etat-Major et un ou deux officiers. Nous travaillames cette nuit-la jusqu'a 2 heures du matin pendant que le Colonel Dewinck rentrait a Meknes avec la mission de mettre le General Dody au courant du moment du debarquement et de lui transmettre les ordres.

Les instructions que m'avaient transmises Monsieur Rigaud specifiaient que les troupes americaines devaient debarquer dans tous les ports et plages du Maroc et atterrir sur tous les aerodromes.

Je devais en outre arreter dans la nuit du debarquement les commissions d'armistice allemandes et un certain nombre de personnalites francaises suspectes dont la liste m'etait donnee.

Monsieur Rigaud m'avait annonce qu'un officier de liaison americain viendrait me mettre au courant des dispositions de [illegible], cet officier n'etait pas venu.

[illegible] dans Mr. King, vice-consul des Etats-Unis, [illegible] desirais me voir, au Consulat a connaitre

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[redacted] de ports et plages.

[redacted] de l'attitude de Mr. King,

[redacted] qu'il etait preferable que les premiers debarquements aient lieu dans des ports ou plages ou ne se trouvaient que des elements dependant directement de moi. C'etait le cas a Rabat et a Mazagan.

Je demandai donc a Mr. King d'intervenir si possible aupres de l'Amiral ou du General qui commandait les forces americaines pour que, initialement, le debarquement n'ait lieu exclusivement qu'a Rabat et Mazagan et que les debarquements suivants n'aient lieu que quand des ordres auraient pu etre donnes par le Resident a l'Amiral Michelier de n'avoir pas a resister. Le telegramme envoye par Mr. King est malheuresement reste sans effet.

En tout cas, que ce telegramme soit suivi d'effet ou non, le point de debarquement le plus important etait Rabat, puisque c'etait le siege de la Residence et du Sultan.

Je devais d'autre part prendre le commandement des troupes du Maroc dont l'etat-major etait a cote de la Residence. C'est donc a Rabat que je devais me rendre en personne et y attendre le representant des troupes americaines qui ne manquerait pas d'y debarquer avec les premiers elements pour negocier avec le General Nogues.

Je previendrais le General Nogues un peu avant le debarquement et je prendrais avec moi un bataillon pour parer a tout imprevu, empecher toute reaction et faciliter le debarquement. En meme temps, je ferais prevenir l'Amiral Michelier a Casablanca.

Dans la nuit, 2 ou 3 heures avant le debarquement je faisais remettre aux commandants de toutes les garnisons et a tous les aerodromes situes sur le territoire de ma division, par des officiers de mon etat-major, des ordres specifiant que le General Giraud prenait le commandement de l'Afrique du Nord, que les troupes devaient debarquer a l'heure fixee et que les troupes [redacted] ne pas resister, mais les aider par tous [redacted] les moyens [redacted] qui [redacted] Monsieur Rigaud.

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[illegible] leurs [illegible] pour
[illegible] Monsieur de mettre positivement de pouvoir
[illegible] agir contre l'Allemagne et les supplirai de donner
[illegible] pour confirmer ceux que je donnais moi-meme.

J'ajoutai au General Nogues que s'il preferait, en raison de ses engagements vis-a-vis du gouvernement, rester en dehors de l'operation, je lui demandais de me laisser faire et de s'effacer pendant le temps necessaire pour effectuer les debarquements, apres lesquels il pourrait accepter le fait accompli et reprendre sa charge. Je joignais a ces lettres les copies des documents que m'avait remis Monsieur Rigaud, soit le plan general de l'operation d'Afrique du Nord et copie des lettres echangees entre le General Giraud et Mr. Murphy, etc., et je decidai d'envoyer porter les documents a l'Amiral Michelier par mon chef d'etat-major et au General Nogues par ses chefs de cabinets civil et militaire que je me proposais de convoquer en temps voulu. Je decidai en outre de les envoyer 3 heures avant le debarquement de facon a donner a leurs destinataires le temps de donner l'ordre a la Marine, ou de confirmer les miens a l'armee de terre d'accueillir les Americains en allies, les ordres pour la defense des cotes etant en effet permanents et devant declencher automatiquement l'ouverture du feu.

Le 7 dans la journee j'envoyai un officier, le Capitaine de Lardemelle, a Marrakech, dans un avion de la commission francaise d'armistice, pour porter une lettre au General Martin avec toutes les instructions necessaires.

Dans la matinee j'avais fait venir a Casablanca le Colonel Magnan, commandant le regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc, auquel je fis part des projets en cours pour la nuit suivante et je lui demandai si je pouvais compter sur lui et sur son bataillon de Rabat. Le Colonel Magnan accepta immediatement et je lui donnai l'ordre d'[illegible] ce bataillon au cours de la [illegible] et de l'envoyer a l'etat-major des troupes du [illegible], jours a la caserne je d'y [illegible] le commandement [illegible] ordres qu'ils [illegible] etc

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[illegible] l'intervention des troupes du Maroc [illegible] et à la Residence, de façon à s'opposer à toute reaction eventuelle.

2) Envoyer des officiers et des hommes sur le port et la plage de Rabat pour y attendre les Americains, les guider vers le quartier de la Residence et m'amener le commandant des troupes.

3) S'interposer eventuellement entre la Residence et les Americains de façon à servir d'intermediaire et à eviter toute effusion de sang. Je me proposais en effet si le General Noguès ne s'etait pas decide à 5 heures d'aller le trouver à cette heure là avec le General americain qui se presenterait.

Dans l'apres midi du 7 je convoquai le President de la Commission d'Armistice francaise à Casablanca, le Colonel Cailles, et le previns qu'il serait possible que nous recevions l'ordre d'arreter les commissions d'armistice allemandes assez prochainement et j'arretai avec lui les mesures de detail de l'execution.

Un peu plus tard, à la fin de l'apres midi, je convoquai les colonels des troupes chargees de l'operation contre les commissions d'armistice et leur donnai l'ordre d'operer dans la nuit meme, à 5 heures du matin, de consigner d'ici là leurs troupes dans leurs casernements et de les mettre sur pied en temps utile. Je leur fis promettre de garder le secret, ce qui fut fait et ces officiers manifesterent un grand enthousiasme à l'idee de reprendre la lutte et d'arreter les Allemands des commissions d'armistice.

A la fin de l'apres midi je telephonai au General Martin pour le prevenir du decalage de 3 heures dans les debarquements. Il avait recu mon officier et ma lettre et etait entierement d'accord avec moi. J'ai su depuis qu'il avait telephone, je ne sais pourquoi, vers 23 heures à la Residence, ce qui eut [illegible] pour effet de l'alerter.

[illegible] je donnai une dizaine d'officiers de mon [illegible] de leur remis les [illegible] garnisons et

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[redacted] je vis arriver quelques personnalites civiles [redacted] presentees par Monsieur Peyrouton, pour me constituer un etat-major civil eventuel. Parmi eux se trouvaient Monsieur Gremond, controleur civil, secretaire general de la region de Fez, Monsieur de Korneuil, neveu du Marechal Lyautey, controleur civil, et Messieurs Rostand et Dimeri, officiers de reserve. Le directeur adjoint des Affaires Indigenes, Monsieur Bonifacy, devait etre convoque par moi-meme a notre arrivee a Rabat.

Nous partimes avec tous ces messieurs, le Capitaine de Verthamont, mon officier d'ordonnance, et le Marechal des Logis Bor, mon porte-fanion, vers 23 heures, sous la pluie, pour Rabat.

Le debarquement allie repondait tellement a l'interet du pays et au desir general de tous les vrais Francais, et de l'armee en particulier, qu'il ne me paraissait pas vraisemblable que nous puissions nous trouver devant une difficulte profonde, si comme je l'esperais le General Nogues et l'Amiral Michelier avaient les memes reactions nationales que les officiers que j'avais vus dans la soiree . Nous partions donc avec enthousiasme pensant deja a la prochaine campagne de Tripolitaine a laquelle nous esperions bien participer pour liquider l'armee Rommel, premiere etape vers la victoire et la liberation de la France.

Arrive a Rabat vers minuit et demi chez mon cousin Crepin, j'y retrouvai le Colonel Magnan, du regiment d'infanterie coloniale du Maroc et j'envoyai chercher Monsieur Pardion, chef du cabinet civil, et le Lt. Colonel Piatte, chef du cabinet militaire du General Nogues, mais l'un ne put etre trouve et l'autre refusa de se deranger. (J'ai su depuis qu'il avait ete mis en defiance par le coup de telephone malencontreux du General Martin). Devant leur carence j'envoyai a leur place a 2 heures du matin aupres du General Nogues mon officier d'ordonnance le [redacted] de Verthamont, qui etait son neveu, avec mission de lui [redacted] et les propositions que j'avais preparees.

[redacted] a l'etat-major des troupes

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[redacted] des troupes du Maroc et un certain nombre d'officiers et fonctionnaires.

Le bataillon du Regiment d'infanterie coloniale du Maroc prenait les dispositions prevues. Les hommes etaient mis au courant des evenements. C'etaient tous de jeunes engages venus de France dans l'espoir de reprendre la lutte. Le debarquement americain repondait a leurs voeux et ils executaient leurs consignes avec ardeur. Pas un officier n'avait eleve la moindre objection ni eu la moindre hesitation quand le Colonel Magnan les avait reunis vers 22 heures. Plusieurs d'entre eux pourtant avaient combattu en Syrie.

Pendant ce temps, a Casablanca, j'avais fait donner l'ordre a la Commission d'Armistice francais d'arreter les commissaires allemandes a 6 heures, mais le Colonel Gailles voulant avoir confirmation aupres de l'Amirauté avait telephone dans la nuit a l'Amiral Michelier, qui convoqua mon chef d'etat-major, le Colonel Nollo, au moment ou celui-ci s'apprêtait lui-même a lui remettre ma lettre suivant les ordres que je lui avais donnes.

A deux heures du matin il se presentait a l'Amiral Michelier et lui exposa la situation, en lui remettant ma lettre et les documents qui etaient jointe. L'Amiral Michelier lui declara qu'il avait son service de renseignements, qu'il n'y avait pas un bateau sur l'Ocean, que d'ailleurs les Americains n'etaient pas prets et n'avaient pas les moyens necessaires et que du reste une telle operation n'etait pas techniquement possible. J'avais ete le jouet d'une mystification et l'Amiral m'enlevait le commandement de la division, que j'avais d'ailleurs passe avant de partir au General Desre, mon brigadier de Casablanca.

J'avais en effet convoque le General Desre a 21 heures pour le mettre au courant. Il m'avait manifeste un grande satisfaction de reprendre la lutte contre l'Allemagne a cote des Americains et m'avait assure que je pouvais compter sur [redacted]

[redacted] donnes par l'Amiral Michelier [redacted] les dispositions que j'avais

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[illegible] allemands feraient contre [illegible] par leurs tatonnements. Les ordres d'[illegible] [illegible] exposés par mon chef d'état-major devant la manœuvre prise par les événements. Peu après, le Général Duseé, surveillé par l'Amiral Ronarch, alertait la division en vue du combat.

Dès mon arrivée à l'état-major des troupes du Maroc, au moment où mon officier d'ordonnance remettait ma lettre et les documents joints au Général Noguès, j'avais envoyé des ordres aux différentes divisions du Maroc pour les mettre au courant du débarquement américain et leur prescrire d'accueillir partout les Américains en alliés.

Peu de temps après mon arrivée à l'état-major, le Général Lahoulle, commandant l'aviation du Maroc, répondait à ma convocation et arrivait avec son Chef d'état-major, ainsi que le Colonel Bondis, chef d'état-major des troupes du Maroc.

Je leur exposai la situation et demandai au Général Lahoulle de donner des ordres à ses unités pour que l'aviation n'engage pas le combat et accueille les Américains en alliés sur ses aérodromes. Le Général Lahoulle m'objecta immédiatement son serment de fidélité au Maréchal. Je lui répondis que dans des circonstances pareilles un serment n'avait de valeur que quand il s'adressait à quelqu'un de libre, ce qui n'était pas le cas du Maréchal, qui avait dit lui-même qu'il n'était qu'un prisonnier et qu'il appartenait à des chefs de notre rang de prendre leurs responsabilités, quand l'intérêt du pays l'exigeait d'une façon aussi évidente.

Au bout de quelque temps le Général Lahoulle déclara que si l'armée de terre ne combattait pas, l'armée de l'air ne combattrait pas non plus. Je le priai alors de faire part de sa décision à l'Amiral Michelier au téléphone, lui demandant d'insister encore auprès de l'Amiral pour que la Marine adopte la même attitude.

Au cours de cette conversation téléphonique, l'Amiral [illegible] Général Lahoulle qu'il [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Je lui répondis que j'étais au regret, mais que je ne pouvais lui permettre d'aller donner des ordres qui n'auraient d'autre resultat que de faire sacrifier des Français pour le seul interet de l'Allemagne. "Si je comprends bien" me repondit-il," je suis votre prisonnier". "Admettons", repliquai-je" et asseyez-vous dans un bon fauteuil." Ce qu'il fit, pendant que son chef d'etat-major essayait d'entrer en communication telephonique avec les bases.

J'avais fait occuper les centraux telephoniques de l'etat-major et de la poste, mais en raison du peu de temps dont j'avais disposé et du manque d'informations données par Monsieur Rigaud je n'avais pas connaissance d'un reseau independant et secret qui reliait la Residence, l'Amirauté et les divisions et qui continua à fonctionner. De ce fait le General Noguès eut toute facilité pour consulter l'Amiral Michelier, peut-etre Vichy, et donner des ordres de resistance.

Vers 3 heures le Colonel Magnan vint me prevenir que le General Lascroux, commandant les troupes du Maroc, etait en bas et que ses hommes, suivant la consigne qui leur avait été donnée l'empechaient de penetrer dans l'etat-major. Le plan d'eloignement de Monsieur Rigaud n'avait donc pas joué. Je priai le Colonel Magnan d'aller expliquer au General Lascroux la situation de lui faire part de la decision qu'avait prise le General Giraud de me confier le commandement des troupes du Maroc pour l'operation et que dans ces conditions je le priai de vouloir bien se rendre au point ou le conduirait un officier de mon etat-major le Lieutenant de Marcilly.

Le Colonel Magnan fit cette communication au General Lascroux qui lui demanda de venir me parler. Le Colonel Magnan repondit que, dans les circonstances actuelles, il etait preferable de s'abstenir. Le General Lascroux lui dit: "Alors faites de moi ce que vous voudrez". Le Colonel Magnan le prie alors [illegible] dans le voiture du Lieutenant de Marcilly, accompagné [illegible] et le General fut conduit à Mehdia [illegible]

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[illegible] contraire aux ordres que j'avais donnés.

[illegible] d'ailleurs [illegible].

Bientôt après se présentait à moi le Lt. Colonel Piatte, chef du cabinet militaire du General Noguès qui, arrêté par des barrages de troupes, n'avait pu pénétrer dans la Résidence.

Des discussions s'engagèrent entre moi, le Colonel Bondis et le Lt. Colonel Piatte, le Colonel Bondis s'inquiétant du sort du General Lascroux, son chef, et demandant quelle était la position du General Juin, commandant en chef, qui était en outre son ami personnel.

Je lui rappelai ce qu'avait dit le General Juin quelques semaines plus tôt et exprimai la conviction que les sentiments du General étaient entièrement d'accord avec les miens.

Nous essayames, à ce moment, d'en avoir confirmation en téléphonant à Alger, mais nous ne pûmes avoir la communication qu'avec l'état-major de l'aviation d'Algérie, qui ne nous donna que des renseignements assez confus, nous disant qu'il y aurait eu en effet quelques tentatives de débarquement sur les côtes d'Algérie.

Je discutai longuement de la situation avec le Lt. Colonel Piatte et lui demandai instamment d'user de son influence auprès du General Noguès pour obtenir qu'il confirme les ordres du General Giraud et de moi-même. Il parut convaincu au bout d'un certain temps et je l'envoyai au General Noguès, ainsi que son adjoint le Commandant Guérin.

Les heures passèrent et aucune réponse ne parvenait du General Noguès. Par contre j'étais avisé de Casablanca que ma division avait reçu l'ordre de résister aux Américains. A Rabat devant le contre ordre envoyé par le General Noguès le Colonel Devinck n'avait pas mis au courant le General Dody de sorte que quand le General Lascroux arriva, il trouva une situation retournée et fit arrêter à son tour mon escorte.

Vers 5 heures se présente à moi Monsieur Meyer, Consul [illegible], porteur d'une lettre du Président Roosevelt, [illegible] reçu du Maréchal au même moment que [illegible]

[illegible] la Résidence, je [illegible]

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[illegible] de débarquement a Rabat me fit venir immédiatement pour que nous puissions aller trouver ensemble le General Nogues et essayer encore de le convaincre pendant que ses troupes debarqueraient et entreraient en liaison avec les Alliés.

Or aucune embarcation ne se presenta a Rabat, ni a 5 heures ni a 6 heures, ni ulterieurement. Par contre, a 5 heures, le debarquement commencait a Fort Lyautey, Fedala et Safi, et des combats s'engagerent. Vers 7 heures des avions de chasse americains apparurent sur Rabat mitraillant des pieces de D.C.A.

Vers 8 heures le General Nogues me fit appeler au telephone et entrant dans une violent colere me declara que je m'etais laisse monter le coup par "la bande d'idiots qui m'entouraient", qu'on se battait a Fort Lyautey, a Fedala et a Safi comme a Oran et a Alger et que si je ne renvoyais pas immediatement les troupes qui m'entouraient, il ferait fusiller "tous les officiers du regiment d'infanterie coloniale du Maroc"; apres quoi le General Leyer, commandant la cavalerie du Maroc, vint me supplier d'eviter toute effusion de sang entre Francais, car il avait recu l'ordre de me faire attaquer par les chars du 1er Regiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique qui etait sous mes ordres.

Je fis repondre au General Nogues que mon intention etait, comme j'en avais recu l'ordre, d'empecher une effusion de sang entre nos troupes et l'armee americaine qui venait en alliee pour nous aider et que, a plus forte raison, je ne voulais pas d'effusion de sang entre Francais, que, du moment qu'il avait decide de combattre, mon role etait termine et que dans ces conditions je renvoyais le bataillon du regiment d'infanterie coloniale du Maroc qui m'entourait.

Je le fis aussitot et me rendis a la Residence pour me mettre a la disposition du General Nogues. Le Colonel Magnan, chef de cabinet, Adjoint du Directeur des Affaires Politiques [illegible] vint me dire que le Sultan et son entourage [illegible] et qui

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[illegible] de la compagnie de garde de la Residence.

[illegible] au cours de la nuit [illegible] avait fait [illegible] cette compagnie ainsi que quelques unites de la garde noire du Sultan et meme des effectifs du service d'ordre de la Legion des Combattants (S.O.L.). Tous ces elements avaient ete desarmes des leur arrivee sans aucune espece d'opposition, par le Regiment d'Infanterie coloniale du Maroc et leurs armes etaient empilees dans un coin. Toutefois quelques tirailleurs de la compagnie de garde de la Residence n'avaient pu etre interceptees et constituaient un poste militaire avec un fusil mitrailleur.

Nous fumes introduits dans le bureau du Chef du Cabinet Militaire de la Residence. M'accompagnaient: le Colonel Magnan, Monsieur Bonifacy, Adjoint du Directeur des Affaires Politiques, Monsieur Gromand, Secretaire General de la region de Fez, Monsieur de Koraoul, controleur civil, Monsieur Rostaing, industriel a Casablanca et Monsieur Dimeri.

Aussitot introduits dans le bureau nous vimes installer devant chaque porte et chaque fenetre des sentinelles en armes. Non seulement nous ne fumes pas recus par le Resident, mais nous restames enfermes dans cette piece jusqu'a 5 heures du soir.

Apres l'enthousiasme de la veille nos espoirs s'effondraient et nous avions l'impression que plus peut-etre que le 24 Juin 1940 la France perdait la guerre une deuxieme fois. L'indecision du General Nogues, l'incomprehension de l'Amiral Michelier nous stupefiaient et leurs responsabilites nous apparaissaient effarantes.

Vers 10 heures le Colonel Magnan avait ete appele par le Resident, qui lui declara que son regiment manquait sur la ligne de combat et qu'il etait pret a lui rendre le commandement s'il repugnait de les subordonner. Le Colonel Magnan ayant declare que son regiment lui obeirait et qu'il en prendrait, il fut [illegible] et reprit son commandement.

[illegible] quelques sous-[illegible] explication en [illegible]

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[illegible] de Meknes. Au bout de deux [illegible]
[illegible] sobre on route, il faillit [illegible] aller cher-
[illegible] et c'est en pleine nuit que nous arrivâmes à
Meknes.

L'officier de garde mobile qui m'accompagnait m'avait dit avoir reçu l'ordre de me conduire à la Division de Meknes, mais en fait de Division ce fut à la prison civile de Meknes que nous arrivâmes vers 8 heures ou 9 heures du soir.

Le directeur de la prison s'excusa de devoir nous faire subir les formalités d'écrou et nous dûmes remettre notre argent, nos papiers, nos montres et même nos rasoirs. Mes compagnons furent incarcérés dans la même cellule et je fus enfermé seul dans une cellule de l'infirmerie.

Le lendemain 9 novembre nous fûmes autorisés à nous promener ensemble pendant les heures réglementaires, à faire venir nos repas de l'extérieur car la nourriture de la prison était la même pour tout le monde - pour les indigènes et pour nous - et dans l'après-midi je vis passer dans la cour, escorté par un gardien, mon chef d'état-major, le Colonel Mollo, qui avait été arrêté la veille au soir et je me crois pour moi mis au régime du secret. Le Lieutenant de Lareilly et les deux frères Guillaume qui avaient accompagné le Général Lasceroux à Meknes étaient également incarcérés et au secret.

Les nouvelles les plus fantaisistes circulaient et au loin on entendait gronder le canon. Déjà les prisonniers gaullistes s'ingéniaient à me faire passer des billets pour m'exprimer leur sympathie et m'exposer leur situation.

Vers 6 heures je vis arriver un monsieur en civil qui se présenta comme Maître Buttin, Bâtonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats de Meknes, et me dit que nous devions passer en cour martiale le lendemain à 9 heures. Il avait été prié de désigner un défenseur d'office et y fut tenu [illegible] désigner lui-même. Aucune [illegible] possible n'était prévue. Le bâtonnier était un notre [illegible] et eut une conversation de [illegible] avec [illegible] se mettre au courant [illegible] affaire.

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[illegible] d'Alsace.

[illegible] manifestait une sympathie évidente [illegible] elle garde à l'extérieur pour les 3.0.A.

Un jeune officier de Legion Etranger désigné par le General Body pour veiller à nos besoins éventuels était si bouleversé qu'il en avait les larmes aux yeux et dut être relevé.

Dans la soirée les gardiens laissèrent de la lumière dans ma cellule jusqu'à une heure avancée de la nuit pour me permettre de préparer ma défense.

Le 10, à 7 h 1/2, le gardien très ému venait me réveiller et vers 8 heures et demie nous partions en voiture escortés par des gardes mobiles pour le Palais de Justice de Meknes. Devant le Palais une garde importante de Légionnaires du 3e étranger rendait les honneurs; je la passai en revue et nous fumes introduits dans la salle d'audience. A 9 heures la Cour fit son entrée. Elle était présidée par le General Colette et composée des Généraux Ronin et Francois et des Lieutenant-Colonels Joubert des Ouches et Chevaldini.

Après un interrogatoire d'identité le Président lut l'acte d'accusation et ordonna le huis-clos. Demandant aussitôt la parole, je déclarai au Président que, comme j'aurais l'occasion de la montrer au cours des débats, cette affaire n'était pas particulière au Maroc, mais que j'avais agi suivant les instructions qui m'avaient été transmises de la part du General Giraud qui avait donné des ordres pour faciliter le débarquement des Alliés dans toute l'Afrique du Nord. Je demandai donc en conséquence que le General Giraud soit entendu ajoutant qu'il n'était pas dans les traditions de l'Armée Française de faire retomber les responsabilités sur les seuls subordonnés et que je voulais bien être fusillé, mais à côté de mon chef.

La Cour se retira pour délibérer et revint quelques instants après en rejetant ma demande. Pendant toute la matinée j'exposai [illegible] l'affaire. La position ne fut pratiquement [illegible] la Cour si par le Commissaire du Gouvernement. A cette heure le Président

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[illegible] fixe l'heure de la reprise de l'audience à 3 heures, je lui fis observer que la prison était trop loin et il la reporta à 3 heures.

Au cours de l'audience de l'après-midi, chaque inculpé fit sa déposition et vers 6 heures les interrogatoires étaient terminés, la Cour et les Commissaires du Gouvernement observant toujours la même discrétion.

Après la dernière déposition, Maître Buttin se leva et déposa des conclusions, déclarant que les interrogatoires avaient confirmé mes déclarations du matin, demandant que le Général Giraud et le Général Juin soient entendus et que les débats soient remis à une date ultérieure pour supplément d'enquête.

La Cour se retira et à sa rentrée rejeta les conclusions de Maître Buttin et leva l'audience jusqu'au lendemain matin. Nous fûmes ramenés à la Prison, le canon tonnait toujours et les bruits les plus extraordinaires sur les opérations couraient dans la prison. Le soir nous dînions tous ensemble dans la cellule de mes co-inculpés quand le médecin de la prison entra avec une grosse serviette sous le bras. Sous le prétexte de nous soigner il nous apportait deux bouteilles de champagne et nous proposait de faire donner de nos nouvelles à nos familles. Chacun écrivit une lettre à sa femme et dans la nuit le docteur, frétant une voiture sous prétexte d'aller chercher des médicaments à Casablanca, traversait les lignes américaines et apportait de nos nouvelles à nos familles de Rabat à Casablanca.

Le lendemain, au moment de partir pour la reprise de l'audience, on apprenait la cessation des hostilités. La ville avait un air de fête et les maisons étaient pavoisées.

A 9 heures l'audience reprenait. Il n'y avait plus à entendre que le réquisitoire et la plaidoirie, mais le Président, se levant, lut un jugement rendu par la Cour, se contredisant avec son jugement de la veille et déclarant qu'il y avait lieu de procéder à un supplément d'enquête que les débats seraient remis à une date ultérieure. Aussitôt je demandai [illegible] réitérai la déposition de la

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[illegible] prison, je reçus vers 5 heures la visite du [illegible] Berchux, major de la garnison, qui vint m'annoncer que nous allions être transférés au Camp d'El-Hajeb, au régime des arrêts de forteresse.

Quelques minutes après, cérémonie du levée d'Ecrou, on nous rendit toutes nos affaires et nous montions dans des voitures et non plus cette fois dans des camionettes en direction d'El-Hajeb. Les S.O.L. qui, depuis le début du procès, montaient la garde autour de la prison - et des gardiens - avaient disparu.

Nous arrivames vers 7 heures au camp d'El-Hajeb par une pluie battante et un capitaine nous installa dans une barraque d'officiers spécifiant que nous ne devions pas sortir de nos chambres, que nos repas nous y seraient apportés et que nous aurions droit à une heure de promenade le matin et l'après-midi.

Je fis venir le Lieutenant-Colonel Loriez qui commandait le camp et était mon ancien major de garnison de Casablanca; je lui fis remarquer que, envoyés ici pour améliorer notre situation, nous ne devions pas être plus mal traités qu'à la prison et que j'entendais que nous ayions le droit de prendre nos repas en commun au mess qui était à côté et de pouvoir circuler autour des barraques dans le périmètre qu'il fixerait.

Nous étions gardés par des indigènes qui reconnurent Monsieur Bonifacc, ancien contrôleur d'El-Hajeb et dès le lendemain nous recevions des cadeaux du Caid, qui nous envoyait des poulets, du thé et des oranges.

Les premières journées se passèrent à écouter la radio au cercle, mais cela déplut à deux officiers de réserve collaborationnistes récemment mobilisés, le Capitaine Delmas et le Lieutenant Allaid, qui sabotèrent l'appareil.

Quelques heures après l'adjudant du génie du camp nous en installait un autre dans notre baraque.

[illegible] des baraques voisines des prisonniers politiques [illegible] pour leurs [illegible] pour les Alliés [illegible] et [illegible] s'entretenir avec nous [illegible]

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[illegible] degrade de cette mesure. Le Capitaine Gardet et tous membres du R.I.C.M. etaient tenus a consigner leur colonel et repartirent le lendemain.

Le 13 le garde indigene que l'on jugeait probablement trop douce fut remplacee par un peloton de gardes mobiles et des ordres furent donnes pour nous isoler. Je protestai et je fis une demande ecrite pour retourner a la prison de Meknes, apres quoi les ordres furent rapportes. Nous n'avions toutefois plus le droit d'aller au mess. Le 13 le Colonel juge d'instruction nous interrogea toute la journee.

Nous suivions par la radio les evenements d'Alger et le 15 mars apprenions avec joie la nomination du General Giraud au poste de commandant en chef.

Dans la soiree du 15 un capitaine vint nous prevenir que notre regime d'arrets de forteresse etait transforme en regime de liberte surveillee et que nous avions le droit de circuler dans le camp.

Il etait 9 heures du soir et immediatement nous partimes tous ensemble rendre visite a Monsieur Capitan, controleur du cercle d'El-Hajeb et a sa femme, qui nous offrirent le champagne et nous invitèrent a diner pour le lendemain.

Le 17 le Colonel Jones, nouveau Commandant du camp, m'avisait que le Colonel Magnan et moi etions mis a la disposition du General Giraud a Alger pour recevoir des commandements de nos grades. Nous partirions le lendemain de Meknes sans avoir le droit de rentrer chez nous.

Apres le dejeuner je descendis a Meknes avec les Colonels Magnan et Holle designe pour un etat-major a Meknes. Nos autres camarades etaient liberes et envoyes dans differentes directions et nous nous separames avec emotion apres des journees qui avaient cree entre nous des liens d'estime et d'affection indestructibles.

[illegible] tragique nous avions ete l'objet [illegible] personnel [illegible] comme il [illegible] depart

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[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

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[illegible] l'avion [illegible] dans la nuit du 8
[illegible] apparece et atta[illegible] l'objet eux et leurs fa-
[illegible] de vertige.

Le décembre, au bout de 15 jours de séjour inutile à Gibraltar, je recevais l'ordre de rentrer à Alger en vue de mon départ pour Washington où j'étais envoyé comme chef de la mission militaire.

A mon retour à Alger je trouvai une atmosphère bien amicale. L'armée française était engagée aux cotés des Alliés dans la dure campagne de Tunisie, l'armée d'Afrique du Nord était rentrée dans la guerre, le but était atteint.

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[illegible] tous les officiers qui m'avaient suivi dans la nuit du 8 novembre étaient dispersés et étaient l'objet eux et leurs familles de vexations.

Le 12 décembre, au bout de 16 jours de séjour inutile à Gibraltar, je recevais l'ordre de rentrer à Alger et vue de mon départ pour Washington où j'étais envoyé en tant que chef de la mission militaire.

A mon retour à Alger je trouvai une atmosphère bien changée. L'armée française était engagée aux côtés des Alliés dans la dure campagne de Tunisie, l'armée d'Afrique en entier était rentrée dans la guerre, le but était atteint.

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In December of 1941, as President of the Armistice Commission for French Morocco, I encountered serious difficulties with the German Commission to which I was accredited. The Germans had, as a matter of fact, forwarded various complaints against me and I knew that sooner or later they would demand that I be recalled. Just then I was sent to Vichy on a " Unimon " mission and had occasion to call on Admiral Darlan.

Admiral Darlan explained to me at great length his policy he had adopted at that time but added that he was perfectly willing to modify it and that he had told Admiral Leahy a few days previous that if the United States would guarantee him several hundred planes and tanks at Marseilles he would be willing to [illegible] immediately.

I took advantage of my visit to tell the Admiral how the Germans were trying to undermine me and added that if I were to be relieved of my command I preferred that it should be upon orders from the French and not through a German demand. He expressed his approval and said it had been his intention for some time past to give me a command. Later I saw his Chief of Staff who offered the Canadian division.

This command has within its attributions the defense of the major portion of the Atlantic coast of Morocco. I did not conceal my way of thinking from the Admiral's Chief of Staff and told him that were I to be entrusted with this command I intended to continue to imbue officers and men with the spirit of vengeance and hostility towards Germany, without which in my mind the Army of the Armistice could not even justify its existence.

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He agreed with me entirely and a few days later I was officially appointed to Casablanca. I was in command until November 7th.

I had exercised my command for a few months - it was then June - when a Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil called on me. I had never had occasion to meet him and he spoke to me of the industrial plants he was setting up in Casablanca and in France. In the course of the conversation he mentioned General Giraud and spoke of the various eventualities that might lead to a resumption of hostilities with Germany - with North Africa as a starting point. He was accompanied by a collaborator, a Mr. Rigaud.

Mr. Rigaud called a few days later and we discussed this question again in which, needless to say, I was most interested.

He came to see me from time to time to keep me informed of certain more or less unofficial plans that were being worked out to rearm North Africa with a view to a resumption of hostilities.

In the early part of October, General Juin, Commander-in-Chief of the French army in North Africa, made an inspection tour of Morocco and, in each garrison-town, called a meeting of all corps commanders, to whom he confided the following facts:

" Germany's strength is now at its peak but will soon begin to decline. Sooner or later, France must reenter this war and join in the operations; this should be done at the most opportune time. Get ready for it, but be cautious and keep this information secret. Trust your chiefs entirely, for the time being we must still

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obey the order to resist in case of an Allied invasion, but maybe in a month or two we shall have instructions to the contrary."

A few days later during a visit of Admiral Darlan I gathered the same impression, for, having come for the avowed purpose of inspecting the coastal defenses, he showed but little interest therein.

On the other hand, I knew that although General Nogues appeared vis-a-vis of the Government to adopt a most conciliatory policy towards the Germans, he was at heart deeply anti-German and anti-nazi.

Admiral Michelier, in command of the Navy in Morocco, had been for several years member of the Armistice Commission in Berlin after the first World War and a member of the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden after this war. He knew the Germans thoroughly and could size them up accurately.

We were under the definite impression that everyone was most anxious to fight again and I was in such a frame of mind when, on November 2, Mr. Rigaud called on me and told me that the Americans were planning to land in force in North Africa, Morocco and Algeria. This plan had been discussed with General Giraud, who had advised that it be carried out in the Spring. Now however the Americans, Mr. Rigaud ~~said~~ informed me, had decided on an earlier action.

The operations were to be carried out in accord with General Giraud who had entered into an agreement with the United States Government on political, economic and military matters, and were to

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coincide with his arrival in North Africa where he was to resume full command.

Mr. Rigaud asked me, on behalf of General Giraud, whether I was willing to act as Commander-in-Chief in Morocco and to facilitate the landings when they would take place.

I had inquired before this from General Giraud - through an officer who had formerly served under him - whether I could trust these men who claimed to be his representatives. Having had a reply in the affirmative, I told Mr. Rigaud that General Giraud could count on me. Mr. Rigaud left me to my reflections.....

It seemed therefore that the plan which Mr. Rigaud had set forth echoed the true feelings of the High Command and that there would undoubtedly be a tacit consent, thus rendering fairly easy the carrying out of a project that answered the secret hopes of all.

One or two days later, Mr. Rigaud came to see me again, confirming the plan that the landings would be made in the very near future and he handed me a few documents, one of them explaining the general scheme of operations, instructing our fleet once to disembark at all harbors and airfields of Morocco, and announcing that General Giraud had appointed me as Commander-in-Chief of landing operations.

Before Mr. Rigaud left I tried to get information about the date and he told me the convoy had already left Gibraltar.

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Mr. Rigaud had contacted a number of civilian personalities in Morocco but, on account of his hurried departure from Algiers, was unable to introduce me to them or to relay to me the information which I might have needed especially in regard to organization of signals.

That left me with a short time indeed to get things [illegible] and few ways in which to do it. I knew I could trust the men in my Division who were in charge of most of the coastal [illegible] of Morocco and also General Martin, whose feelings were well known to me, who was in charge of the Marrakech Division. Inasmuch as the General commanding at Meknes seemed to favor our plans, it did not look as if I should encounter any difficulties on the part of the Army ground forces, except from General Lascroux commanding the troops in Morocco. General Giraud had ordered his transfer and Mr. Rigaud had contrived some scheme to get him away from Rabat when the [illegible] take place.

Therefore I had only to execute the order I had received to take command of the troops in Morocco at the time of the landings. On the other hand, I had no authority over the Navy or the French Resident General. With regard to the latter, Mr. Rigaud had encouraged me to take his place, with or without his consent, but knowing General Nogues' feelings, I thought it would be easy enough to convince him, then he would have taken command himself, which would have facilitated matters all around.

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I had reached this point in my conclusion when, during the night of November 6, my A.D.C. came to my office saying that a Mr. Dimari wanted to see me. It seemed that an order had been issued a few days before for his expulsion from Morocco because Mr. Dimari's military interest in activities had made him a suspect. This man came up to me and handed me a small sheet of paper on which was written the information that landing operations would take place the night of November 7 to 8 at 1 a.m. G.M.D. (2 a.m. local time).

I thanked Mr. Dimari for his message and [illegible] he would not be expelled from Morocco, then I called my Chief of Staff immediately and 1 or 2 officers to whom I [illegible] plot and we all worked together until 4 a.m. in order to get everything ready.

Among the various orders I had received was one [illegible], during the night, the members of the German Armistice Commission and a number of French personalities who were suspected.

After studying the details of the landing plan I had come to the conclusion that it would be advisable for the American army to disembark first in the harbors and that this operation should be by only my men, such as was the case at Fedala and Port Lyautey, but at the points occupied by the Navy which were not under my control.

Around 10 p.m. I asked Mr. King, Vice-Consul at Casablanca, to call on me. I knew him to be cognizant of the plot and I asked him if he could get in touch with the Admiral or General

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commanding the American units that were to land in Morocco, so that they would disembark only at Rabat and Mazagan and wait for orders to be given at Rabat by Admiral Michelier before making further landings. Unfortunately, the telegram sent by Mr. [illegible] never reached its destination.

During the night I made the following decisions:

1) to send an officer on November 7 to warn General [illegible].

2) to give instructions to Colonel Dewinck of [illegible] unit to contact me, to ask him to warn the General [illegible] the Meknes Division as soon as the landings took place.

I had orders prepared for all garrison-towns and airfields located in the territory of my Division. Those instructions, which were to be handed to the commanding officers of the military airfields by officers of my staff a few days before the disembarkations, stated that General Giraud was taking command of French North Africa, that the American troops were to land during the night of November 7 or 8 at [illegible] appointed time and that our men not only should not resist but should help them by all means at their disposal. There was a description of reconnaissance signals that had been given to me by Mr. Pignaud.

I also prepared 2 letters, one for General Noguès and the other for Admiral Michelier informing them of the situation, apologizing for doing so after everything had been settled

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and saying that I felt I knew their feelings well enough to be sure that they would be glad at the prospect of being able to reenter this war against Germany and begging them to issue orders confirming those I was giving myself.

In my letter to General Noguès I added that I should like him to take command of the operations but that in case he would rather not do so, on account of previous pledges, I would ask him to let me direct operations while landings were being made and that I would return the command to him thereafter.

I enclosed with these letters copies of the documents Mr. Murphy had entrusted to me, namely the general plan of operations in North Africa, a letter exchanged between General Giraud and Mr. Murphy, etc., and I decided to send the same documents to Admiral Michelier by my Chief of Staff and to General Noguès by my ADC, who left at once. I decided these papers should be in their hands before the latter, as that Admiral Michelier and General Noguès would have time to organize real resistance to our landings and to fight to the very last, Casablanca, etc., which had standing orders to do so.

On the morning of November 7, I asked Colonel Beeson, commanding the Moroccan Colonial Infantry troops, to come and see me at Casablanca and told him of the plans for the following night, asking him if I could count on him and the two

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battalion to help me. Colonel Magnan agreed to do so and I gave him orders to warn his battalion the next night and to send it to the General Staff of the troops of Morocco at Rabat at 2 a.m., telling him that I would be there to take command. As while landing operations had been postponed 3 hours and were to take place at 5 a.m. local time instead of 2 a.m.

I entrusted the battalion with the mission to:

1) Surround the General Staff of the Morocco troops. I would have joined by them, so as to oppose any resistance.

2) Send officers and men to the Rabat battalion and have with orders to wait for the Americans and to keep them in Residence, and

3) Welcome the Americans there and obtain good behavior, to avoid bloodshed.

On the afternoon of November 7 I asked Colonel Gilles, President of the French Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, to call on me and I warned him that we might possibly receive orders to arrest, in the very near future, the members of the German Armistice Commission. We thereupon arranged the details of the arrest.

Toward the end of the afternoon, I sent for the colonels in charge of the men who were to arrest the German Armistice Commission and gave them the order to do so the next morning at 5. They had therefore to confine those soldiers to their quarters and to get them ready for the appointed time. I pledged them to

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secrecy and they kept their word. The officers were most enthusiastic at the idea of resuming the war and of imprisoning the Germans.

Around 8 p.m. I sent for some 10 officers of my staff, [illegible] to be equipped with a car and, even then, [illegible] prepared for the various garrison and field [illegible]. [illegible] to be handed to each commanding officer [illegible] my staff to secrecy until [illegible] all the information to all our posts.

A few civilian personalities [illegible] were contacted by M. [illegible] civil staff. Among [illegible] Mr. Rostand, Mr. de Monsabert - Civil Controller [illegible] Lyautey's nephew -, Mr. Blanc, by profession [illegible] Fez, Assistant Director [illegible] and several [illegible] Europeans.

It seemed to me that, in the [illegible] of the operation, and especially [illegible] Rabat, that we should not meet any serious obstacle, but on the contrary, the officers would report in the morning when I had met in the evening and would be very keen [illegible].

On my arrival at Rabat, at 12.30 a.m., I met [illegible] in command of Moroccan Colonial Infantry and from [illegible] for the Assistant for Civilian Affairs and the [illegible]

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Military Affairs of General Nogues, but one could not be found and the other refused to come thinking it was a hoax. In reading for them I wished to inform them of our plans so that they would join my ADC in asking General Nogues to concur.

At 2 a.m. I went to the General Staff of our troops in Morocco also in charge of the [illegible] Colonial Infantry, took over their offices, then went at once [illegible] com and of aviation in Morocco and [illegible]

[illegible] time in view of my [illegible] plan to arrest the [illegible] the Colonel [illegible] and, during the night, with [illegible] my Chief of Staff Jut[illegible], [illegible] letters [illegible]

At [illegible] a.m. Colonel [illegible], my Chief of Staff, [illegible] Minister [illegible] letter [illegible] [illegible] ready [illegible] troops and equipment [illegible] looking; that I had been [illegible] more he was removing me from my command, which, in fact, I had learned over to Intendant General [illegible] my departure.

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General Doare had shown great satisfaction at the prospect of resuming the fight against Germany at the side of the Allies and he had also assured me that I could entirely rely upon him.

At 2 p.m. approximately, he was summoned by [illegible] who apparently gave him the order to effect [illegible] before my departure.

As soon as I arrived [illegible] moving, under cover [illegible] colored document to [illegible] engaging [illegible]

Shortly after [illegible] with the chief of [illegible] the Moroccan troops.

I explained the situation to him [illegible] to give orders to [illegible] not fight and [illegible] the American troops. While objecting that he was bound [illegible] assertion that in such circumstances [illegible] given to a person who was free from [illegible] case of War and Peace, who was [illegible] best of [illegible] prisoners. I replied that military [illegible]

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must assume full responsibility whenever the higher interests of the country obviously made such a [illegible] advisable.

After some time, General Ekoulle declared [illegible] forces did not fight, the air force would not fight either. I asked him to advise Admiral Leahy of [illegible] and I urged him to express such opinion [illegible] for which the Navy should not be [illegible].

During this conversation, [illegible] Ekoulle that the Navy [illegible] that they would fight; [illegible] accepted by the Air Force [illegible] that he would be returned [illegible].

I [illegible] him that I [illegible] could not [illegible] "If you wish to put [illegible] plan [illegible] of staff and endorse [illegible] with the Air bases.

It was not been possible for [illegible] of telephone connections, [illegible] disposal, and also because Mr. Ekoulle [illegible]

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information; therefore the main lines between the Residence, the Admiralty and the various chiefs of staff (these were secret) remained available although the Central Exchange of the Headquarters had been occupied in compliance with my order.

A short time after my arrival, at the Headquarters, Colonel Magnan came to tell me that General Laverdure, in command of the Moroccan troops, was downstairs and that my men, following the orders they had received, would not allow him to enter the [illegible] of the Headquarters. I asked Colonel [illegible] to [illegible] and explain the situation to him and to tell him that General Giraud had decided to put me in command of the forces to [illegible] the forthcoming operations; under these circumstances, I [illegible] that he follow an officer of my staff, Lieutenant [illegible] to the place where the latter would take him.

Colonel Magnan delivered this message to General Laverdure who said he would like to confer with me. Colonel Magnan answered that under the present circumstances, it would be preferable to avoid doing so. General Laverdure then said: " You may dispose of me as you think fit. " Colonel Magnan asked him to step into the car of Lieutenant de Morelly together with the two Guardsmen present.

These occurences had not given rise to any clash, but unfortunately, some excited persons had punctured the four tires of the personal car of General Laverdure and others were even beginning to enter the offices of the Residence in spite of the orders I had given to the contrary. They were promptly ejected.

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Soon after that, Lt. Colonel Platte of the staff of General Noguès came to me. Stopped by military police on the way, he had been unable to enter the grounds of the Residence.

Colonel Bondis, Lt. Colonel Platte and myself discussed the whole situation. Colonel Bondis was wondering about the fate of General Lemaroux, his chief, and wished to know the position taken by General Juin, the Commander in Chief, who, I [illegible], a personal friend.

I recalled the views General Juin had expressed on the subject before and added that the General [illegible]

We tried to make [illegible] but we were able only [illegible] police headquarters, where [illegible] us that some attempted breaking [illegible] of the east of Algeria.

The Director [illegible], Colonel Platte and myself [illegible] I strongly urged him to bring about [illegible] General Noguès [illegible] orders issued by General Juin [illegible] that it seemed to me [illegible] General Noguès together with [illegible]

Several hours [illegible] incident me, I was however [illegible] had been given [illegible]

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Around 5 p.m. Mr. Meyer, United States Consul, called upon me. He had a letter from President Roosevelt and he had been instructed to deliver it to General Nogues in person. I gave orders to the effect that Mr. Meyer should be taken to the Residence; I doubt whether he saw General Nogues and cannot say definitely whether this letter was delivered or not.

The American troops were to land at 5 p.m. and I had given orders to the effect that the officer in command of the units which would land at Rabat be immediately brought to me so that I could see General Nogues together and try to convince him [illegible] American troops landed and establish [illegible] relations.

However, no craft appeared at Rabat before 5:30 p.m. or later. But at 5 p.m. hostile operations [illegible] Port Lyautey, Fedhala and Safi.

Around 8 p.m. General Nogues called me on the telephone. He overcame by anger he told me that [illegible] to me by a group of Fools and [illegible] occurred at Fort Lyautey, Fedhala, Safi as well as in the Port of Algiers. Furthermore he stated that if I failed to [illegible] diately the troops which were with me, he would order [illegible] officers of the Regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale of Morocco, to be shot. Then General Leyer, in command of the convoy in Moroccan waters, came to avoid the shedding of the blood of Frenchmen. He had been ordered to launch an attack against my troops [illegible]

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of the First Regiment of African Chasseurs placed under his command.

I had the following answer delivered to General [illegible]: my greatest concern was to prevent bloodshed between the troops and the Americans who were allies coming to help us. For other reasonsm I wished to prevent any bloodshed between Frenchmen, in view of the fact that we had decided to resist. I considered that I had fulfilled my part and declared to General [illegible] of Moroccan Colonial Infantry which was with me.

I immediately followed this courier and [illegible] to put myself at the disposal of General [illegible], Comptroller Pouliquen, Assistant Director of [illegible], [illegible]. I had summoned during the preceding night, one [illegible] and officials sent to me by Mr. Lyttelton, who [illegible] Casablanca Conference, insisted on coming with me and a few minutes later, arrived all together at the entrance [illegible] a few tirailleurs belonging to the Company [illegible] the Residence were on duty.

During the night, General Noguès had [illegible] well as some units of the Black Guard [illegible] elements of the auxiliary police of the "Légion [illegible] (F.O.L.)". Most of these men had been [illegible] difficulty by the Regiment of Moroccan Colonial Infantry, [illegible] not offered any resistance; their arms were piled up in a corner.

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However, a few tirailleurs of the Company of Guards assigned to the Residence had not been forestalled and they had established a fortified post with a sub-machine gun.

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Tangier, Morocco, May 29, 1943.

Dear Colonel Kenardi

On May 28th and today a dispute arose between myself and Mr. Childs concerning which I sent you a brief wire today. The immediate cause was the Ziani document (original in your files) and my effort to send a copy by today's pouch to the OSS office in Washington. Being unable to find any army or navy typist free, I asked Mr. Childs to allow one of the State Department confident/ clerks to type it. He said that he would arrange it. I explained at the time that it was a Fifth Army report and requested that no copy be made, and that no reference be made to it. He commented or implied consent, and at his request I gave him the document. I did not wish to do so, but thought it better to comply than to start a row. This morning, on receiving the copy of document that a carbon had been made. Upon requesting the carbon copy, which was not given me, Mr. Childs stated that he felt free to send a report on or refer to the matter. Upon my taxing him with my request of last night that no carbon be made, etc., Mr. Childs said that he had made no comment. Mr. Childs then stated that all reports or information that I had concerning secret operational matters that could affect the relations between the Legation and Spain or the Spanish Zone must be referred to him. I stated that I could not do this, as I considered myself under the orders of the Fifth Army in these particulars. Mr. Childs then showed me the report he had written to the State Department with a copy to General Clark concerning the affair. In my opinion it is a fair statement of the two sides of the the question except for the fact that he did not say that I believed no copy would be made.

This tempest in a teapot is of little importance except for the principles involved.

All local neo-operational intelligence secured by our Moslem groups is given to Walter Booth, and thus to Mr. Childs. At the same time, do not feel free to give to Mr. Childs any operational information, nor will I do so unless ordered to by yourself, General Strunther or General Clark.

Very sincerely yours,

Tom Clark

Col. W. Col. Kenardi
Chief of General Services

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Africa hdtr. 11 Aug 43
x Clark Papers
x Zacharias
x Brown, Lt.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION
Tangier, May 28th., 1943

Brigadier General Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

My dear General:

I am enclosing a letter from the head of one our Arabic groups of that I believe you will find interesting. It is probable that Carleton Coon has already mentioned this to you, if not, he will be able to give you the details. I believe that the Germans have told their Moslem agents that this is their plan, but it may be one of several or a deliberate plant. In any event the first phase, the sabotage drive, has already started. The Fifth Army has a copy of the letter and I have discussed it twice with them.

On my return from the French Zone I find Tangier and the Spanish Zone much quieter than I had expected. There is nothing new from our various sources that points to Spanish or German action except saboteurs entering French Morocco, and that we have been expecting for some time.

I am glad to say that our relations with the Fifth Army could not be better. They cooperate with us fully and believe that we are of considerable service to them. Please tell Carl Coon when you see him to take it easy, that he's not missing anything here.

Very sincerely yours

Gordon Brown

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SECRET

22/4/43.

[redacted] DOCUMENT.

Dramatis Personae:

(1) Mr. Strings: He wrote the document. He is the head of our Strings organization, an extremely important Moslem personage. He wrote it on the basis of information given him by X.

(2) X: One of Mr. Strings' agents, located in el Ksar el Kebir. His reports have always been reliable.

(3) Zaiani: is the son of the leader of the Zaian confederation of the Middle Atlas in their struggles against the French. His father's name was Moha U Hammou Zaiani. Zaiani killed a Controlleur Civil and took refuge in the Spanish Zone. He is a German agent. He was approached by us to work as a double agent, and replied that he would prefer to work for the Americans and English but refused to serve as a double agent. Browne had met him in peace time.

(4) Ibrahim el Mezzani: Former head of the nationalist party in the Spanish Zone. In peace time he was in Spanish pay; then, with the outbreak of war, he was in Italian pay, and is now a German agent. He is the leader of the Moslem agents of Germany in the Spanish Zone. He is the man from whom the demolition material mentioned in the Bestroot report was surreptitiously taken and photographed, then replaced. He is now in Tangier.

(5) Sidi Helal: A member of the Middle Atlas tribe of Beni Mguild--is in Azrou. He is well known to Browne, who in peace time bought wool from him, and stayed overnight in his house frequently. Sidi Helal is now a refugee in the sanctuary of Moulay Idris in Fez, having been [redacted] by the French of being in touch with the Germans and of escaping. Browne saw him in the mosque and suspected the Zaiani hookup, which the report confirms. Browne believes that Sidi Helal would surrender to the Americans but not to the French, and would tell the Americans about his connections if he is promised immunity and the right to return to his former life without having his lands or goods confiscated. He might give us the German set-up in the Sous and Middle Atlas.

Browne has arranged for release of Sidi Helal who will recall [redacted] from Tangier. This is being done in agreement with the French.

SECRET

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SECRET

ZAIANI DOCUMENT----------Text.

Date, April 22, 1943.

First, I went to Tetuan and met Zaiani, and asked him about the matter of Sidi Helal. I found that I myself used to know Sidi Helal in Azrou when he was still a student and before he was well-known among the people. Zaiani gave me all the information about the son of Sidi Helal and how he escaped from the French Zone and came to Tetuan. He stayed in Zaiani's house as a visitor; then the Germans paid him 400 pesetas a month. The son of Sidi Helal is now staying in Tangier and teaches French and Shluh at the school of Guenoun.

When I asked Zaiani about the political situation and what was going on, he said that the Germans have made arrangements with a French group composed of French authorities such as Controlleurs Civils, etc. They have also made arrangements with a group of Moslems in the French Zone, the idea being that these groups will blow up bridges, railways, and munition dumps, and start revolt. When these things are done in the French Zone, Spain then will move toward the French Zone in the name of Sultan Moulay Abd el Aziz and Germans will land by plane in back of these places.

They have asked me (Zaiani) to propose people (Moslems) who could go with them in the planes in order to show the roads and to act as guides after landing, and to get the support of the natives. Zaiani said that he is going himself very soon to Tangier in order to see once more the son of Sidi Helal as well as the man in charge of this affair at the German consulate.

When I left Zaiani I went to see my friend the Kaid Abdesalam bel Mokri el Bokhari who was formerly pasha in Tetuan. This kaid knows very well that I know that he has close political connections with the Germans, as we used to meet together at the time of the World War in the German consulate, and that the Sultan Moulay Hafid had sent me from Spain with some Turks to the German consulate, and that is why we are good friends up to the present.

I asked him "What is the matter with your friends the Germans, who seem to be having a long sleep?" He said, "We have been telling them and telling them for a long time what they should do. However, they have been waiting and delaying and now they are very sorry that they did not act before the Americans landed and there is nobody to blame but themselves. They now have a great deal of misunderstanding among themselves and each one blames the other for not having acted before. They were very sorry because they now see they should have started a revolution and gotten the French out of Morocco, and now they know very well that they have made a great mistake. "They are now starting all over again and they have gotten in touch with French people in the French Zone in order to start all that is mentioned above exactly as Zaiani told me word for word.

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I met Ir im Wezzani in Tetuan at the place of Ahmef Acdod, and he (Wezzani) told me exactly the same thing. So I found that all this is true when I heard the same thing from the two of them, that is to say that the Germans are going to act very soon, in agreement with the French who are in the French Zone, at the same time as the Spaniards move toward the French Zone in the name of the Sultan Moulay Abd el Aziz.

At this point Mr. Strings quotes and implicitly endorses the following: Zaiani's friend also said "NOW I AM TELLING YOU WHAT IF THE AMERICANS DO NOT ACT QUICKLY IN OCCUPYING THE SPANISH ZONE AT ONCE, THEY WILL BE VERY SORRY, AND THE SAME THING WILL HAPPEN TO THEM THAT HAPPENED TO THE GERMANS IN THE FRENCH ZONE, because if the Moroccan people hear the call of the Sultan Moulay Abd el Aziz while the present anti-American propaganda is going on in the Spanish Zone it will be very difficult. My idea as well as the idea of a great many intelligent people who know the Moroccan situation is that the only way is for the Spanish Zone to be occupied at once and without delay, before the Germans and Spaniards make a sudden move. Every time I go to see Zaiani I also go to see Kaid ben el Hossein el Boktari."

May 4, 1943.

s/ Gordon H. Browne

Gordon H. Browne

s/

translated by Randolph [illegible]

SECRET

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SECRET

28/4/43

REPORT OF INFORMANT AS of Tetuan. (A Government official of Tetuan).

The Khalifa has now gone to Spain. He says that he went for a visit but I know that he went at Franco's order for a secret conference. I do not know exactly where they will meet nor about what they will talk, but I will work hard to find out and let you know.

General Orgaz went to inspect the border road at Suk el Had of Agadir el Krush; then the Alto Comisario of Tetuan told the editor of a Muslim paper not to mention the visit to Had el Krush but to say instead that he had gone to inspect the schools in Shenhawan (Xauen).

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Tangier, Morocco, May 29, 1943.

Dear Colonel Howard:

On May 28th and today a dispute arose between myself and Mr. Childs concerning which I sent you a brief wire today. The immediate cause was the Ziani document (original in your files) and my effort to send a copy by to-day's pouch to the OSS office in Washington. Being unable to find any army or navy typist free, I asked Mr. Childs to allow one of the State Department confidential clerks to type it. He said that he would arrange it. I explained at the time that it was a Fifth Army report and requested that no copy be made, and that no reference be made to it. He consented or implied consent, and at his request I gave him the document. I did not wish to do so, but thought it better to comply than to start a row. This morning, on receiving the copy I discovered that a carbon had been made. Upon requesting the carbon copy, which was not given me, Mr. Childs stated that he felt free to send a report on or refer to the matter. Upon my taxing him with my request of last night that no carbon be made, etc., Mr. Childs said that he had made no comment. Mr. Childs then stated that all reports or information that I had concerning secret operational matters that could affect the relations between the Legation and Spain or the Spanish Zone must be referred to him. I stated that I could not do this, as I considered myself under the orders of the Fifth Army in these particulars. Mr. Childs then showed me the report he had written to the State Department with a copy to General Clark concerning the affair. In my opinion it is a fair statement of the two sides of the the question except for the fact that he did not say that I believed no copy would be made.

This tempest in a teapot is of little importance except for the principles involved.

All local non-operational intelligence secured by our Moslem groups is given to Walter Booth, and thus to Mr. Childs. At the same time, I do not feel free to give to Mr. Childs any operational information, nor will I do so unless ordered to by yourself, General Cannon or General Clark.

Very sincerely yours,

Jack Rivers

Copy to Col. Eddy.
Copy to General Donovan.

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[redacted]

Zac

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION
Tangier, May 28th., 1943

Brigadier General Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

My dear General:

I am enclosing a letter from the head of the [redacted] Arabic groups that I believe you will find interesting. It is probable that Carleton Coon has already mentioned this to you; if not, he will be able to give you the details. I believe that the Germans have told their Moslem agents that this is their plan, but it may be one of several or a deliberate plant. In any event, the first phase, the sabotage drive, has already started. [redacted] Fifth Army has a copy of the letter and I have discussed it with them.

On my return from the French Zone I found Tangier and the Spanish Zone much quieter than I had expected. There is nothing new from our various sources that points to Spanish or German [redacted] except saboteurs entering French Morocco, and that we have been expecting for some time.

I am glad to say that our relations with the Fifth Army could not be better. They cooperate with us fully and believe that we are of considerable service to them. Please tell Cash Peck when you see him to take it easy, that he's not missing anything here.

Very sincerely yours,

Gade Clement

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[redacted]

22/4/43.

[redacted] Germans:

1. Mr. Strings: He wrote the document. He is the head of our Strings organization, an extremely important Moslem personage. He wrote it on the basis of information given him by Y.

2. Y: One of Mr. Strings' agents, located in el Kasar el Kebir. His reports have always been reliable.

3. Zaiani is the son of the leader of the Zaian confederation of the Middle Atlas in their struggles against the French. His father's name was Moha ou Hammou Zaiani. Zaiani killed a Controlleur Civil and took refuge in the Spanish Zone. He is a German agent. He was approached by us to work as a double agent, and replied that he would prefer to work for the Americans and English but refused to serve as a double agent. Browne had met him in peace time.

4. Ibrahim el Mezzani: Former head of the nationalist party in the Spanish Zone. In peace time he was in Spanish pay; then, with the outbreak of the war, he was in Italian pay, and is now a German agent. He is #1 among the Moslem agents of Germany in the Spanish Zone. He is the man from whom the demolition material mentioned in the Beatroot report was surreptitiously taken and photographed, then replaced. He is now in Tangier.

5. Sidi Helal: A member of the Middle Atlas tribe of Beni Mguild--his home is in Azrou. He is well known to Browne, who in peace time bought wool from him, and stayed overnight in his house frequently. Sidi Helal is now a refugee in the sanctuary of Mouley Idris in Fez, having been accused by the French of being in touch with the Germans and of escaping./ Browne saw him in the mosque and suspected the Zaiani hookup, which this report confirms. Browne believes that Sidi Helal would surrender to the Americans but not to the French, and would tell the Americans about his connections if he is promised immunity and the right to return to his former life without having his lands or goods confiscated. This might give us the German set-up in the Sous and Middle Atlas./

Browne has arranged for release of Sidi Helal who will recall his men from Tangier. This is being done in agreement with the French.

SECRET

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[redacted]

[redacted]---Text.

Date, April 22, 1943.

[redacted] First, I went to Tetuan and met Zaiani, and asked him about [redacted] of Sidi Helal. I found that I myself used to know Sidi Helal [redacted] was still a student and before he was well-known among [redacted] have all the information about the son of Sidi Helal and [redacted] from the French Zone and came to Tetuan. He stayed in Zaiani's [redacted] night; then the Germans paid him 400 pesetas a month. The [redacted] Helal is now staying in Tangier and teaches French and Spanish [redacted] of Tangier.

[redacted] When I asked Zaiani about the political situation and what [redacted] he said that the Germans have made arrangements with a [redacted] of French authorities such as Controlleurs Civils, etc. [redacted] arrangements with a group of Moslems in the French Zone, [redacted] these groups will blow up bridges, railways, and munition [redacted] revolt. When these things are done in the French Zone, [redacted] toward the French Zone in the name of Sultan Moulay Hafid el [redacted] will land by planes in back of these places.

They have asked me (Zaiani) to propose people (Moslems) [redacted] with them in the planes in order to show the roads and to [redacted] after landing, and to get the support of the natives. Zaiani [redacted] is going himself very soon to Tangier in order to see Sguiat [redacted] Sidi Helal, as well as the man in charge of this affair at [redacted]

When I left Zaiani I went to see my friend the kaid Abd [redacted] el Bokhari who was formerly pasha in Tetuan. This kaid knows [redacted] I know that he has close political connections with the Germans [redacted] to meet together at the time of the World War in the German [redacted] that the Sultan Moulay Hafid had sent me from Spain with [redacted] German consulate, and that is why we are good friends up to [redacted]

I asked him "What is the matter with your friends the [redacted] to be having a long sleep?" He said, "We have been telling [redacted] them for a long time what they should do. However, they [redacted] and delaying and now they are very sorry that they did not [redacted] Americans landed and there is nobody to blame but themselves. [redacted] a great deal of misunderstanding among themselves and [redacted] other for not having acted before. They were very sorry [redacted] they should have started a revolution and gotten the French [redacted] and now they know very well that they have made a great [redacted] now starting all over again and they have gotten it worse [redacted] the French Zone in order to start all this [redacted] Zaiani told me word for word.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

SECRET

I met Ibrahim Mezzani in Tetuan at the place of Ahmed [illegible]. Mr. Mezzani told me exactly the same thing. So I found that it is true when I heard the same thing from the two of them: that they say that the Germans are going to act very soon, in agreement with the French who are in the French Zone, at the same time as [illegible] towards the French Zone in the name of the Sultan Moulay [illegible].

At this point Mr. Strings states and implicitly endorses the following: Zaiani's friend also said "NOW I AM TELLING YOU THAT IF THE AMERICANS DO NOT ACT QUICKLY IN OCCUPYING THE SPANISH ZONE AS THEY WILL BE VERY SORRY, AND THE SAME THING WILL HAPPEN AS HAPPENED TO THE GERMANS IN THE FRENCH ZONE, because if the [illegible] people hear the call of the Sultan Moulay Ahmed el Azib who is [illegible] anti-American propaganda is going on in the Spanish Zone it will be very difficult. My idea as well as the idea of a great many people who know the Moroccan situation is that the only way is for the Spanish Zone to be occupied at once and without delay, before the Germans and Spaniards make a sudden move. Every time I go to see Zaiani I also go to see Kaid ben el Hossin el Bokhari."

May 4, 1943.

s/ Gordon H. Mueller

Gordon H. Mueller

translated by Randolph Gaines

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SECRET

28/4/43

RE[illegible] INFORMANT AS of Tetuan. (A Government official of [illegible]

The khalifa has now gone to Spain. He says that he went [illegible] but I know that he went at Franco's order for a secret [illegible] I do not know exactly where they will meet nor about what [illegible] talk, but I will work hard to find out and let you know.

General Orgaz went to inspect the border road at Sur el [illegible] el Krush; then the Alto Comisario of Tetuan told the editor [illegible] paper not to mention the visit to Had el Krush but to say [illegible] he had gone to inspect the schools in Sheshawen [illegible].

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EUCA, N 11,508
x Treasury, Dept of
x Collaborationists
x France

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

JUN 5 1941

My dear General Donovan:

I know you will be interested in the enclosed report prepared by members of my staff on the financial manipulations of collaborationists in French Africa.

Very truly yours,

H M Jr

Secretary of the Treasury

Brigadier-General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure.

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[redacted]

MEMORANDUM

Re Financial Manipulations of Collaborationists in French Africa.

The techniques of Axis looting have been common knowledge for years. The fact that the collaborationists in each of the occupied countries shared in the "pay-off" on Axis looting is equally well known. This memorandum will not repeat this story. Rather, it will outline some of the financial manipulations in French Africa of the French collaborationists.

As early as September 30, 1942 we were informed that the appointment of Jacques Guerard as the Vichy Government's ambassador to Portugal was probably evidence that "the rats were leaving the ship" and that Guerard was probably trying to arrange transfers of funds for Laval and others where they would be available when the "breakup of France comes." Guerard is an old-time collaborationist and is associated with the Banque Worms group.

After November 7, 1942 we were reliably informed by a prominent French banker (now in the United States) that:

> For a considerable period prior to the Allied invasion of North Africa, French industrialists and bankers prominent in collaboration had been transferring funds to North Africa. It is estimated that such persons, notably, the Banque de l'Indochine, the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, Banque Worms, the Rothschilds, Rivaudeau, etc., had prior to November, 1942, accumulated in North Africa funds in excess of 25,000,000,000 francs.

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> These francs represent their reward for facilitating the successful handling of the "occupation costs" by Germany in France, which was accomplished in the following manner. The collaborationist banks and industrialists received from the Germans all property of refugees, Jews, and labor unions which had been expropriated by official decree. The most valuable of these properties were then sold to the Germans and payment thereafter was made by debiting the credit balance created by daily write-ups of 500,000,000 francs on the books of the Banque de France pursuant to German fiat. The collaborationist financial institutions, with large assets in foreign centers, were apparently willing to participate in the German occupation scheme, whereby they in effect became potential defendants in suits for these properties after the war, provided they would be allowed to remove the francs received for these properties to North Africa. This accounts for the estimated 25,000,000,000 francs accumulated by these institutions in North Africa.

The attached articles by Drew Pearson, Johannes Steel, Nicholas [illegible] and Time Magazine indicate that this story is no secret.

As a matter of fact there is no need to speculate about it for that that the French collaborationists were funneling assets from Metropolitan France into North and West Africa. On March 11, 1943 Treasury representatives interviewed M. Pose in Casablanca. Pose is the director and general manager of Banque Nationale Pour Le Commerce et l'Industrie (B.N.C.I.), Paris. Shortly before November 8, 1942 Pose suddenly showed up in North Africa and was subsequently named Economic Minister in Giraud's administration. While he was recently forced to resign from this position, he is still most active in the affairs of B.N.C.I., Afrique. B.N.C.I., Afrique, the parent of B.N.C.I., Afrique, was organized in 1929 through the efforts of Pierre Laval who paid the funds of the French Government to set up the Caisse Nationale de Credit into B.N.C.I. The fortunes of this bank have followed the fortunes of its political sponsors.

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Pose's significant statements to Treasury representatives may be summarized as follows:

(a) B.N.C.I. opened its first offices in North Africa in September, 1920 (after the Armistice). At the present time B.N.C.I. has 30 branches in North Africa, approximately equally divided between Morocco, Algiers and Tunis and there are six more branches in West Africa, the first branch having been opened in November, 1940. By 1942 the B.N.C.I. was doing 20% of the commercial business in Morocco and 12% of the deposit business.

(b) Throughout the past 2-1/2 years - between the fall of France and the landing of the Allied forces in North Africa - Pose has systematically and deliberately funneled off assets of the B.N.C.I. in Metropolitan France to the colonial empire. In following this practice of funneling its assets into the colonies, Pose contended that the bank had to be very careful not to allow the procedure to become too evident to the Nazis, and hence in some areas it has bought out established banks and kept the name of such banks rather than put them under the name of the B.N.C.I. (e.g. Madagascar).

Accordingly, we have the frank admission of one of the collaborationist banks of its practice of diverting its assets into North and West Africa and the other French colonies. The other big French collaborationist banks have similar outlets in French North and West Africa. Thus, for example, the State Bank of Morocco (Banque d'Etat du Maroc) is the subsidiary of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas; Societe Generale in Algiers is the subsidiary of Societe Generale (France); the State Bank of Algiers is a subsidiary of the Comptoir National d'Escompte; Banque de Tunisie and Banque Commerciale du Maroc are controlled by Credit Industrial and Commercials. Banque Nouvelle also has branches in French Africa.

It must be kept firmly in mind that the state banks in French Africa are privately owned and controlled subsidiaries of financial groups in Metropolitan France -- the same collaborationist group that is influential in shaping policy in North Africa.

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Moreover, the exchange control agencies in French Africa are not independent government agencies. They are in fact the instrumentalities of the so-called state banks in French Africa. Thus M. Jan Hostiou, the head of the Algerian Office des Changes, is an employee of the Bank of Algeria and has his office in their building. A similar situation prevails in Morocco and in the A.O.F. (West Africa). In the A.O.F. the director of the Office des Changes and the managing director of the Bank of West Africa are one and the same person — M. Bettin.

The foregoing has been set forth to show:

(a) That all the facilities were available for the pouring of collaborationist funds into French Africa.

(b) That in fact such funds did funnel into French Africa prior to the Allied occupation; and

(c) That the collaborationist group in France did control, and still controls, the financial institutions in French Africa and the exchange control authorities in such area are the servants of the so-called French African state banks, which are in reality privately owned.

Of course, the final objective of these financial manipulations was not merely to transfer collaborationist loot into franc assets in French Africa. Collaborationist francs in North Africa are merely searching for a bridgehead into free dollars, free sterling or some other valuable currency. The black market rate for French francs in France is variously quoted between 150 and 200 to the dollar against the official rate of 50 francs to the dollar in French Africa. As terms of paper profits the collaborationists made enormous profits in getting their francs into French African whether the official rate there was 75 or 50 francs to the dollar. But the collaborationists are not after mere paper profits evidenced by francs accounts which inevitably must be heavily less than the francs attain its natural level at the end of the war. This [illegible] is to translate those paper profits into dollars or sterling

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earnings, credits, or investments -- preferably dollars -- if they are to be utilized here.

Accordingly the financial proposals emanating from North Africa must be carefully considered in their proper frame of reference, in order to ascertain whether such proposals are designed to provide a means whereby collaborationist groups can cash in on their frank holdings, or, even though such proposals may be suggested by perfectly proper motives, whether such proposals will have the result of providing a vehicle for collaborationist groups to move their assets into realizable foreign exchange. Some of the financial developments in this connection have been:

(1) Demand for free dollar accounts. One of the first demands was that we ought to free all of the blocked accounts in the United States of the North African banks and if this were not possible as a minimum we should free the accounts of the Offices des Changes (exchange control accounts). Treasury representatives who have just returned from Africa, refer to reports of this character by M. Ben Bachir, Director of Exchange Control for Algeria, by M. Ivon, Secretary of Finance to the French High Council, by the State Bank of Morocco, as well as by the highest political quarters in the French African Government, e.g. General Giraud, probably prompted by Puaux, Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Serpuret, et al.

Obviously, the easiest way of "cashing in" on these frank profits is to get the French dollar accounts here freed from our financial control so that such dollars can be manipulated into closed collaborationist accounts both here and in North America.

We have countered by issuing a license over the official assets which requires that we be given ten days advance notice of any transfers and that

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during this period we can vote any transaction. As set up, and in practice, this licensing procedure is very flexible and it causes little or no delay or inconvenience for any bona fide transaction.

(2) Accumulation of dollars through financing from expenditures for our forces in French Africa. Tying into item (1) above is the financing of our forces in French Africa. To furnish our forces with francs we have established dollar accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for each of the State banks. As our forces need francs, we credit these accounts with dollars. At the present time the accounts of the Central Banks of Algeria and Morocco have more than $75,000,000 to their credit, arising from these transactions. While technically these funds belong to the "French Treasury in Africa", we should not be misled by either the title of the account or the source from which we got the francs.

The "French Treasury in Africa" borrows the francs with which our forces are supplied from the French banks in Africa. In other words the collaborationists in their political capacity secure the francs from themselves in their financial capacity. We buy the francs with dollars which are credited to the accounts of the French African state banks "for the account of the French Treasury in Africa." This puts the French Treasury in Africa in the position of owing large balances to the collaborationists banks and having as its only substantial asset with which to repay such balances its dollar holdings in the United States. If these dollars holdings were free of the United States controls as the French would like, the French Treasury in Africa would be under considerable pressure to transfer its dollar balances to the collaborationist banks.

(3) [redacted] Item (3) we need to repeat in this memorandum

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the United States also in the name of Giraud to establish the right to use the blocked assets of the former French Government and the Bank of France, even though the French African authorities had tens of millions of dollars on deposit here. To date we have parried all such attempts but inquiry has been advised by the Commandant en Chef in no many words that his acceptance of our refusal is "without prejudice" to reopening this matter again.

The very most any of the collaborationists to realize on their frame ups in North Africa would be to shoulder the French people with the francs and for the collaborationists to take the dollars of the French people in return. This, however, is looking at the "end product" of such deals, rather than the inevitable proposals by which the effort is being made to establish the right to deal in such assets.

(A) Further a French dollar loan in the United States. One of the most recent maneuvers bearing on this subject is reflected in a cable dated March 20, 1943 from the American Consulate General in Algiers. This cable stated:

> "This is a message for Secretary Hull and Secretary Morgenthau from Murphy, Clausen and Murphy.
>
> United States Government permission to refill North African commercial in the blocked francs to French residents of the United States has been asked by Tree. The desire of the United States Government in introducing the issue of unrestricted personal exchange at Casablanca is made of unity with the [illegible] Treasury for payment for dollars thus [illegible] of francs [illegible] would be the same as the [illegible] for commercial [illegible] in North Africa. Psychological [illegible] and [illegible] the funds acquired, according [illegible] [illegible] the purpose of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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this proposal was side-stepped by the following note which was prepared and which was sent on:

> "This is a memorandum from the Secretary of the Treasury for Messrs. Murphy and Clayton.
>
> "With regard to the Secretary's No. 314 of March 20, concerning the sale in the United States of North African securities to American residents here, the Treasury Department has advised that the Government of France is one of the governments which defaulted in payment of debts to the Government of the United States. For that reason, under the so-called Johnson Act of April 13, 1934 (U.S. Code, title 22, section 804a), persons resident in the United States cannot buy securities of the French Government. It has not been possible, accordingly, to look into the merits of the request made in the telegram under reference. The Department of State agrees with this conclusion."

The possible ramifications of this proposal were outlined in the attached article by Johnson Steel. In brief, Steel indicates that while the French talked about floating a dollar loan in the United States, in reality, the B.N.C.I., et al would take up the loan in francs. In other words the B.N.C.I., et al would have, in effect, converted their francs into French Government dollar bonds, constituting a dollar obligation against the dollar assets of any French Government hereafter established.

Methods of Counteracting these Manipulations

In discussing the French financial proposals, none of this Government's counter-moves have been noted. By and large the thrust of this defense has been our freezing orders pursuant to which French assets in this country may only be used pursuant to Foreign Funds Control license. This strategy is purely defensive on our part and leaves the collaborationists in a position to maneuver on any level in operating for the use of funds in the control. While our controls are effective, it would be foolish to [illegible] hope of false security -- for the foreign controls are

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as elsewhere than our Treasury mates. The French will press for license on all fronts -- making full use of political tactics to achieve their ends. It is on this level that the defense of our freezing regulations will most likely break, for much will be made of the fact that the French are a "proud and sensitive people" and that our controls are incompatible with their status as a sovereign ally. It may be expected therefore that pressure on the State Department will be great.

Immediately after November 7, 1942, Treasury representatives in North Africa did take all the measures possible within the fabric of the political situation prevailing to frustrate the financial activities of the collaborationist group. However, our forces in North Africa were in no position to impose duress as an army of occupation. Instead, we had to persuade the French to take action. Under the pressure of our Treasury representatives the French on November 16 issued "Instructions to Banks", which, among other things, provided for the blocking of all bank accounts belonging to European nationals, including people in Metropolitan France.

On December 20, after lengthy and prolonged negotiations, the Treasury representatives succeeded in having signed a "Trading with the Enemy Ordinance" under the terms of which severe penalties were laid down for any trade or communication with the enemy, or enemy-occupied areas, and on the terms of which a Black List would be issued -- the French authorities never subsequently issued Black Lists for several European countries and their colonies.

Control over Italian and French West Africa by the French North African administration was delayed for some weeks following the events of November 8. It was not until December 7 that French West Africa formally allied itself with French North Africa on the side of the United Nations. During this

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[illegible] it would have been possible for financial transactions not connected [illegible] to have been carried on between this area and Metropolitan France. [illegible] French East Africa finally came within the sphere of influence of French North Africa, it was on political terms so favorable to the French that financial controls other than those indicated above could not be enforced upon.

On March 5, 1943, the French issued a sequestration decree, the negotiations for which were instituted by Treasury representatives in early December, 1942. This decree, at least, sets up the legal and administrative framework within which the frozen balances of the collaborationist could be [illegible] in North Africa if it were the disposition of the authorities there to deal with the situation. Needless to say this is in fact the real place to control such spoils. If these looted balances were blocked in the banks in North African there would be less need for us to be concerned about an attack on our own freezing regulations since the funds would be blocked at their source. However, no one should be overly optimistic that the collaborationists in a political capacity are going to impose effective controls on themselves in their financial capacity.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that United States Treasury representatives carried with them on their landing at Algiers on November 8, 1942, drafts of decrees which, if issued, would have imposed really effective controls over such looted funds from the very start. It was not that we had failed to anticipate the problem - rather there was no vehicle available through which the necessary controls could be established.

As things now stand, our technicians in North Africa are limited as to what they can do to control the situation. They must use persuasion with the French. They can pick out the most sordid cases and force the French to deal with them. But they cannot hope to be really effective

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will, they can get almost French Government cooperation.

To the extent possible the Treasury Department has taken and will continue to take a strong position against the efforts of the collaborationist group to transfer the looted assets out of French Africa. However, it seems clear that this is not a problem which may be adequately dealt with by the Treasury Department without the support, both on a political and economic level, of the other interested governmental agencies.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew [illegible]

h Profits

[illegible] were permitted to keep the purchase price of the property. In these cases [illegible] made huge profits, and it was these profits which were transferred to North Africa before the American landing.

[illegible] doing business with the Germans were The Banque de Paris et de Pay Bas, the Banque de Indo-China and the Banque Worms.

Despite their close cooperation with Germany, apparently these [illegible] knew in advance that United States troops were going to land in North Africa. How they knew this military secret in ample time to send their money to Algiers though the United States Cabinet did not know, it [illegible] a few days before has now been definitely established on the side of the Atlantic.

However certain circumstantial facts are significant. The charming and suave Robert Murphy, had as his close friend, [illegible] Lemaigre-Dubreuil, head of the French Association of Tax [illegible] a big business lobby [illegible] the laws of these countries. Lemaigre-Dubreuil worked hand in glove with the Comite des Forges, or steel trust, which had property in Austria and Axis countries. He had led the Fascist disturbances in Paris in 1934, shared the same political philosophy of these German collaborating bankers, and was close to them.

Strangely enough it was Lemaigre-Dubreuil whom Murphy chose to handle his contacts for the invasion of North Africa. It was he who picked General Giraud, arranged to get him to North Africa in disguise, and who was Murphy's key man in this vitally important operation.

[illegible] told his banker friends in Paris about our military plans in North Africa, but it is an incontestable fact that they moved [illegible] 25 billion frane profits, [illegible] from unfortunate Jews and labor unions, to North Africa shortly before the actual Allied landing.

French Banking Lobby

AFTER United States troops landed, the State, War and Treasury Departments had agreed to keep the exchange rate at 75 francs for 1. Whereupon the French bankers immediately launched a lobbying campaign to get the franc at 50 to the dollar instead. This would greatly enrich the 25 billion-franc nest egg they had sneaked out of Paris.

Strangely enough the bankers received vigorous support from Ambassador Bob Murphy. His argument was that [illegible] French Africa to the south, the franc was pegged at 50 to the dollar, so it should not be 75 to the dollar in North Africa.

However, Washington had fixed the 75-franc rate in Algiers and Morocco before the Germans had made their iron fist weaker in this area where they had not been able to weaken the franc in Free French Africa.

The bankers, as supposed to [illegible] United States financial [illegible] ing of this case, Mr. Murphy went to bat vigorously for his French banking friends that eventually he got hold of President Roosevelt in Casablanca and the White House issued an order fixing the rate at 50 francs to the dollar.

Overnight, the French banking clique which had profited from the forced sale of Jewish and labor union property had their 25-billion-franc nest egg increased in value from 350 million dollars to 833 million dollars.

Capital Chaff

IT was shortly after Louisiana's Senator Ellender telephoned Louisiana's Supreme Court Justice [illegible] Higgins that he was [illegible] appointed to the [illegible] Fifth Circuit Court [illegible] that F. D. R. appointed [illegible] among Allied to that [illegible] [illegible] to fill [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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New York Post

Steel Filings

Did Speculators Tip Nazis To Our Africa Invasion?

By Johannes Steel

Cordell Hull has stated that there is deep concern among the United Nations over the transmission of vital information to the Axis through neutral countries.

The Secretary of State made this comment in the course of a press conference when he was asked about a remark of a former Argentine Consular Attache in Tokio to the effect that Argentina has been the eyes and ears of the Japanese government in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Hull is well justified in expressing his concern although the problem is certainly not limited to Argentina and in more than one way is of our own making. Only the politically naive will insist that Germany derives no advantage from the continued existence of large diplomatic staffs in Washington on the part of such "neutrals" as Finland and Spain, both of which are actively on the side of Germany.

Loophole for Fascism

The whole world is laughing at our appeasement of Spain. Last week, Argentina ratified the first in a series of cultural agreements between that country and Spain, which are deliberately aimed at the spread of Fascist propaganda throughout South America and at the destruction of the Pan-American ideal. The projected ideological conquest of South America by the Fascist doctrine of Hispanidad is perhaps even more important for the future than the fact that the Japanese Embassy in Argentina is accused of sending more than sixty cablegrams a day to Japan with full information on United States war production.

Yes, information is leaking through neutral sources, but not through neutral sources alone. For what I would really like to know is who was the American official who tipped off Jacques Delmaigre-Debreuil some [illegible] before the American [illegible] took place, that an Allied invasion of North Africa was coming. Let us not forget that that tip [illegible] Darlan to [illegible]

de Boisanger, who represents Vichy on the board of directors of the Bank of International Settlements at Basle, to participate in the North African currency speculations which have made vast new fortunes and which are now being investigated by the United States Treasury.

Nazi Bankers Also Knew

Certainly this was vital information, the leakage of which should have caused grave concern because these French speculators, who knew of the coming [illegible] of the Allied invasion, informed their German colleague on the board of directors of the Bank of International Settlements, Baron von Schroeder, of it. In fact, de Boisanger met von Schroeder in Switzerland early in October 1942. Shortly after Baron von Schroeder's conference with de Boisanger, French industries and banks which were half German-owned began transferring their assets to North Africa.

All liquid funds were transferred to the offices of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and the Banque de l'Etat du Maroc in Morocco and Algiers. All this, of course, for the purpose of exchanging francs [illegible] with the help of the American diplomatic representatives in North Africa, into dollar assets. This was possible because there were [illegible]

[illegible] of its motives and dangers, the protection of the [illegible] sound hedge against Hitler's military defeat.

Meanwhile it would [illegible] be extremely interesting to [illegible] whether Baron von Schroeder, who primarily seemed to be interested in transferring German-French assets to North Africa, thought it necessary to inform the German General Staff of the knowledge that an Allied invasion of North Africa was on the way. A particularly interesting question since Herr von Schroeder was the man at whose house in Cologne in 1933 the pact was made between German industry and Hitler, leading to the latter's election as Chancellor.

If von Schroeder did inform the German General Staff of what he expected to happen in North Africa, it would be interesting to speculate upon the reasons which made the German General Staff decide not to take more drastic counter-measures than it did. Could it be that the German General Staff felt that all the conquest of Africa would finally amount to was a delay of one year in the establishing of a second front on the European continent by the Allies, giving the Germans enough time to fortify Festung Europa?

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U.S. Investigates French Profits In Revaluing of Franc in Africa

Vichy Officials Said to Have Reaped Harvest on Advance Tip of Upward Exchange Revision After Invasion; Seizure of Funds Likely

By Nicholas P. Gr[illegible]

WASHINGTON, April 18 [illegible] Department [illegible] foreign [illegible] is investigating reports that [illegible] exchange [illegible] the Vichyite [illegible] French North [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] francs [illegible] 50 to 100 [illegible] were learned today.

[illegible] may lead to [illegible] control over the finances [illegible] officials hinted suddenly [illegible] to have a stated extraordinarily large sums of francs in anticipation of a profitable converting into dollars.

Soon after the invasion of North Africa by the Americans, the franc was revalued at 50 to the dollar, [illegible] established and was thereby automatically raising it to 2 cents. Conversion of francs into dollars began.

The groundwork for punishment of these exchange speculators exists and may be put into operation after the investigation is completed. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander in chief of the Allied armies in North Africa, may permit conversion of francs based on holdings as of a certain date perhaps prior to the invasion.

These officials, it is learned, acquired large sums of francs after the invasion and after they had received exclusive information of the proposed upward revaluation. The Treasury may also use the threat of the seizure of dollar assets some of these officials have cached in the United States or refuse to honor credits deposited to their accounts.

Bernard Bernstein, former head of the Treasury Foreign Funds Control Division, was suddenly commissioned prior to the invasion a [illegible] established and was sent to North Africa ostensibly to straighten out the chaotic monetary condition of the colonies.

Last January he returned to the United States and conferred with his former colleagues in the Treasury. Little is known of these con-

(Continued on page 22, column 6)

[illegible] Treasury [illegible] Africa [illegible] the hands of [illegible] and State Departments, [illegible] Lend-Lease and Board [illegible] nomic Warfare officials, [illegible] stamped them, but publication [illegible] dated by the Army and the State Department.

The United States [illegible] revalued upward to ease the purchasing power of the native population and the French colonists. By one stroke the United States is expected to bring some relief to the hard-pressed population which had been robbed by the Italian and German so-called armistice commissions.

The Treasury printed special American currency for circulation in North Africa. These dollars are marked with a gold seal as contrasted with the customary blue seal. This special currency was prepared as a precaution against Nazi seizure and possible use in other parts of Europe.

The franc at the time of the invasion had a nominal value of slightly more than one cent. It had been declining since the German invasion of France. The French government has in the United States about $1,400,000,000 in gold exchange and other assets.

Although most of the resources of the Bank of France were sent out of the country, the Germans were able to seize considerable resources, as for example, about $250,000,000 of Belgian gold which was entrusted to the Bank of France. The position of the French currency has deteriorated since June, 1940, the Nazis draining the Bank of France at an alarming rate. Its foreign exchange holdings have declined to 37,000,000 francs, the bank reported, while occupation costs have risen to 100,000,000,000 francs. Note circulation has grown from 151,322,000,000 in December, 1939, to 323,484,000,000 francs. These statistics are said to be inaccurate and ostensibly "doctored" to make [illegible] a better monetary picture than is the case.

In other words, the [illegible] of Marshal [illegible] a sum to the [illegible] equal to [illegible] money in [illegible] full of francs [illegible] of the inflated [illegible] culation.

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[redacted]

Dollars

[redacted]

Monsieur Dubreuil [redacted] surrender associations included an interest in pro-Fascist Paris newspaper, connections with [redacted]

With the consent of the U.S. State Department a consent which [redacted] was given reluctantly Monsieur Dubreuil recently [redacted] an official economic adviser in Algiers.

Unknown outside of inner Allied economic circles [redacted] preceded his entry, French officials [redacted] had transferred millions of francs to North Africa when the rate of exchange was 100 to 120 francs to the American dollar. Upon French advice the U.S. authorities reduced the rate to 50 francs to the dollar, enabling the speculators to turn a profit of 100 to 140%. Before the U.S. Treasury officials awoke and forbade such speculation several huge fortunes were amassed by this trading in francs and dollars.

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

Steel Filings

How the Treasury Halted A Peyrouton Dollar Deal

By Johannes Steel

It may yet be too early to draw the balance sheet for the first fiscal year of collaboration in North Africa. We have never been told when the first fiscal year of collaboration began.

We do not know when the first deal was negotiated and the first transaction consummated. Yet there are ample indications that German as well as French big business knows the precise dates. The question now is whether we will eventually be able to pay dividends on the business of collaboration in which we have engaged in North Africa.

Let us therefore strike an interim balance. What did we get? Certain military concessions which, it is insisted, saved American lives. Considering what has happened in North Africa since we first landed there, it remains extremely doubtful that any lives have been saved by negotiation. In fact, it may very well be that we would have long been in Tunis and Bizerte had we not negotiated with Darlan long enough to give the Germans time to throw really important reinforcements into Tunisia. If we had given Darlan the alternative of being shot within two hours or delivering Tunis and Bizerte within that time, we would probably be there now.

The Fortune Hunters

We also got Giraud and that band of sinister international operators, headed by the ubiquitous Marcel Peyrouton, who see this phase of the war as nothing but an opportunity to amass gigantic fortunes and control over a continent-wide European industrial and financial cartel.

We also got Gen. Nogues who, in fact, is still actively sabotaging our efforts at every step of the way. Further on the debit side is the unparalleled loss of American diplomatic and political prestige among the peoples of Europe in particular and the peoples of the world in general.

Now let us take a look at what this has cost us already and what we are proposing to pay out in the future. I mean in actual cash. Somehow, during the last two weeks before the Allied landing in Africa, a sum of money, according to the latest information amounting to 25 billion francs in cash and securities, was transferred from the Continent to North Africa. This was done with the permission of the Vichy Government and the German economic control of France. The 25 billion francs represented assets and moneys chiefly held by German and French interests.

The transaction in the main was carried out through the Banque Worms and their North African correspondents, the Banque Nationale Pour le Commerce et l'Industrie. Now, it is important to note here that these French francs which were transferred to North Africa were purchased in France at the rate of approximately 200 francs per dollar. Meanwhile, however, the American Administration in North Africa has obliged the holders of these funds by exchanging these francs for dollars with the one difference that we have been giving them $4 for 200 francs, or fifty francs to the dollar.

Peyrouton Finds a Way

Of course, it has been physically impossible for Marcel Peyrouton and his principals to unload altogether the total of 25 billion francs and obtain dollars for them. Apparently there were not enough dollars in North Africa. Now, however, Marcel Peyrouton and his French and German principals apparently believe they have found a way of doing it.

Representatives of the Banque Nationale Pour le Commerce et l'Industrie have convinced a group of three American banks that it would be a good idea to grant the Giraud administration a loan of fifty million dollars upon which the American banks, of course, will earn their usual 4 per cent commission.

But—and this is a beauty—said the representatives of the Banque Nationale Pour le Commerce et l'Industrie to the American banks: "All you have to do is underwrite this loan. We will take it up in North Africa ourselves. North African French business will subscribe to this loan because we believe in the future of Giraud and France. But, of course, you must enable us to convert our francs into dollars so that we can subscribe to this fifty million dollar loan. Will you get the Treasury to buy our 25 billion francs at the rate of fifty francs per dollar?"

This plan was being worked out neatly in New York and Washington last week until the Treasury got wind of it and politely but firmly said "No!" This does not mean, however, that the boys have stopped trying. Here is one for the Senate to investigate. A really hot potato!

You also may listen to news analyses by Johannes Steel over Station WMCA daily at 7:30 p. m.

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Africa N. 1114
* State Dept
* Boarder Control
* Tangier

APRIL 5 1943

MR. ROOSEVELT

WILLIAM A. KIMMEL.

REPORT OF BORDER CONTROL BETWEEN TANGIER AND THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ZONES OF MOROCCO.

As of possible interest, I attach herewith despatch from the Legation at Tangier, dated February 18th, which has been handed to us by the Department of State.

W. A. K.

Attachment

cc: Colonel Donovan
Colonel Burton
Colonel Huntington
Mr. Hyatt

SECRET

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[redacted]
[redacted]

Tangier, February 12, 1943

No. [redacted]

Subject: Report of border control between Tangier and the French and Spanish Zones of Morocco.

[redacted]

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to the Department's telegram No. [redacted] authorizing the Chargé d'Affaires to meet General Patton in order to work out a satisfactory system of border control and referring also to the comments on Legation from the Legation of February 4 1943, in which the Near Eastern Division states its desire for information on the effectiveness of the present system of border control and the collaboration existing between all interested agencies to make it so, I have the honor to report on the system as it is working at present.

With the exception of certain Spanish officials who travel on diplomatic or service visas, it is felt that no undesirable persons can, under the present system, enter or depart from Morocco legally. The control is very strict and the chief difficulty encountered by the Legation is not so much in preventing undesirables from obtaining visas, but rather in obtaining visas for those non-official persons whom the Legation or the French and British Consulates General wish to go to French North Africa. When favorable action is finally taken, an American border control number is allotted to be affixed on the visa without which the visa is not valid.

All applications for visas made at the French Consulate General in Tangier are referred to the Legation where they are examined by the Foreign Service Officer in charge of border control, Mr. Henry S. Hopkins, who has taken on this work in addition to his other duties, including the Economic Unit control and the accounts work. The applications are submitted by Mr. Hopkins to the offices of the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, and Air Corps Liaison. Some of these applications are referred in turn to the British Intelligence Service in the event there is any reason to believe that persons might be interested in the applicants, and they are all examined by Mr. Hopkins to see that the Assistant Naval Military Attache, if an undesirable enlistment is known by any one of the American services, the application is disapproved as such. If the applicant is either unknown to the services or if it is considered necessary further to put him to the test, the application is forwarded with a recommendation, the visa [illegible] recommendation being favorable. Upon leaving Tangier, the applicant

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are forwarded to Rabat where they are seen by the French Civil and Military authorities, the American Consul, Mr. Mayer, and the American Military Counter Intelligence Service. The applications are also referred to Algiers for review.

For the ordinary person who has not the support of the American, British, or French authorities, a month to two months is required in order to obtain a visa. Inasmuch as French North Africa is a military zone and an active theatre of operations, delays are to be expected and the granting of visas should be the exception rather than the rule. In many cases, however, excessive delay is a source of embarrassment to the Legation, both as regards certain types of Spanish applicants who have the backing of the Spanish authorities and also with respect to cases involving other nationalities, particularly when such persons have been of service to the Legation or the American or British Intelligence Services. The Legation has suggested to the interested authorities in French North Africa that the French Consul General in Tangier be granted a certain lot of numbers each month which can be affixed to visas without prior reference to Rabat or Algiers. In spite of objections from some quarters, the Legation is still of the opinion that this would be desirable, and a member of the Legation staff has been told by Colonel P. L. Black, G-2, Casablanca, Colonel Herviot, Director of Public Security at Rabat, and Ernest Mayer, American Consul at Rabat, that they were generally in accord with this proposal.

At present to facilitate urgent cases, it is necessary for the Legation either to telegraph Algiers or telephone Mr. Mayer in Rabat or both. Even this procedure does not completely facilitate matters in the numerous cases in which the French Protectorate authorities insist on waiting until the actual application has reached them before taking action. It is also obviously impossible to use the telephone in any cases involving an American or British Agent whom it is felt should leave immediately in order to avoid arrest, imprisonment, or even death at the hands of the Spaniards. It has been suggested that if numbers were allotted to Tangier, a telegram could be sent to Rabat in each case notifying the appropriate authorities the name of the person for whom each number was employed so that there would be no confusion at the border. It is realized, of course, that the military authorities have the responsibility for keeping enemy agents under control, but at the same time it is felt that nine-tenths of the information contained in the French or American counter espionage files in French North Africa concerning persons in or from Tangier undoubtedly originated from one of the six Allied Intelligence Services in Tangier which are actively engaged in this work.

For the purposes of expediting the issuance of those few visas which are to be granted, it is hoped also that in the near future some system may be devised to obviate the necessity of the reference by Rabat of all visas to Algiers. Favorable endorsement is never placed on an application which has been made in Tangier unless the applicant is well known to one of the Intelligence Services. Persons applying in the Spanish Zone at Tetuan and Larache have their applications forwarded direct to Rabat without reference

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to Tangier, but their names are sent to Tangier for checking so that an unfavorable endorsement could be sent to Rabat by telegraph if necessary in order to stop the allotment of a number. Finally, all applications made in Tangier by persons resident elsewhere are forwarded with the endorsement "Without Observation". It is our opinion that considering the careful scrutiny given applications of persons originating in Spanish North Africa and Tangier by the Legation there would seem to be no necessity for the reference of such applications to Algiers by Rabat. It is believed that if the action on such applications by Rabat were notified to Algiers in such case with opportunity given for review of the action by Algiers without the delay inside the reference to Algiers for approval, some of the delay now ensuing might be avoided without any relaxation of the control.

The suggestions and observations made above are offered only as exceptions to the general observation that the border control system appears to be working very successfully, and that cooperation between those concerned in its execution is all that can be expected. Any delays which may exist in attempting to accelerate the procedure are only natural ones due, primarily, to the fact that so many offices and services are involved.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ J. Rives Childs
Charge D'Affaires ad interim

811.1

Original and Hectograph to Department
Copy to Embassy, Madrid
Consulate, Rabat
Consulate, Casablanca, for General Clark
Consulate General, Algiers

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April 7, 1943

Mr. Frederick C. Cochener

Mr. Edmund L. Taylor

Whittaker Cable #1563

Sherwood's proposal would appear to abolish the psychological warfare section, as previously constituted, and replace it by:

(a) A general, long-range propaganda service in Algiers under OWI direction, probably with some supervision from General McClure.

(b) A combat propaganda unit under Haseltine in which OWI men will conduct propaganda and OSS gather intelligence without either representing their agencies.

The implications of this proposed re-organization, as they appear to me in the light of other information I have gathered here, are as follows:

(1) In the North African Theater there will be no way in which our M.O. representatives can carry out their black propaganda functions unless they are detached from the psychological warfare service altogether and attached to Colonel Eddy.

(2) Colonel Eddy probably will not be authorized to handle propaganda other than rumors, at least without the consent of the OWI head in Algiers.

(3) The Sherwood proposal already has been accepted in principle by General Eisenhower, or is about to be accepted. This will greatly strengthen OWI position in North Africa and improve their general bargaining position in relation to us.

As to our immediate line of action I think the first thing is to find out from Whittaker what possibilities, if any, he still has of doing black propaganda work with Haseltine, and if the reply is not satisfactory have him

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transferred to Colonel Eddy. At the same time, every effort should be made to supply Hazeltine with the personnel he needs.

I doubt that there would be any use trying to protest against the new set-up. I am not quite sure that it is really harmful to us, although it looks ominous. If we do contemplate any protest, we must act immediately and very forcibly; otherwise, it will be too late.

In my talks with OWI here I will try to find out more about the arrangement and, if necessary, try to get some clause allowing us to operate in North Africa to be written into the agreement. In the North African theater at least, it appears that the only way we can do any large-scale propaganda is in full partnership with OWI.

E.L.T.

cc General Donovan ✓



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Darlan Adm. Fenard
Assassination
Africa, N.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION HELD THURSDAY, JANUARY 28th, 1943

Subject: Darlan Assassination

My French informant confirmed that the assassin of Darlan was Bonnier de la Chapelle, who was one of Dastier's pro de Gaulle group. Dastier is the brother of General Dastier de la Vigerie, who is with de Gaulle in London. de la Chapelle was a young man with an Italian mother.

Dastier arrested Darlan and General Juin, who was called to Darlan's house during the night of the American landings. He told the Admiral that his house was surrounded, the telephone lines cut, and that he could retire or otherwise pass the time as he saw fit. Because of the treachery of a colonel in Dastier's group, Darlan was subsequently released and able to assure the direction of resistance.

The arrests made subsequent to Darlan's assassination were of Dastier's followers. He himself remained in hiding.

In Morocco, General Bethouard went to Rabat with his followers to arrest General Noguès on the same night, but found himself and his men overpowered by the 30th who were protecting Noguès. Bethouard was arrested and imprisoned and Noguès called Admiral Michelier in Casablanca. The Admiral informed him that all was quiet there. Thereupon, Noguès, thinking the attack to be no more than a commando raid, ordered resistance. When, the next day, he discovered the magnitude of the invasion, he recognized his mistake, but it was too late.

That de la Chapelle was the assassin of Darlan was confirmed to me by a young personal friend of the assassin, who knew him well as one of Dastier's de Gaullist followers. His friend also confirmed that de la Chapelle had been executed.

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Memo #4072

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION HELD THURSDAY, JANUARY 28th, 1943

Subject: Casablanca Conversations

My French informant said roughly the following: -

1. Robert Murphy and Mack had arrived in London.

2. Between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, relations had been very reserved but correct. Giraud had two propositions to offer: -

(i) That de Gaulle place himself under his orders (this proposition was never made, apparently on advice of FRD and PM)

(ii) A triumvirate with Giraud at the top and General de Gaulle and an unknown French general still in France under him, de Gaulle remaining at the head of and bringing with him the territories he now administers.

This latter proposition met with a very chilly reception from de Gaulle, who compared it to Napoleon's Consulate which was based on great victories and a plebiscite. With some sarcasm, de Gaulle told Giraud that neither one of them had any victories, and that he, de Gaulle, had the plebiscite.

3. Relations between General Giraud and General Catroux were very cordial. General Catroux is of General de Gaulle's age and military "promotion" and has had far more political experience. For these reasons, General Giraud is apparently quite ready to listen to him.

4. General Giraud took full responsibility for bringing Peyrouton to Algeria, saying that he needed a man with a firm hand in authority there.

5. General Nogues took no part in the conversations, other than to be present at the dinner offered Sultan by FDR.

6. De Gaulle had a long and very cordial talk with FDR which lasted late into the night. The impression is that FDR was favorably impressed.

7. It was agreed by Giraud and de Gaulle that there would be an exchange of Missions between London and Algiers, chiefly for consultation on the military side. It was the opinion of my

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informant that everything depended on the choice of personnel for these Missions. It was his view that if Catroux went to Algiers, French union would follow within a period of weeks. On the other hand, if the Mission were composed of insignificant persons, the possibilities of union might be forever lost. With Catroux would go his aid-de-camp now in London, Captain Burin des Roziers, who was secretary at the French Embassy in Washington until Laval's accession to power. My informant also expects to be included in the Mission, although this is not yet certain.

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Gibraltar A. A.070
Jr. Report - A.2102
Agreement
French
Eisenhower, Gen D.
King, David.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: March 9,1943

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Major D. W. King

SUBJECT:

I. In my comments or the various paragraphs of this agreement I am speaking from my knowledge and experience in Morocco, and Morocco only.

II. It was several weeks before the French Military authorities made any move to reinforce their Spanish Moroccan border or increase the border patrols, police, etc.

III. Up to the time I left (Dec. 29th) nothing had been done to remove some 10,000 Italians in and about Casablanca from the coast. This was suggested by Colonel Newlot of the Sureté but all his efforts to do so were blocked.

As for consulting our Commanding General, no lists of arrests or prisoners were submitted as far as I know, neither were the liberations of F.P.F and U.O.L. leaders and agitators reported.

IV. I should say off hand that the phrase restricting our use of the personnel in the port put us definitely at the mercy and willingness to cooperate or not, of the port authorities. The chiefs of this organization were always against us.

V. This was not carried out. Those chiefs and technicians who were friendly to us were blanketed and cut off from communicating directly with our chiefs.

VIII. Three of the best merchant ships were taken over by the French authorities from the Louis Dreyfus line. It would be interesting to know whether they have been restored to this line for the purpose of chartering them to our government.

IX. There have been numerous disputes and arguments on this subject.

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X. This had not been done when I left.

XI. Nevertheless Radio Maroc continued to broadcast anti American propaganda under the direction of its chief for almost a month after the Armistice.

D. W. K.

Dwk

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A 2102

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

Through our [illegible] we have received a copy of [illegible] entered into between the [illegible] and General Electric. A copy of [illegible] for your information.

[illegible]

January 9, 1943

Dick - Bill
You make your
Comments on this
L.

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

COPY

NORTH AFRICA
AGREEMENT

(Between French authorities and General Eisenhower)
Preamble

The forces of the United States and their co-[illegible] allies have landed in French North Africa for the purpose of preventing the domination of this territory by Germany and Italian forces and their Allies and for carrying on the war for the defeat of the Axis powers.

By a common agreement [illegible] North Africa, all communications in French [illegible] in the person of [illegible] West French [illegible].

It [illegible] of the French [illegible] of the United States [illegible] to [illegible] forces of the United States [illegible] to [illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] set forth [illegible] forces [illegible] Numbers I [illegible].

I [illegible] in this [illegible] General [illegible] the [illegible].

I. [illegible] rights and privileges [illegible] French [illegible] direction. [illegible] the cause of [illegible] and [illegible] United States and [illegible] French [illegible] African territory and [illegible] from [illegible] All movement of French [illegible] operations will be notified to the Command [illegible] of the United States may be stored.

III - French [illegible] personnel will co-operate in the [illegible] of their functions and loyalty to the purpose of the forces under the command of the Commander, General, United States Army [illegible] supporting forces. Such [illegible] personnel will have [illegible]

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A 2705

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

as may be necessary for the maintenance of cover and public relations services throughout the territory in coordination with the Commanding General of the United States Army.

IV - The control and command of all landing and other facilities for aircraft, harbor and port facilities, defenses, ordnance and armament will be available to the Commanding General, United States Army, and supporting forces, for the purpose of [illegible] thereof. The control of [illegible] will not include the [illegible] French personnel without the consent of the French authorities.

V - Full information [illegible]

VI - French [illegible]

All [illegible]

[illegible]

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

above, and such maintenance as he may consider [illegible] proper maintenance and operation of all [illegible]

X - In North Africa, requisitioning of billets, supplies, buildings, transportation and services for the use of the Allied Forces under command of the Commanding General, [illegible] is authorized, if not practicable to procure by purchase, [illegible] quantities and fair prices. Requisitions will [illegible] authority of the Commanding Officer of the troops [illegible] and upon the Mayor or other appropriate civil [illegible] be made initially. In cases of necessity, Payment [illegible] made in cash or by [illegible] of the Army to whom the [illegible] The receipt [illegible] be filed by [illegible] with any [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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XV - The Commanding General, United States Army, and the forces under his command and supporting forces and their legal Governments, the representatives of their governments and civilian employees of these governments shall enjoy extraterritorial privileges and be exempt from the jurisdiction and immunities to the process of the courts, civil and criminal, of the territory.

XVI - In North African areas decreed by the Commanding General, United States Army, to be of importance to the conduct of the war, as set forth in the preamble hereof, from time to time, and by him to be military areas under his command, the orders of the Commanding General, United States Army, and the civil authorities will be [illegible] becomes necessary.

XVII - [illegible] opinion of the Commanding General, United States Army, the authorities of [illegible] in accordance with [illegible] necessary for the protection of the [illegible] under his command.

XVIII - [illegible] such military [illegible] may deem [illegible] on the local [illegible] of the present [illegible].

XIX - [illegible] Commanding General, United States Army, [illegible] of such civil [illegible] may deem appropriate [illegible] as well as for the [illegible] as well as [illegible] operation of [illegible].

XX - [illegible] will extend to the [illegible] postal services [illegible] and shall [illegible] in the [illegible] appointed by the [illegible].

XXI - The foregoing arrangements shall be [illegible] and French languages. The English text is authoritative.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

NOTE: The foregoing was furnished me by Mr. Preston Goldsmith (U.S.Embassy) who was Deputy Civil Affairs Administrator, AC of S, Force Commander, (North African Operation) - and by the Major [illegible] between Darlan and CG AF.

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Africa
X Asia
X Central File
X Government

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

March 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Lt. Comdr. McBaine

In response to your request, I forward herewith a copy of Report O-3160.

The problem of making sufficient copies with the limited personnel we have, and the desire not to overburden your files with unwanted material, are the reasons why a separate copy was not sent you in the first place.

T. H. McB.

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O 3160

Subject :- Military Government in CYRENAICA

SECRET

SECRET

CYR/152/4/G.

15 Feb 43.

TO: 83 Area.
99 Sub-Area.
4 L of C Signals.
HQ Libyan Arab Forces (Senussi).
AADC. CYRENAICA.
NOIC. BENGHAZI.
NOIC. TOBRUK.
212 Gp. RAF.
HQ Military Government of CYRENAICA.
1 F. French Div.

rptd Main HQ EIGHTH ARMY
Rear HQ EIGHTH ARMY
DMO. GHQ MEF.
DMI, GHQ MEF.
OPO. Political Branch GH[illegible].
MEIC. GHQ MEF.
SIME, GHQ MEF.
ISLD. GHQ MEF.
HQ CRTA. TRIPOLITANIA

FROM: HQ. CYRENAICA DISTRICT.

1. Instructions issued by Main EIGHTH ARMY for the Military Government of CYRENAICA (M.8A/264/Political of 21st November, 1942), are cancelled.

2. Commander Cyrenaica District is generally responsible for the Military Government of Cyrenaica (FSR. Chap. II, Sec. 7 (i)). The representative of the political services in Cyrenaica will be the Deputy Chief Political Officer who has been given a warrant under authority of the Commander in Chief, MEF to exercise all functions of Military Government on behalf of Commander, Cyrenaica District, subject to any directions that may be issued to him by the Commander, Cyrenaica District or the Chief Political Officer, MEF. (FSR. Chap. XII. Sec 61 - 63 applies to relations between CPO and DCPO).

3. The DCPO is authorized to proclaim to the inhabitants such measures as may be necessary for the security of the Forces, the maintenance of order and the proper administration of the territory, and to enforce obedience to them by such penalties as he may think fit.

4. Relations with the civilian inhabitants will cease to be a function of local administration carried out by Formations, Areas and Sub-Areas.

Proclamation (Delegation of Powers), signed by Commander, EIGHTH ARMY will come into force with effect from 15th February, 1943. The DCPO will delegate his powers under Article 1 of this Proclamations will be signed (Secretary to the Administration). Consequently, Proclamations will be signed by these DCPO, Orders, Rules and Regulations by the Secretary to the Administration; and the local orders by Political Officers. They will not in future be signed by Area and Sub-Area Commanders.

5. The relation between Commanders of Areas and Sub-Areas and Political Offic[illegible] shall be the same as those between the Commander, Cyrenaica District and the DCPO. Political Officers will keep Commanders of Areas and Sub-Areas informed.

6. The lay-out of the Military Government is attached as Appendix 'A'.

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7. Subject to the over-riding consideration of furthering the progress of operations, the Arab population will be treated well. In the name of their exiled religious leader, Sayed Mohammed Idris el Senussi, the Arabs have been thanked in the House of Commons for the assistance they have given to the British Army and have been assured that His Majesty's Government will not again see them subjected to Italian rule. HMG are anxious to improve the present conditons of the local inhabitants by good administration, by giving the Arabs a share in the administration of their country, and by maintaining social services on a level not lower than that established by the Italians.

8. Formations and Units in Cyrenaica District which are not in possession of copies of ' Notes on Military Government ', Part 1 and II, and Cyrenaica Proclaimations 1 - 10, will indent for them on HQ. Military Government of Cyrenaica.

Lt-Col.
General Staff.

3 Copies to GHQ. MEF for : -

Minister of State, Cairo.
C-in-C. Mediterranean.
A.O.C.-in-C. EGYPT.

LWK.

SECRET

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O 3160 - 2

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SECRET

APPENDIX "I" to
[illegible]/132/4/3 dated 15 Feb 43.

SECRET

COMMANDER CYRENAICA DISTRICT

STAFF

HQRS MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Legal | Police & Prisons | Medical | Public Works & Transport | Local Port. | Public Rels. | Intelligence | Tribal Affairs | A & Q | Estab. Officer (Areb Personnel) | Education | Agriculture & Veterinary | Postal

Courts of Justice | Land Registry. | Legislation | Custodian of Enemy Property.

Finance

Accounts | Currency | Trade &

Northern Province

Barce Dist. | Cirene Dist. | Derna Dist.

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

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APPENDIX 'A' to
DYR/152/4/3 dated 15 Feb 43.



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Africa N. 10,253
x Water Supply
x Tunisia
x R+A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan DATE: April 8, 1943

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT:

Transmitted herewith is one copy of "Water Supply in Tunisia," prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as confidential.

William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research & Analysis

Enclosures (2)

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CONFIDENTIAL

WATER SUPPLY IN TUNISIA

Interview with Robert S. Charles, President, Layne - New York Co., Inc., 97 Liberty St., N.Y., water supply contractors, and Joseph W. Simard, C.E., International Water Supply, Ltd., Montreal. March 2, 1943.

Informants worked for Hydraulique Afrique in Tunisia 1931 - 1935, on and off, drilling a number of wells, for municipal supplies for Tozeur, Tunis, Sousse, and others. Have photos, including a stream in flood, camel caravans, trench flow, etc. They rely greatly on Carte Tunisie, Tunisie, 1/900,000, about 1930, Paris, which shows roads, mountains, etc.

A. Water

1. General. Most streams in Tunisia dry up in summer. [illegible] have continual flow near their sources, particularly in the mountains of the northwest. In the main parts of the country, most streams have water only in detached pools here and there in summer. The Medjerda River flows all year. The Miliane River, south of Tunis, has some water all year, but only a little in summer.

In the semi-arid country south of the Chotts - Eastern ranges the natives store surface runoff in surface masonry cisterns, with masonry roof. Source of supply for cattle and people. Natives drink it without special precautions, though tea is much used too.

Most of the villages and smaller cities depend upon water from house roofs, stored in cisterns. Even in the western central mountain area, in the Tebessa - Kasserine district,

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water supply would be a serious problem for troops in summer. In some localities, the natives depend upon surface water, which is limited in amount in summer. For troops operating in this area in summer it would be necessary to tank water in for considerable distances or dig wells. Some water might be obtained by digging wells in stream beds with portable apparatus. It seems likely that sizeable underground water supplies could be tapped by deep wells near Djilma, east of Sbeitla. Metlaoui, a mine in the southern part of the area, has an abundant supply for its own use.

2. Tozeur and Vicinity. Along the anticline of the Tozeur area, the natives have in many cases dug deep trenches into hillsides to tap underground sources. The trenches are perhaps 200 feet long, and are graded so the water flows out by gravity, often as a considerable stream.

Nefta, west of Tozeur, for example obtains all its town water in this manner, and in addition waters over a thousand acres of dates. (Note: Total daily flow, 9½ mil. gal.--1918 Report on Tunisia).

Tozeur, besides such a local supply, has 4 wells, drilled in 1931-35, which produce 1500 gallons per minute each (8,640,000 gal. per day, total). (Note: Total from all sources, 14½ mil. gal. daily--1918 Report on Tunisia). Oasis El Hamma, north of Tozeur, also had drilled wells.

The drilled wells in this area go down 800 to 1000 feet before striking water. Once tapped, the water rises to the surface and flows. Of the 4 recent wells at Tozeur, 3 flow

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naturally and one has a Diesel pump.

At Kebili, east of Shott Djerid, water conditions are believed to be similar to those at Tozeur, though informants have no specific information on Kebili.

Dates are the main crop in the Tozeur and Kebili areas, but are not important farther north. The dates are carried by camel to nearby markets, such as Gafsa and Gabes; grain and other food is the return cargo for the camels.

The water in this dry area, as at Tozeur, has about 1500-2000 parts mineral salts per million; this seems very fine to the natives, though appears hard to us. (In the north, water is much less alkaline. At Tunis, for example, only about 100 parts per million.)

3. Gafsa. Has trench flow water of unknown quantity, and in addition has three wells with a total flow of perhaps 500 gallons per minute.

4. Sfax has an ample supply of water, brought 50 km. from the west by an aqueduct.

5. Sousse gets its water by gravity flow in an aqueduct from springs, and a well at Bou Hafna, in the mountains 45 km. west of Kairouan. Flow from this aqueduct is probably about 2 million gallons a day.

In the coastal plain in the vicinity of Sousse, old Roman wells are common. Some of these are very carefully made, with steps of stone leading down to the water.

At the village of Beni-Hassan, south of Sousse, 3 wells have been drilled to 190 feet, with a total output of about 1

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million gallons a day. Here and in the general vicinity of Sousse, electric pumps are used. The power comes from the steam generating plant at Sousse (Coal is probably the fuel used.)

6. Kairouan, a holy Arab city, is supplied by two wells, each of which produces one million gallons of water per day. The water is conveyed by an aqueduct.

7. Tunis. Tunis was at one time supplied by a huge stone aqueduct built by the Romans and now in a state of ruin. This aqueduct heads in a reservoir near Zaghouan.

At present, the city is supplied by a pipeline heading near Zaghouan. Additional water is obtained from the Medjerda River, with the aid of a dam in the river (exact location not known by informant).

About 10 years ago, Tunis was experiencing severe water shortage about 8 months per year. Use of water was limited to a few hours each day in the early morning, around noon, and in the evening. "Hydraulique Afrique" drilled wells 12 miles south of the city to increase the amount of water supplied by the pipeline, and Tunis now has an adequate supply. The water is of high quality, with only about 100 parts of mineral salts per million. The water is safe to drink.

8. Bizerte gets water by a pipeline from a reservoir in the mountains. Water is also supplied by a group of wells near the coast to the northeast of the town.

9. Sfax

Sewage systems are lacking in most towns of Tunisia.

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The scarcity of water is an important factor in limiting the development of flush sewer systems.

Sfax has an excellent piped sewer system, with an outlet direct to the sea.

Tunis has a piped sewer system, but the disposal of the sewage is unsatisfactory. The sewer empties into the lagoon just east of the city, and the sludge collects there. When the wind is east, a bad smell pervades the city.

The resort towns south of Tunis, such as Hammam Lif and Hammamet, have excellent systems of sewage disposal.

Bizerte has a good sewage system.

C. Health

The French government operates an excellent system of health centers throughout Tunisia (at Tozeur, Gafsa, etc.). Each center has a doctor, and usually a nurse. The centers do effective work along such lines as vaccinating the people. There is not much sickness, so far as the informants had noticed.

D. Snow

Occasionally snow may obstruct traffic for brief periods on mountain roads in western Tunisia. The snow conditions seem to be about like those of Washington, D. C.

E. Mud

In the semi-arid area, particularly southward from Kairouan, the mud appears to be bottomless. The mud dries very fast, however, and half a day after the rain has stopped it is solid enough to support wheeled vehicles. In poorly-drained areas, like the numerous shotts that occur in the lowlands from Tunis

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to favour, the mud may remain for weeks after a rain.

The roads in this area are mostly dirt, commonly just cross-country tracks, so the mud conditions are very noticeable.

In the lowlands and valleys west of Tunis, informants stated that they had not noticed so much mud. They suggested that perhaps this is because they did not have to drive away from paved roads: these lowlands have an excellent system of roads.

(Note: Additional information on Tunisian water supply, including maps showing aqueducts and water sources for a number of towns, will be found in the ISIB Report on Tunisia, C.B. 4096 i, March 1941.)

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March 16, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Mr. Wallace R. Deuel

Thanks for your notes on Lessons of North African Operations. I think, in substance, your recommendations are right, and I have in mind preparing a statement of such problems before the next job is done.

W.J.D.

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North Africa Ops 10/8 92
Lessons
Deuel

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

March 15, 1943

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

FROM: WALLACE R. DEUEL

SUBJECT: Lessons of North African Operations

To judge from the reports on our North African operations which you asked me to read, it would appear that lessons of value for the future might be learned in respect of the following points:

1. The officers responsible for the landings and subsequent operations of the (other) armed services were not aware of many of the arrangements which we had made in advance of the landings.

It will probably be neither possible nor desirable in future operations to inform any but a very small number of the officers of the other services as to arrangements we will have made in advance. Would it not be possible, however, to make arrangements for informing responsible officers that arrangements have been made and that it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements be respected in so far as is compatible with other considerations -- and that most particularly natives of the theatre who have cooperated with us must be protected at all costs? I take it that something of this sort was done in the case of the North African operations, but it seems that the other services involved were not adequately impressed.

2. In some cases apparently the officers responsible for the actual landings and subsequent operations were unwilling to accept the judgment of our people who had been there before and who were thoroughly familiar with the local situation.

Could the Joint Chiefs instruct theatre commanders in future situations of this sort to pay more heed to the advice of our people on the spot? Also, could the situation be discussed in advance of the actual entry of the army and/or navy into a theatre in some kind of talks of our responsible representative or representatives and the theatre commander?

3. The officers responsible for the landings and subsequent operations seem to have interpreted the President's

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ruling that they were a liberating, not an occupying, force, in such a way as to leave power in the hands of local French officials which those officials used in such a way as to do great harm to those who had helped us in advance.

In the future, when a similar ruling from the President may be made, would it not be possible to keep a closer rein on local authorities -- without deviating in any degree whatever, naturally, from the spirit and letter of such a presidential order? At the very least, men who have risked their lives to help us in advance obviously must be protected against the consequences of their having done so.

4. The officers responsible for the landings and subsequent operations seem to have been short of staff advisers familiar with France and the French language and with local conditions.

Surely this is a point on which we can be particularly useful. Our principal political officer attached to the theatre commander will always be an expert in the area which is the scene of operations, and we will have a fairly numerous representation of the CSS, also expert in that theatre, upon whose knowledge and services he can draw. Could the Joint Chiefs give our principal political officer the rank or authority necessary to cause his counsel to be more effective?

5. I assume that this has already been done, but might a full statement of the problems which have arisen in the North African operation, drawn up especially for the Joint Chiefs and presented to them, be useful?

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North African operations

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[redacted]

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Bruce N. 10/26/42
K Rosebonough, A.
K Report.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan DATE: March 8, 1943

FROM: Major King

SUBJECT:

1 - I absolutely agree with this memorandum.

2 - I have sensed that something of this sort has been going on hence my eagerness to get back and try and pick up my old machine.

3 - I would like to add the names of:-

M. Poussier, Controleur Civil of Casablanca

General Desré, the man who broke his word to General Bethouard

to the list of those essential to be removed.

Dick King

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Lee Hart 10/76
+ Roseborough - Ca
+ Report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel W. J. Donovan DATE: March 4, 1943

FROM: Francis P. Miller

SUBJECT:

The other day I received by hand from North Africa a personal communication from Arthur Roseborough. The Director of S.I. and the Acting Chairman of the Reporting Board have received copies of this communication. In addition to the attached copy for you, they have decided that the only other distribution should be a copy to Mr. Hugh Wilson for dissemination among the members of the Planning Board.

F.P.M.

Attachment.

SECRET

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a fine hand - 10/26 -
v Roosevelt
A Report -

Probably written 2/15/43

Date Received 2/26/43

SECRET

It is difficult to know where to start on a brief summary which is all I shall have time for now. I shall pass over the military situation with respect to which I claim no competence. It appears that in the opinion of some of our more serious minded officers it leaves much, in fact almost everything, to be desired. However, whatever may be the impression at home the actual command in the N.A. theater is definitely British though we are in the unfortunate position of getting the credit for the mistakes.

With respect to the political and intelligence situation - where I do immodestly claim some competence, the position is even more tragic than even you or I ever imagined.

The picture can't be painted in a few words, and I do not have time to treat it adequately. The official position of those charged with our political policy here is that we have done (and continue to do) what we did because it was necessary to win the war. The position of our military authorities is that they are not in politics and are not concerned with it - which is, of course, a blatant obvious error. They are in politics over their ears but do not have the wit to realize it or the competence to deal with the situation. The easy thing therefore is to close their eyes and refuse to see the obvious.

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I do not find it easy to explain what we have done and are doing here in the political field. Any conclusions I may draw now must be taken as tentative. These would seem to be the primary elements:

1. The absence of any clear controlling policy or principles in Washington.

2. Our lack of aptitude and just plain ignorance and stupidity in this field.

3. The temperament and background of the principal political advisers upon which the command here and apparently the War and State Departments at home rely.

4. The influence of the British.

5. The French we have to deal with here in N.A.

6. The lack of coordination and the friction between our military and our civilian departments.

The first of these elements is largely responsible for the sixth, but this is, of course, the traditional contempt and mistrust of the soldier for the civilian in time of war.

In the field of world politics we have - or had - one great asset - the belief in us as the great champions of democracy, of freedom and honesty. We are known to be naive, but were believed to be honest and straightforward. When, as we have done here, we abandon the one ground on which we could defend ourselves and descend into the arena of the anti-chamber and try to engage in the labyrinthian maze of Machiavellian diplomacy, we are beat in advance.

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Our political advisers and military leaders made the initial mistake of depending upon Giraud to turn the trick here in N.A. When that failed - as they were told it would, they would appear to have become panicky and lost their nerve. Darlan was perhaps not as bad as some of us believed, but in calling on him to save us we lost ourselves. We cut ourselves adrift and have not yet found our bearings or our courage to face the facts and deal with them. When Darlan was shot and Giraud, the man we had chosen, came in, he was no longer our man and no longer felt any obligation towards us.

The French are quick to sense weakness and to exploit it. They - and the British - have done so here to such an extent that our position has become ridiculous and pathetic.

Our C in C has laid down the basic principle that we are not here as an invading Army. The French are our Allies and friends and, whatever they may have done as individuals prior to "D" day, they are now to be trusted as friends and Allies. We all wish to God that this were true. But the fact is that French North Africa is not French and that many of the French here are not our friends and cannot be trusted. They are precisely those who are in control!

Virtually all of our proven friends - those who worked with us and risked their lives to prepare for the arrival of our troops - have now been put in jail, or in the case of Army officers, degraded and sent to outposts in the desert so as to be out of contact with us. We do not raise a finger to protect these people!

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There are literally hundreds of these cases all over N.A. I shall cite a few which are illustrative, but by no means unique.

Three young officers of the French Coast Guard Service made possible General Clarke's much publicized clandestine meeting a few days before "D" day. One put the motorcycles and cars of the other services out of commission, and the two others stood guard over the house where the meeting took place. Without this help, Clarke and his companions would almost certainly have been caught. They have all three been degraded and sent into outposts!

All over N.A. the S.O.L. - the Nazified S.S. troops of the "National Revolution" were and continue to be - together with the P.P.F. - most actively opposed to us. Many of the parachutists who have recently been dropped behind our lines have been Algerian members of the P.P.F. who happened to be at a convention in Paris on November 8. But those who do not need a parachute to come here are, under the C in C's orders to be treated and trusted as friends!

At Oran the General commanding the troops - a notorious and outspoken collaborationist who publicly declared that Giraud was a traitor - " militarized " the local S.O.L. on "D" day and its leader, Dounic*, surrendered eventually to our General F. in very correct military fashion after the fighting ceased.

Despite the protests of our control vice consul, General F. immediately took Dounic* to his breast, dined with him, was seen publicly with him, had his picture taken with him - which is now displayed in Oran. Our friends who had worked with us at the risk

* The spelling of this name is not clear. It may be Dounic.

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of their lives but had remained undercover, disclosed themselves after the arrival of our troops. Dounic*, through his S.O.L. which, though nominally "dissolved" remains active, used his obvious favor with our commanding general as a proof that the S.O.L. had in fact been accepted by the Americans and harassed, threatened and assaulted our friends despite their appeals to us for help.

Today in Oran the civilian organizations which are entrusted with the unloading of our ships, the building and servicing of our airports, the distribution of our gasoline, are openly controlled by Dounic* and four of his friends of the S.O.L. or P.P.F. All this vital information undoubtedly goes directly to the Germans. We have repeatedly reported the situation to G-2 of A.F.H.Q. who merely refer it to the French Securité Militaire - headed by Col. C, a very doubtful character and "former" open collaborationist, who refers it to F. his man in Oran who protects Dounic* and takes no action.

To illustrate the effect of this, when I sent a man to Oran to recruit for our service he was told by the two men who had been most active in helping us before "D" day that three months ago they could have given him hundreds of men ready to die for ours and their cause. Today, however, not a man would work for us - for the British, perhaps - but not for us as we were obviously unable or unwilling to protect those who risked their lives for us.

One more case here in Casa. - out of hundreds which could be cited. A young soldier engaged in the training of the Chantier de la Jeunesse,

* Spelling of this name is not clear. It may be Dounis.

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a youth training program patterned on the Hitler Youth recently reported to one of the C.I.C. agents of our command here, that the French officer in charge of the camp was openly teaching pro-German doctrines and propaganda in the camp. This report was passed to the head of our G-2 here - until recently a deputy sheriff in Washington State who does not speak French and has no knowledge of them or other qualifications for the post. He passed the report on to the French who sent it to Nogues! with the name of the soldier who made the report!

Soon afterward Nogues at dinner with our General Patton said, "General what would you do with a soldier who informed on his superior?" Patton is reported to have replied, "I would court-martial the so and so." The soldier in question is now under arrest awaiting court martial! We know from experience that it will serve no purpose to bring the case to the attention of our authorities, but I intend to do so.

The two men primarily responsible for advising the Command on political matters are, of course, Bob Murphy and Julius Holmes. Both have definite qualities and competence and I do not believe their sincerity can be doubted. They are both, however, in the position today of having to justify an initial mistake which may have been unavoidable.

B.M. has a conservative cast of mind and the usual State Department respect for the status quo. He lives in a somewhat ethereal stratus of those in power and seldom if ever gets down to the pay dirt of the little people who make up the nation and from whom one learns, I believe, what goes on within the nation. For him, those who wish to change the status

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que no matter how just their complaints or how valid their claims on us may be are "trouble makers" and must be prevented from making "trouble". I fear B.M. lacks the courage to force an issue with the French Authorities. The course of least resistence is to avoid doing so and the pleasantest. He is an able man and a charming one but not a strong man. The French quickly recognize weakness and exploit it.

Much the same can be said for J.M. though he is a stronger personality, I believe, than B.M. He also is perhaps even less convinced that this is a peoples' war and that the people should have much to say about it as the peace. Both men are ambitious and very jealous of their perogatives.

The French here who are in control are a consummate lot of politicians whether they are in uniform or out. It is perhaps significant that in Giraud's recent declaration he followed de Gaulle in stating that France when liberated should be allowed to choose her institutions but unlike de Gaulle, Giraud failed to add that she should also choose her leaders. Those about Giraud have spent lifetime attaining and maintaining themselves in position. Now that they have recovered from their shock and amazement at not being removed when we came in, they are digging themselves in and eliminating all those - in particular those who have proved their friendship for us - who might be dangerous to them. Our authorities, particularly the military, are completely lost in this intrigue and keep reassuring themselves by repeating that they are not in politics and must not interfere in French political affairs.

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The result is tragic. Those who looked to us and worked with us for deliverance have completely lost confidence after a period of bewilderment and patient waiting. Most serious of all is the effect in France itself as well as all Occupied Europe. We are making inevitable a bloody civil war in France. Those who are responsible for our policy here - for the sake of maintaining order here - may well be responsible for a communist Europe tomorrow. Russia remains the only power to which the people of Europe can turn and who has not betrayed them.

The time I have spent on this hasty and most inadequate sketch of the political situation leaves little time for the intelligence picture. It can be summarized as

1. Utter incompetence on the part of our G-2 and C.I.C.

2. Army has no conception of "intelligence" as the French and English understand and practice it. The British are in complete control of G-2 of A.F.H.Q. by default on our part. I have yet to meet an American officer in intelligence who has any adequate training for the job. Most of them are ex cavalry officers or ex deputy sheriffs in uniform. Few speak French and fewer know anything of the people. Here in Morocco we have a lot of soldiers in the C.I.C. running around in civilian clothes who do not speak the language.

The most depressing thing is that reports which our service turns in or which are received directly, are turned over to the French for investigation and action, and the French not only take

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no action but punish the informers. Under these circumstances, no one dares give us information. The case I cited above about the young soldier is not an exception. It is the rule. It is worse than futile to try to build up a counter espionage service. The networks we had before the landing have been virtually destroyed. Recruiting for penetration of Europe is impossible as prospective recruits are convinced that we can't or won't take care of them.

As black as the picture may seem it is not hopeless provided we act promptly. The removal of a few men - Bergeret and Chertiene in Algiers, Boison and Forest in Oran, Nogues and Lascroux in Morocco - would convince the rest that we are not complete fools and would bring them in line. It is foolish to say that six men cannot be replaced.

The improvement of our own intelligence is not such a simple matter. Men cannot be trained over night. The friction between the military and civilian branches might be reduced, however. The French here are more than aware of it. They boast of adding fuel to the fire and of keeping it alive.

I trust that this hasty attempt may help give you some of the picture.

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Africa N. 10,284
Strategic Data
Country Survey
Morocco - Sanitation
King, David

File

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: March 11, 1943

FROM: Major D. W. King

SUBJECT: Observations on secret memorandum of March 1 entitled "Political Policy in North Africa"

In analyzing this memorandum I should underscore the fact that what I say in regard to Morocco is from personal observation; what I say in respect of North Africa, however, is hearsay as I was not present in this area other than for a brief period.

In my opinion General Patton was placed in an untenable position from the start. He entered an area in which a section of the population was enthusiastically for him but another section was just as enthusiastically opposed or indifferent to an American entering. As of November 11 General Patton was instructed to treat the entire population on the basis of an area of friendly cooperation. Thus the basic fact was ignored that he was surrounded by numerous elements still hostile to Americans. This situation was intensified by the fact that many of those hostile to him were in key positions and have so remained. Instead of being able to take such measures and precautions as he saw fit to insure the safety and transportation of his troops, General

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Patton was told to cooperate with the existing authorities in office and rely upon their help and good will.

General Nogues flew to Algiers and came back fully entrenched in his old position with all his old power and with all his own henchmen around him.

It was then decided that a sharp date line was to be drawn, that is November 11, and that everyone in Morocco was to be judged by his actions after that date regardless of whether he had worked for or against us before.

The Nogues clique, the Collaborationist, the P.P.F., and the S.O.L. couldn't believe their ears, as they were all packed up and ready to go. Those who had risked everything to help us in the past were appalled as they could see what was coming.

The saying around Casablanca at that time summed up the situation: "It took the Americans three days to take Casablanca and then Nogues conquered them in a day."

It may have been our idea to win over the hostile French by this generous, somewhat quixotic move, and at the same time remove any accusations of sedition against those who had helped us but it didn't work that way.

The old cliques took a long breath of relief and got to work. Those who had helped us were arrested or at least warrants were issued for their arrests; P.P.F. and S.O.L. leaders who had been active against us were released from jail.

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Those who were not arrested had the finger of derision pointed at them and it was carefully explained to them that they were considered as rebellious, impetuous children and that the Americans only respected those who had done their duty and kept faith with Petain, Laval, et cetera.

Then began a period of confusion. Those of the Vice Consuls who had built up a group of partisans and supporters over a period of 18 months were besieged by delegations demanding justice, vengeance, or reward.

Some of these claims were justified from men who had really served us and who were in actual danger of arrest or were about to be mobilized from key positions or who felt that they were entitled to some consideration in the new order of things which they hoped would be established.

On the other hand there were men trying to pay off old personal grudges, men who had done nothing for us but proclaim their hatred of the Germans and love for the Americans, very discreetly, and men who sought to make themselves important by bringing in wild tales of treachery, German propaganda, and native uprisings.

All these cases could only be handled by men who knew the type of man they were dealing with or who, if they

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didn't know the case themselves, knew who could give them an unbiased opinion on the case.

The Army G-2 was soon snowed under. There was no one in that branch who had been in the country before and none of the chiefs spoke French. At first they came to us for help and we tried to put them in touch with the reliable chiefs of the various French services such as Colonel Hervoit, head of the Surete, Major Breitel, head of the S.R., Captain Doudot, head of the C.E., but as they could not speak French and the French officers could not speak English our G-2 began to pick its own favorites.

Most of these men had been discarded by us as untrustworthy and useless after we had been in the country three months. These men, however, spoke English or got some of the new Vice Consuls who had arrived just before D day to translate for them so the chain of misinformation was complete.

Soon little sub-commissioners of police in outlying districts, who had been sent there for grafting, insubordination, or inefficiency, were brought into Casablanca without even getting leave from their chief, to testify as to their chief's treachery and their own martyrdom because they had been pro-American.

As a matter of fact their chief had helped us to

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such an extent in spite of Noguès' and the Germans' protests that he was under orders be quit the 15th of November on the third demand of Herr Auer, Chief of the German Armistice Commission.

In the meanwhile officers like Major Champeaux, commanding a battalion of Tirailleurs, were forced to hide as there were orders out for their arrest. Champeaux had given me his word that if we were landed he would order his men not to fire and would join us. He had refused an offer to leave secretly and join De Gaulle saying he thought he could be more useful with his troops in Africa. He kept his word, thereby probably saving the lives of several hundred Americans for he was in a key position and his battalion was considered the best one in the best regiment of the division. Nothing was done for him. I went to General Patton and explained the case but he told me his hands were tied and that the Major would have to give himself up and go through the mill. I offered to take him into my own house but was forbidden to do so. Eventually I got some friends to take him. Two weeks later an amnesty was arranged for such cases but in the meanwhile he had plenty of time to reconsider his rashness in helping us. Other officers who were not caught openly in the act of helping us, such as Major Bouard, Lt. Monglin, Lt. Marcilly,

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and others were sent to small inland posts more or less in disgrace, and leaving their wives and children in houses which they could not afford to leave or have their furniture moved to the new posts.

In the meanwhile the old clique was triumphant. Monsieur Poussier, the Controleur Civil (Mayor of Casablanca) invited our generals to his house and went to the Generals' house to dinner. Mr. Culbert, the civilian adviser to the General Staff, gave parties in his apartment to which the old officials and our ranking officers went. The same thing occurred at Rabat with General Nogues and his other officers. Young Frenchmen with collaborationist tendencies were employed at headquarters because they spoke English and knew Poussier, et cetera.

Young Poussier boasted that he could get any job for his friends because his father had enormous influence over General Patton.

The people who had helped us began to growl. None of them seemed to be able to reach the heads of our various departments. The French attached a military mission of some 40 officers to our headquarters and their sole objective seemed to be to act as a retarding agent between the requests of our General Staff and the people who would carry them out.

In all these cases it must be remembered that General Patton was under severe handicaps. He did not know that the

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French do not receive people in their own houses or go to other peoples' houses unless they are on extremely cordial terms with them. Official dinners are, of course, an exception. He had no way of hearing the impression this made on the hundreds of little people who had helped us. As far as his dealings with Nogues were concerned he had been instructed to work with him and the men Nogues sent to act as liaison officers were not likely to tell him some of the secret instructions Nogues had given to some of his officers, i.e., that they were to look upon the American army as an army of occupation; that the anti-aircraft batteries manned by French gunners were not to fire on any Axis planes; that he, Nogues, had caused a rift in the relations between our Charge d'Affaires at Tangier and General Patton.

Nogues promised everything and saw to it that nothing was done. The same was true of the officials in Casablanca.

After a time, however, General Patton sent for me and asked my opinion of conditions. I gave him a short resume of the various tricks which Nogues had played and suggested that I might be able to convey this idea to Nogues through private channels that the General's patience had limits and that it might be well to smooth out some of the obstructions on the road before General Patton brought up a steam roller. General Patton agreed to this and was delighted

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at the idea of being able to get at Nogues unofficially from the side lines.

I then asked him if we could not supply the Commander of the Moroccan Corps Franc with a liaison officer in order to cut through the red tape the French were using at the time; that is, whenever the Corps Franc wanted anything the General commanding in Casablanca was full of regrets because it had just been promised to the Americans. General Patton said that that was beyond his power as he was dealing directly with the French Staff only.

During all this period of flux I had pinned my hopes on one thing. If we could get General Giraud to come to Morocco and raise the morale of the Army, putting officers in command in whom the younger officers had faith and relieving the others, I felt that other matters would fall into line. The Surete is under the Army in time of war and so are the S.R. and C.E. so there wouldn't be much left except the "Service des Affaires Indegenes" for Nogues to fool with and most of this service was on our side at that.

I wired Colonel Eddy and Mr. Murphy to this effect and spoke to General Bethouard who was then at Gibraltar on the same subject.

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But Giraud proved to be rather a broken reed. First, by his unwillingness to assume the responsibility as head of the government in North Africa. Secondly, by the humility and timidity he displayed when Nogues called him a traitor and renegade during his first visit to him in Algiers. Thirdly, his delay in coming to Morocco to stiffen up the Army and take the real control in hand. It must be remembered that Nogues was only Resident General and not Commander in Chief of troops. This delay was probably due to the fact that he believed Nogues when the latter told him that the troops in Morocco considered him a traitor and a renegade. In the meanwhile General Bethouard had been sent to Gibraltar and his staff scattered all over Morocco, so there was no sincerely friendly general in Morocco. Just before he arrived in Morocco I sent word around to the various garrisons what Nogues had told Giraud and arranged to have the troops and public give him a hearty ovation wherever he went. I, myself, could not get to see him when he was in Casablanca so could not tell him what was going on behind the scenes. Neither could any officers or officials friendly to us speak to him privately.

In spite of his enthusiastic reception it seems only

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too obvious that when he returned to Algiers instead of taking a strong line of his own he has been making every effort to conciliate the old Army groups and get back into their good graces to the consternation of the Army group which risked everything--careers, pensions, and rank--to help us.

In closing I think we should remember one thing. When the French play politics they play them for keeps and they just don't understand our attitude in not rewarding those who helped and punishing those who opposed us, especially as we could have left most of the minor and subordinate in their jobs and changed the whole character and tone of the Administration by the removal of five or six men.

- II -

I have already made a report on our activities in Morocco before and during the landing of our Task Force but think the items given below should also be mentioned.

Major Jean Rigaud, who had become Colonel D'Astier de La Vigerie's right hand man did not arrive in Morocco until November 1.

He rushed around the country from Marrakech to Port Lyautey and spoke with various men whom he designated as

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substitutes for various pro-Vichy officials should the Americans or British land in Morocco.

He did not get a final decision from General Bethouard to throw in his lot with us until November 4 and it was not until late in the afternoon of November 5 that I knew that our plans for the various resistance groups were to be changed and that we were to call off our men in order to give the French military men a clear track.

This presented the following problems:

1. The telephone and telegraph groups had to be told not to cut connections between the French General Headquarters command posts, batteries, et cetera, as these would be required to give orders to the various units and batteries not to fire.

2. The order to cut the power off at Rabal, Casablanca, et cetera, had to be countermanded and the railroad group was told to protect all railroad equipment instead of organizing local breakdowns.

3. The arresting of the Armistice Commission was to be carried out by the Garde Mobile under Military direction instead of by my group of roughnecks under the direction of the Service of Information, and their second mission or objective, i.e. to go by trucks to Fedala to reinforce our

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somewhat weak resistance groups there, was cancelled. The auto buses acquired to take 50 men of the Casablanca railroad group to Fedala were also cancelled.

4. The Police and Surete were charged with arresting German agents, P.P.F., and S.O.L. leaders and those pro-Vichy officials in power instead of Valabraigue and his group and my railroad strong arm group doing so.

5. The groups which had been designated to destroy the gasoline tanks and bomb supplies at the various aviation fields were told to protect them against German agents' sabotage.

These changes in orders had to be carried out in less than 48 hours and the various group leaders warned at the same time to have their groups in a state of alert.

The password for guides and interpreters had to be issued and arms distributed to the various action groups. Samples for instruction purposes had already been issued.

I had to lend my car to Capitain S. and Lieutenants Merglin and Marcilly to go to Meknes and arrest General Lascroux instead of having the Meknes group do it. This, however, worked beautifully and was worth the loss of my car for two weeks.

But all these difficulties and changes were nothing compared to the errors of:

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1. Not sending the Staff Officer to Casablanca with the latest orders and details of the landing.

2. Not sending a mobile force to Rabat (if they could not land at Sale) from Fedala to take possession of the "Residence" and support General Bethouard. Had this been done the orders given the commanding officer at Port Lyautey, by one of our friendly French officers, not to resist could have been confirmed by General Bethouard.

Also General Desre might have kept his word if he knew that Nogues was a prisoner.

Failing these two things it is my opinion that we would have done better not to have tried to change our original plans and hand over to the Military at the last moment.

At least had we not done so the Armistice Commission would not have been escorted to the border unscathed.

D. W. King

D. W. King

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 9, 1943

TO: Major King

FROM: Colonel Donovan

I am returning the copy of the Political Policy to you.

I was interested in your statement, but I am satisfied that you could do better on the comments you have made, as I am also satisfied that this report does not present all of the facts that entered into that night.

As a matter of future use I would like you to pool all your thinking together, and I would like you to examine this whole situation more completely.

WJD

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To: Jack King

Help me

on This and

your Comments

D

Director's Office

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan DATE: March 9, 1943

FROM: Major King

SUBJECT:

I agree with this report except for the statement that General Giraud called in Peyrouton. It was my understanding that Murphy in agreement with the D'Astier de Vigerie group decided to get Peyrouton over to Africa, even before the killing of Darlan.

In regards the list I would like to make the following comments: General Odic of the French aviation is something of an opportunist. He was not held in very great esteem even by those officers in the French Aviation who were loyal for us. I don't think he would do our cause any good and might even alienate more of our supporters, Jean Angelelle. This man was never of any particular help to us. He was sent as I remembered to Fez by Colonel Harriet [illegible] as a disciplinary measure on account of petty grafting at Casablanca. He afterward got in touch with OSS-2 and set himself up as a martyr.

M. Binet might have been sent to Port Lyautey because he believed in the Allies but just before he was sent there he became very active hunting out our agents and when he got there he was very much against us. The man who really came over to our side and gave us every assistance was Pigeon the Chief of the Port Lyautey City Police. He put his whole force at our disposal.

The other names are correct as far as sympathies go.

D. W. K.

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Colonel Donovan

March 9, 1943

Major King

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a Fiddaman 10/43
x Situation Report
x Intelligence
x Hughes, H. S.
x Sawyer, J. E.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan

From: Donald C. McKay

I am sending you herewith a memorandum on the North African situation prepared by Captain H. S. Hughes and Ensign John E. Sawyer of the staff of The OSS Weekly Survey. An attempt has been made to get at the facts of this situation and to present an objective picture of the development of the situation in North Africa from the beginning.

D.C. Mc.

Attachment

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No. 1

SECRET

POLITICAL POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA

March 1, 1943

The following memorandum was prepared by members of the staff of the OSS Weekly Survey. It is for inter-office distribution only.

An increasing volume of reports and personal observations emphasize that fundamental lessons of political policy must be learned from our experiences in North Africa. Observers returning from the scene agree that any similar Allied operation should henceforth have:

(1) a positive political program consistent with the United Nations professed war aims.

(2) trained American administrators and intelligence officers to supervise political affairs.

(3) a thorough knowledge of the local situation and of the reliability of local personnel with whom cooperation is planned.

The general burden of comment on North African affairs approves the plan of using the mass of local civil and military officials, in order to relieve Allied forces of enormous administrative responsibilities. A large number of critics are also prepared to accept the arrangement with Darlan on grounds of military expediency. The central points of issue are that--having decided on the above general plan--there was no positive program for correcting its important defects:

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i.e., to remove notoriously pro-Vichy and pro-Axis groups and individuals from positions of power; to free and use individuals and groups who had consistently served the Allied cause; to establish in North Africa a regime that could arouse the enthusiasm of those elements in occupied countries who are resisting the Axis.

The trend since the President's trip to Casablanca has been notably better; but much has yet to be done to assure full military security and to make North Africa a weapon, not a liability, in American psychological warfare.

I. The Preliminary Period

The preparatory work of Mr. Murphy and his group was extremely effective in facilitating an Allied landing at Algiers, less so at Oran, and decidedly less so in Morocco.

A principal criticism directed at Mr. Murphy's preliminary work is that it involved cooperation not simply with the lower echelons of the civil and military hierarchies, but with men in the highest positions whose reliability was highly questionable. Some observers have attributed this policy partially to the fact that the contacts of our diplomatic personnel were largely limited to Vichyites, and that in distinguishing between "good" and "bad" men, they therefore tended to choose between good and bad Vichyites.

An example was M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, apparently one of Mr. Murphy's principal contacts. Dubreuil, undoubtedly a

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man of courage and force, is a French oil man and financier, who has maintained association with the "Cagoulards," a French Fascist organization, exported lubricating oils to Tripoli after the Armistice, and was considered the principal supplier of French oil to Rommel. He was always sufficiently in favor with the Axis to get a passport from the German-Italian armistice commission, and was linked with banking groups whose capital tripled after the Armistice. This example can be multiplied.

Observers have stated that the public and officials alike were astounded that the incoming Americans sustained in power individuals deeply committed to Vichy or the Axis. When the Allies landed it is reported that a number of such officials even straightened out their records and made all preparations to leave office, when the unfolding of Allied policy "exceeded their wildest expectations."

Our political representatives have been equally criticized for failing fully to cooperate with those who had been consistently pro-Ally. Experienced administrators warned our representatives before (and since) the landings that men like Noguès were not to be trusted. Reports have come in steadily of individuals and groups who, at considerable personal risk, had served Allied interests and were prepared to assume administrative responsibilities.*

*See Appendix for one list of names.

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In addition to this militant wing, observers generally agree that the mass of officials were quite prepared to serve under new and pro-Allied leaders, so long as they were allowed to retain their jobs. The choice presented was therefore not one of maintaining the existing regime or assuming all the administrative burdens ourselves; but rather it was possible to use the hierarchy, placing reliable men in key top positions.

II. The Landings--November 7-11

At least three groups were to aid the American landings under the general supervision of Mr. Murphy. At Algiers, a mixed group of pro-Ally officials, local liberals, and De Gaullists, which counted Dr. José Aboulker as its founder and Henry d'Astier de Lavigerie as its effective head, had laid plans for seizing all strategic installations. It was with this group that General Mark Clark made contact. In Morocco, Noguès' deputy, General Béthouart, had organized a military coup. OSS representatives had set up an extensive fifth column. The D'Astier-Aboulker and Béthouart groups apparently assumed that Allied sympathizers would replace Vichyites in the most important posts. Last minutes changes of plan, however, in both Algeria and Morocco resulted in the maintenance of the administrative status quo.

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Algeria. At Algiers, the plans of the D'Astier-Aboulker group worked smoothly. By about two o'clock on the morning of November 8 the group (numbering around 400) had succeeded in occupying all its objectives--including the Prefecture, Radio-Algiers, the Military Telephone Exchange, and the headquarters of the 19th Corps Area and of General Juin, Commander-in-Chief of the North African Forces. Juin himself, Darlan, the prefect Temple, and almost all the other high officials suspected of Vichy sympathies, were prisoners. The insurgents had lost two killed, and one wounded. At 6:30 p.m. American troops entered the city practically unopposed.

Fighting at Oran, however, was considerably heavier. On November 9, Giraud arrived and proclaimed himself head of the French forces resisting the Axis (the General was apparently slightly confused, having expected to command all the Allied troops). Giraud's landing failed of its effect: career officers evidently were loath to break their oath to the Marshal, while pro-democratic elements may have been disappointed that the General had not recognized the authority of Fighting France. Giraud's announcement failed to stop resistance in the interior and around Oran.

Meantime, Darlan and Juin had broken their parole and escaped. Darlan's presence in Algiers, so far as the American authorities were concerned, had been entirely coincidental:

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he had come to visit his sick son and was genuinely surprised by the Allied landings. Moreover, the D'Astier-Aboulker group had apparently not anticipated an agreement with the Admiral. In the dilemma created by Giraud's failure to rally significant support, Darlan seems to have offered his services. The chiefs of the British and American governments gave their approval to the proposed agreement. By saving the appearance of legality, the armistice with Darlan on November 10 put an end to the fighting in Algeria.

Despite extreme statements that without this agreement, it would have taken three to six months to pacify North Africa, most observers believe that the Allied divisions landed in the original convoys would have been sufficient to take care of the situation in a few days, and that fighting was almost over when the armistice was signed.

Morocco. For different reasons, the coup projected by General Béthouart and the fifth column activity of the OSS both failed of their full effect. A few minutes before the hour set for his own arrest, Nogués learned of Béthouart's plans. The Resident's decision to seize Béthouart and his accomplices and to order resistance to the Americans doubtless sprang from his belief that the reported convoy either did not exist or represented nothing more than a commando raid. Where Nogués' order arrived in time, as at Casablanca and

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Port Lyautey, considerable fighting resulted. Elsewhere, except for naval units and coastal batteries, resistance was negligible.

A last-minute change in orders to the OSS agents further accounts for the uneven opposition which the Americans faced. On the eve of the invasion, the head of the OSS in Casablanca received instructions from the U. S. high command to call off the native fifth column---which numbered several thousand and had full plans to paralyze Nogues' military effort. The fifth column network was so extensive, however, that the OSS was apparently able to reach only the most significant portion. At Safi and other places where Allied sympathizers had not received the countermanding order in time, the fifth column almost completely paralyzed French resistance, and the Americans suffered only minor casualties. Elsewhere, heavy fighting continued for four days. Casablanca capitulated on November 11 only after General Patton had completely surrounded it--and under the threat that a failure to comply with the American ultimatum would mean the destruction of the city.

Meantime, Nogues had flown to Algiers and accepted Darlan's armistice. With his troops almost out of ammunition and discipline breaking down, the Resident had apparently decided that further resistance was hopeless. Furthermore, the American terms provided that the civil and military

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officers who had compromised themselves by resisting the invasion should retain their positions. Such generosity apparently came as a real surprise to Noguès and his subordinates. Finally, the Resident was able to lay down his arms without breaking his oath to Pétain. An emissary sent in haste to Vichy brought back the Marshal's permission to come to terms with the Americans.

III. Darlan's Administration--
November 11-December 24

The paradoxical result of the November 10 armistice was to maintain in power those who had favored the Axis and opposed the American landings--without immediately freeing those who had aided the Allies. In Algeria, Darlan apparently made a thorough effort to comply with whatever requests the American authorities made of him: some of his subordinates adopted a less cooperative attitude. In Morocco, Noguès and most of his administration never treated the American forces as allies.

Algeria. In his first weeks of power, Darlan quietly entrenched himself in authority. The adherence of Dakar on November 20 raised his prestige; while by December 1st he felt strong enough to proclaim himself Chief of State (later changed to High Commissioner). On the other hand, the fleet at Toulon failed to follow his orders to proceed to North Africa and on November 27 scuttled itself. (Darlan had

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instructed the fleet to scuttle only in the event that escape proved impossible. In ten days, Admiral de la Borde, commander at Toulon, would have been succeeded, in the course of naval rotation of posts, by an admiral thoroughly in sympathy with the United Nations).

American army officers bear witness to the fact that Darlan and his subordinates gave them all necessary military facilities during these critical weeks. Yet suspect individuals remained in many important posts. At Oran, where General Boissau and the Prefect Boujard, both pro-Vichy, were in authority, Laval's Service d'ordre légionnaire continued its activities. At another port, where damaged Allied ships were repaired, the chief engineer was a member of Doriot's Parti populaire français. General François, another strong Vichyite, commanded all anti-aircraft services.

On the whole, the French officials were either unable or unwilling to arouse enthusiasm for North Africa's reentry into the war. The general mobilization often worked to the detriment of the Allies. Under the influence of the fascist Legion, certain officials exempted Vichyites from service and removed United Nations sympathizers from important positions by mobilizing them into the army. Others sent home men who responded to the call. Discrimination was general against Jews and against the Corps franc, a military unit formed especially to fight by the side of the Allies.

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The chief difficulty appears to have been that while Darlan was willing to do practically anything the Americans requested of him, Mr. Murphy did not insist on the removal of officials of doubtful reliability. The State Department apparently failed to understand the hostility felt by pro-democratic elements in France and in the United Nations camp generally, for Vichyites who had changed sides in the war but had not altered their fundamentally fascist orientation (see Appendix I, The OSS Weekly Survey, Feb. 4-11). The men on the spot received little news of the storm of indignation that was rising in Britain and to a lesser extent in the United States.

Morocco. After the German occupation of Vichy France, Darlan maintained that Pétain was no longer a free agent and embarked on a course of his own. Noguès, on the other hand, continued to recognize the authority of the Marshal, and communicated with him by way of Spain. This contrast epitomizes the difference in policy between Algeria and Morocco. While Darlan was willing to make changes at American suggestion, Noguès maintained the status quo pure and simple.

Evidences of Noguès' equivocal attitude are legion. At least 40 United Nations sympathizers among the civil and military authorities of Morocco received transfers or demotions.

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While the arrangement with the Americans provided for the release of General Bethouart, many less outstanding pro-Ally officers remained in custody. Others were alienated by Nogues' provision that all troops take an oath of loyalty to the Marshal. Furthermore, as in Algeria, the general mobilization resulted in the relegation of pro-Ally officers to interior outposts and the installation of Vichy adherents in key positions. Notably at Casablanca, the mobilization of the harbor police and of electric light and water service personnel resulted in their replacement by Italians or by men who did not know their jobs. The Moroccan authorities ordered the liberation of enemy agents for "lack of evidence" and directed that French anti-aircraft batteries shoot down no Axis aircraft. For six weeks the Spanish Moroccan border remained practically uncontrolled, while Spanish consuls were free to keep the enemy informed of American troop movements.

After a short lull following the Allies landings, the Service d'ordre légionnaire resumed its hooligan operations against Fighting French and American sympathizers, and its dissolution came only as a result of American pressure. Members of the influential industrial bloc headed by Jean Epinat frankly favored a German victory. The Moroccan radio and press, under the direction of Richard and Pierre Mas, continued to follow a Vichy propaganda line. When the longshoremen and garagemen of Casablanca engaged in slow-down activities (partly inspired by the Service d'ordre), the

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French authorities were apparently unwilling to intervene effectively. In short, Nogues' administration obviously did not provide a sound basis for the American position in Morocco.

IV. Giraud--December 24-March 1

Darlan's assassination brought no fundamental changes. For two days, the succession question remained confused. Possible claimants included Nogues, Chatel, and even the Comte de Paris, pretender to the French throne. (The Royalists were apparently trying to fish in troubled waters at this time; they were not, however, responsible for Darlan's assassination, which was committed by a youth with De Gaullist sympathies). On December 26, Giraud assumed authority. Apparently at Chatel's suggestion, he immediately arrested 18 prominent republicans as suspects in the Darlan murder. Of these, 16 had been members of the pro-American D'Astier-Aboulker group.

Once installed in power, Giraud proved to be less accommodating than Darlan. While the Admiral had always been an opportunist, the General had a clear-cut patriotic-conservative point of view, anti-German, but closely paralleling that of Marshal Pétain on domestic issues. To succeed the collaborationist Chatel as Governor-General of Algeria, Giraud chose Marcel Peyrouton, anti-German and anti-Laval, but at the same time a well-known foe of democratic elements. Previous use of Vichyites had represented merely a maintenance of the status quo: Peyrouton's appointment was the first deliberate acceptance

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of the services of semi-fascists out of a job. At the Casablanca conference, Giraud and De Gaulle failed to agree on any form of political cooperation--among other reasons because Giraud refused to make a formal commitment in favor of France's republican traditions.

With the arrival of Harold MacMillan as British Minister in North Africa, the London Government had begun a steady pressure for democratization of the administration. At Casablanca, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill apparently agreed that liquidation of the political difficulties in Algeria and Morocco must proceed more swiftly. In his first radio address after his return, the President was vigorous in his condemnation of compromise with fascists. The first fruits of this change of policy have included the appointment of Charles Brunel (of the D'Astier-Aboulker group) and of René Chambe to important posts, the creation of a semi-representative Council of War Economy, and the release of 27 Communist deputies, with a promise to free the remaining political prisoners within two months.

Much, however, still remains to be done. Giraud has not taken and apparently does not intend to take a firmly republican stand. He has emphasized that the relaxation of anti-semitic decrees must proceed slowly, and evidently intends to appoint the notorious Pucheu (of Vichy and the

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Banque Worms--now resident in Spain) to the Algerian administration. As of early February, 5050 political prisoners remained in confinement, to 1,300 who had been set free. Slowdowns, whispering campaigns against the Americans, and the shady activities of Vichy and Spanish agents are continuing. The French administration has mishandled the distribution of food--thereby discrediting American promises. Above all, most observers believe that such suspect officials as Noguès and Bergeret must retire before a healthy political condition can replace the current atmosphere of suspicion and compromise.

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APPENDIX

A few able, pro-Allied administrators suggested by one well-qualified journalist include:

--General Emile Bethouart, (see page 6)

--General Odic, youngest full general in the French army, strongly pro-American.

--M. Chevreux, lately head of the Moroccan Sûreté Générale, recently retired from his position, after working to prepare the way for the Allies.

--Louis Contard, former civil chief of the Casablanca district, who is a Freemason and anti-clerical.

--Jean Angelette, chief of the Moroccan counter-espionage service before the fall of France, now sidetracked to Fez.

--M. Ninet, formerly chief of police of Casablanca, sent to Port Lyautey because he believed in the Allies.

--M. Cerbieli, another former police chief who was retired because he kept too close a watch on the Germans.

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Schneider, E 479

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. William J. Donovan DATE: February 16, 1943

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: French Opinion in London regarding North Africa Report of Professor E. Schneider - British Empire Section

You had previously expressed an interest in examining this report when it had been received in this office. For your information, I am enclosing a translation of the report which arrived recently.

Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

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Africa N. 10,711
x France
x Opinion
x Schreider, E.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

A-1562

There is attached a translation of an article by Prof. E. Schreider concerning French opinion on events in North Africa. This document was forwarded by our London office on January 16, 1943.

Attachment

February 17, 1943

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

A 1632

Repercussions of the events in Africa have attained large proportions in both "zones" of the mother country, but have varied considerably. Although the news that has reached here is incomplete, some distinctions can already be drawn.

I. The reaction in circles that favor the policy of collaboration.

In official spheres confusion was evident. First of all, the government feared the influence of Darlan's broadcasts, as they were addressed to the principal groups faithful to the regime. But it is not an exaggeration to say that what caused the greatest apprehension was the attitude of the Parisian "collaborators", who wished to take advantage of a favorable situation.

Indeed, at the start the pro-German groups in the capital showed great confidence. Two illusions encouraged this attitude. On the one hand, it was thought that the military operations in Africa involved a limited number of troops, and on the other hand, the reasonable behavior of the men in charge of defending the African possessions gave rise to a feeling of optimism.[1]

The Parisian press seized the opportunity to demand that its program be carried out immediately: complete incorporation of France into the "European" system, more radical changes in the domestic political structure, and a military alliance with the Axis. This campaign awakened serious worry in government circles (and almost relegated the African difficulties to second place). For these demands were accompanied by direct attacks against the government, which was criticized, especially as ever since the former "free zone" was occupied it has "sat entirely at the mercy of the German authorities."[2]

Nevertheless, a great disappointment awaited the Parisian "collaborators". The government obtained guarantees and remained in office. It was decided to keep Laval in power as the exclusion of any other candidate, according to the very words of a German-inspired broadcast. Reassured in this manner, the government continued all the attempts to retain control of the situation in the former free zone, where very active excitement was being evidenced.

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1. "The English and Americans had apparently counted on certain dissensions, military and of other sorts. Today they have to change their tune." (Oeuvre, 11/9/42). "We have excellent reason to be optimistic again....Any dissensions that may have made themselves felt are now crushed." (Oeuvre, 11/13/42).

2. Cf. Doat's attack, Oeuvre, 11/11/42.

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Information from various sources concurs on this point: great confusion reigned in Legion circles, which were one of the main supports of the government. When Admiral Darlan attained in effect the presidency of the council, he did everything needful to make this movement a docile and dependable instrument. There is not the slightest doubt that he made it a fortress of "Darlanism", very fascistic in the political domain, but hostile to the "socialistic" phraseology of most Parisian collaborators.

Laval, feared by most Legionaires because of his close relations with the Germanophile groups of the capital, tried to take in hand this rather indeterminate movement, but in November the transformation had not yet taken place. The new Head of the Government used quite rough methods: purge followed purge, and this increased the uneasiness.

As long as Darlan retained an iota of power, the elements faithful to him felt more or less protected from even the most serious perils. When his break with the Government became known, a solidarity again followed at first in the ranks of the Legion. But at the same time, there were quite evident hesitations and counter-currents.

It is true that the government did its best to delay the announcement of Darlan's change of sides and retraction.[3] Nevertheless, the Admiral's appeals were heard and excitement rose high. The idea gained ground rapidly that Petain was a prisoner and everything would have acted in favor of the Allies.[4] These doubts were dissipated only when the Marshal spoke over the radio. But the Legion appeared in a state of open crisis.

If we are to believe private sources, the confusion reached its height when other appeals were heard, also addressed to the Legion elements by a person whom they knew well, but who spoke in the name of the de Gaullist movement.[5] But in the end there was nothing but agitation without positive results. If one takes into account what had been said for some time by well-placed observers, this was, on the whole, to be expected.

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3. One might add in this connection that [illegible] appeared unaware of Darlan's new position.

4. On November 21st, Luchaire in the Nouveaux Temps spoke of thousands of letters from readers who still doubted that Petain and Darlan had split.

5. This refers to the speeches, broadcast by the station at Brazzaville, of M. Charles Vallin -- a member of the directorate of the Legion, a Croix de Feu deputy, municipal councillor of Paris under the regime of German occupation, and an active emissary of the Vichy Propaganda Ministry -- who recently joined the Fighting French.

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The Legion as a whole is governed by very powerful political and social instincts which force it to support the Vichy regime although that regime does not entirely share its tendencies in the realm of international relations. But the mass of the Legion--all the evidence concours on this point--lacks clear ideas and is submissive to the established order provided it is sufficiently conservative. At bottom, Petain was the only man who could have moved the Legion. Any other calculation based on the so-called spirit of resistance of the legionaires was necessarily doomed to failure. Darlan was quite aware of this when he claimed to speak in the name of the Marshal.

At present it looks as if the Legion movement is collapsing. Because of its hesitations, the Head of the Government was not able to count on it as a nucleus for the single party, capable of opposing analogous groups of which many have formed on the other side of the demarcation line. The Legion service of command, which includes only the more or less militant elements, was separated from the Legion organization, transformed into a national militia, and placed under the orders of the President of the Council. It is improbable that the old Legion will be called upon to play an important role again, whether within the Vichy regime or in opposition to it. Just as the Legion elements in the Colonies do not seem inclined to facilitate the task of the Allies, these same elements as in the mother country, on the whole, even when not pro-German, evidence a hearty distaste for the nations that in their eyes incarnate anti-fascism.

One must come to the same conclusions as regards certain other branches related to the Vichy regime, such as the groups reorganized under the aegis of La Roque, or a few elements connected with that important part of the higher clergy which, since it is willing to support only a political order to its liking, implicitly accepts collaboration with the enemy. The combined information available suggests that any policy that trusted such elements would end up in the worst complications, not only because these elements are irremediably compromised in the eyes of the public, but also because one cannot succeed in completely detaching them from a regime which the country rejects.

However, this does not mean that Darlanism is dead. Various reports show on the contrary that the policy of waiting (attentisme) is still very much alive in higher circles of Vichy and Lyon, and the Parisian press even claims, in a tone of polemic, that men of this sort still hold positions of command.[6] They are considered Darlanists in the rather broad meaning given this word as a result of recent occurrences. It is very unlikely that these elements will take any sort of initiative, and it is hard to see on whom they could depend for support.

6. The following are mentioned among present "Darlanists". Lucien Romier, Wladimir d'Ormesson, Francois-Poncet, and de Wendel, who have large interests in Africa, and Thierry Maulnier who, it appears from private reports, has shown himself Anglophile in confidential talks.

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II. The reaction in circles hostile to the regime and to the policy of collaboration.

Apart from the permanent minority of irreconcilables, whose reaction to every move in collaboration, the effects of the landings corresponded to the fears of the American landings [illegible] In several places [illegible] were not given in the reports. The result of [illegible] demonstrations were certainly more [illegible] by the Navy radio.

Total [illegible] of the country did not follow [illegible] the previously accepted [illegible] in the former free areas. However, it is believed [illegible] of the public were not content with [illegible] In view of [illegible] Navy way in this [illegible] Lion was explained. The officials [illegible] Undertakings were not [illegible] Allied landings. [illegible] the public [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The [illegible] American and British [illegible] Army. [illegible] the difficulties [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] were under [illegible] of German [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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elements" of various political parties.[7] It is not certain that this text was actually written in France and approved by the signatories. Too little time elapsed between the arrival of the German troops in the former free zone and the departure of the Gaullist emissary who brought the text for it to seem likely that real conferences were held and the document jointly composed.

It is possible that it was written in London according to more or less explicit directives given the emissary when he left. It is possible that its Gaullist color was accentuated--tactics of this sort have been in use for some time. It is interesting that the text was not signed by the Communists who, according to the person who claims to have brought the document were unwilling to give their support, but asked that it be made known that they demand immediate liberation of the political prisoners in Africa.

Even if the Gaullist accent of this document was artificially [illegible] everything suggests that after a very short while the [illegible] the political developments of which struck the direct [illegible] as well as the masses--provoked a removal of Gaullist sympathies, [illegible] in spheres that used to be openly suspicious [illegible]

The Socialists are a case in point. As a consequence of [illegible] formulated a long time ago by the French Socialists in London, and especially because of the messages of M. Louis, who recently [illegible] a mandate from the Party, the Socialists [illegible] unoccupied zone have at manifest a certain anxiety in regard to the Gaullist movement. [illegible] newspaper did not hesitate to take action on the declarations [illegible] of General de Gaulle and to ask for explanations.[8] [illegible] when the fascist deputy Valois joined the Gaullists.[9]

On the other hand, we saw that in the very beginning the socialist executive committee did not attach much importance to De Gaulle's role in the Allied landings. But a little while later a message came through Mr. Blum, transmitted from the prison: in view of the state of the situation in Africa, a reserve was what General de Gaulle's [illegible] We must say in passing that this message [illegible] of the French Socialists [illegible]

7. La Marseillaise, 11/29/42. A slightly different text was broadcast by Brazzaville.

8. Le Populaire, 7/15/42.

9. Le Populaire, No. 6, 7/15/42.

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The Radicals in their turn, in a secret note [illegible] connected with the Gaullist movement. But more strongly attached to M. Herriot, expressed reservations. "Of course, my dear friend, [illegible] defeats the enemy excites our satisfaction..... [illegible] at the turn of events and at the behavior of the [illegible] we shall forget nothing; we shall never forget that [illegible] took advantage of the foreign occupation to carry [illegible] scheme to strangle the Republic and set up in [illegible] to our people, a shameful regime of dictatorship [illegible] at war can accept the most opposed and [illegible] plane of resistance. But our victory, the victory [illegible] all the glorious, marvelous soldiers of the liberty [illegible] it to be stolen from us".10 The radical never [illegible] as that of the republic, of anti-fascism, [illegible]

Even [illegible] suspicion. When [illegible] accepted for reasons of [illegible] known politicians of [illegible] awakened by the [illegible] point out a certain [illegible] of the African empire [illegible] of spirit is appearing [illegible] succeed, but they [illegible]

We have to [illegible] of Admiral Darlan [illegible] long before the [illegible] The exception was the Gaullist [illegible] rightest elements [illegible] of resistance. [illegible] only with difficulty, [illegible] government [illegible] his escape, [illegible] in silence [illegible]

The reason for this is that in political [illegible] the reputation of being a revolutionary, is not a financial [illegible] that the group that puts out "Combat" is ready to follow [illegible] is based on their previous actions since the second world war permits one to conclude that it is actually so. If this group, or certain of its elements, joined Giraud, it could simply increase the friction among the resistance groups for ever since the organization behind "Combat" was

10. Franc-Tireur, 11/20/42.

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They have sown doubt even in the democratic resistance groups that used to have absolute confidence in the United States.

Let me say in passing that this psychological crisis is not confined to France alone; analogous observations have been made in other occupied countries.

III. The reactions in the French circles of London.

As soon as it was learned that General Giraud had left [illegible], the Gaullist ephores in London spread the rumor that [illegible] American manoeuver directed against de Gaulle". And [illegible] a step to the left, in the hope of once again winning [illegible] English democratic circles, notably the Labourites, [illegible] Giraud". A similar reaction followed the Allied landing [illegible]. This time the case of the Gaullists was made worse by [illegible] Darlan and other was compromised either through the policy [illegible] or by the role they played in the Petain regime.

The anti-Americanism of the Gaullist circles, [illegible] thus found an ideological and even a democratic varnish. There is no doubt that it misled some British circles as to [illegible] Gaullist policy was quite different, and they [illegible] by M. Charles Vallin, a man long well-known in Paris, who assumed [illegible] responsibilities. In addition [illegible] pro-fascist Vichy elements [illegible], but on the side of General de Gaulle. At the same time [illegible] Brazzaville met on the [illegible] against the American concessions [illegible] the collaborators and fascists, [illegible] triumphantly announced that [illegible] Vichy Legation in Ankara, had joined [illegible].

The position of [illegible] is very [illegible] in our mind. The most influential element [illegible] Britain, and therefore does not deserve the name of [illegible] would not suffer too much if [illegible] coming of M. Vallin [illegible] to the Gaullist movement [illegible] that the successor was to be [illegible] of this very M. Vallin. The Foreign Landings caused this plan to collapse. It was a childish idea in the first place.

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Personal rivalries play a large part in Gaullist policies. General Giraud is essentially the adversary, or the competitor, of General de Gaulle. As early as the end of October, M. Dongo Cochin had gone to London on a mission to win de Gaulle to a pact with Giraud. This attempt was unsuccessful. It is unlikely that negotiations will prove any more successful under present circumstances. General de Lattre de la Tassigny had returned from Algiers with relatively good results. He reported that Giraud thought the time for decisions had not yet come, as the situation in Africa was too complicated, but nevertheless was ready to make a move. The news of the death of Darlan was announced and everything was undecided again.

The shift to the left became even more pronounced for one reason or another. On the one hand, because it is well known in Gaullist spheres that, with a few exceptions resistance in the metropolitan country is essentially [illegible] on the other hand, it is known that in North Africa the Gaullist [illegible] in general made up of leftist elements, while the [illegible] by a few republican phrases which de Gaulle occasionally uses [illegible] most often toward Darlanism, royalism, even fascism. The Royalists [illegible] although quite well represented in the Gaullist movement, are [illegible] the Algerian royalists.

This shift to the left, [illegible] in the arrival of M. Garnier, a German [illegible] the confusion, in Gaullist circles, [illegible] thetic to fascism are very strong; [illegible] also, for most of the people, [illegible] Communists: the liberal [illegible] have rejected offers of collaboration [illegible]

All [illegible] risks it entails: it [illegible] Garnier in London [illegible] policy appears [illegible] elements of the [illegible]

The [illegible] is not [illegible] Darlan, [illegible] expedition. [illegible] foreground of [illegible] What [illegible] and exiles, [illegible] to know [illegible] in France, [illegible]

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The democratic, Socialist, and independent elements that constitute the anti-Gaullist opposition here have not changed their attitude toward General de Gaulle and his movement. This attitude remains negative, for the fluctuations and ambiguities of Gaullist policy have convinced them that nothing, probably, will be able to discredit [illegible] Darlanism either, with or without Darlan. They are afraid that a [illegible] may be organized in North Africa, which, given the political [illegible], might be tempted to play the role of "France's [illegible]".

Diplomatic circles (Vichy, Cambon, [illegible]) of suggesting a temporary civil administration [illegible] from General Giraud's military command, and which [illegible] "apolitical", but responsible [illegible] does not seem to be known outside the [illegible] other independents have not formulated [illegible] to be waiting for events to [illegible]

They [illegible] not only the [illegible] situation in North Africa, [illegible] situation and the disappearance [illegible] point of view that is becoming [illegible] land in France [illegible] Fascist fashion [illegible] will come, not [illegible] or socialists [illegible] Fascism, and [illegible] or less explicit [illegible] affirmed as regards [illegible] All democratic [illegible]

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Feb. 25, 1943

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: David Williamson

SUBJECT: Political Problems of an Army of Occupation

The attached paper was written by Mr. Winnacker of R. & A. It represents the factual evidence brought back by David King and myself. It is, of course, only a draft.

I find, to my surprise and delight, that Jimmy Dunn has been working on this problem. Perhaps you would like to talk with him about it.

D. W.

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2-25-43

Mr. Williamson:

These are interesting points and they should be worked up into a formal memorandum, if Colonel Donovan thinks appropriate, for submission to the Joint Chiefs.

JM

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

(86361)

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THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION

Military operations in North Africa have undoubtedly been hampered by the theoretical separation between civil affairs left in the hands of the local French administration and military affairs controlled by the United Nations army command. Many of these difficulties could have been avoided if the army of occupation had arrived in North Africa as well prepared for political as for military problems. If the task of psychological warfare consists not only of facilitating the occupation of a country but also of making the area a safe base for operations, the O.S.S. has a definite stake in the policy which the army command practices in an occupied region.

The experience of the last three and a half months in North Africa indicates that in any future operations the following precautions should be taken:

(1) The army command should have close liaison, amounting to control, over those services essential to the safety and smooth functioning of troop movements, etc.

(2) The army should be able to approach, consult, and operate with the chiefs of public services without having to go through the central authorities.

(3) The forces of occupation should be accompanied by sufficient administrative personnel properly trained in government and local customs and languages to supervise closely the local authorities.

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By such precautions most of the difficulties which have arisen in North Africa could be avoided:

(a) Lack of rapid execution of military demands by civilian authorities.

(b) Failure to have a trustworthy intelligence service.

(c) Inability to explain directly to the local population the reasons for shortages or for military demands such as housing, motorcars, etc.

(d) Lack of control over propaganda instruments.

(e) Inability to replace those of doubtful loyalty in the local civil service by personnel friendly to the United Nations.

The following report lists some of the complications encountered in Morocco.

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THE MOROCCAN EXPERIENCE

Since November 10, 1942 the United States army command has received in most cases the support of the local government. However, the lack of close supervision over the local government has often prevented the correction of existing abuses and has created confusion in the minds of local United Nations sympathizers. Among the difficulties which have been experienced the most important are the following:

(A) Lack of rapid execution of military demands by civilian authorities. About 25 to 30 French officials at Casablanca represent the Rabat government at U. S. army headquarters in Casablanca. About 75% of all U. S. requests are handled fairly satisfactorily, especially those which ask permission for the erection of permanent installations such as the enlargement of the Marrakesh Airport. However this system has certain definite drawbacks:

(1) The time consumed by red tape in forwarding requests from Casablanca to Rabat and back.

(2) The lack of secrecy for army plans.

(3) The delay in overcoming the objections of the central authorities for 25% of the requisitions. Among the specific difficulties encountered are the following:

(a) The Casablanca Barracks. The U. S. Army at Casablanca hired a contractor through the local syndicat to

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build some barracks. Rabat decided that the local contractor had no right to enter into a contract independently of the central government. The old contract was voided and a new one drafted, which called for a price nearly doubling the cost.

(b) Green Tea at Casablanca. Seven hundred tons of green tea were still stored on January 22 in a U. S. warehouse. French officials claim they have no transport facilities available to move it inland and no retail dealers to sell it at Casablanca.

(c) Water Supply in Port of Casablanca. The main quay waterpipes which were broken were not repaired for many weeks on the plea that no repair parts were available. Consequently ships had to move to another quay after unloading to take on water for the return voyage, thus crowding the harbor and lengthening the turnround.

(d) Road Repairs. Moroccan roads are deteriorating rapidly under heavy tank and truck traffic. French officials are doing little to solve the problems of road upkeep created by the new situation.

(e) Meat at Casablanca. Four hundred tons of meat on a U. S. merchantman were to be given free to the city of Casablanca if trucks were furnished for unloading. Only three trucks arrived and the ship had to sail for the United States with most of its meat cargo.

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(f) Slow-downs. French officials have appeared unwilling to curb effectively slow-down activities of longshoremen and garage-workers in Casablanca. Some of these activities are known to have been started by the French Legion's Service de l'Ordre.

Comment: Most of these difficulties could have been avoided

(a) by dealing directly with local officials instead of having to go through Rabat;

(b) by giving U. S. supervisors sufficient authority to precipitate action by local officials;

(c) by having available in the U. S. Army men with a detailed knowledge of the local scene. Such men would be able to distinguish between real and nominal excuses, to put their finger . trouble-makers and chronic malcontents, and to suggest the proper means by which prompt action on U. S. demands could be obtained in each specific case.

(5) Failure to have a trustworthy intelligence service. The U. S. Army intelligence service under Colonel Black, with Lt. Colonel Parsons in charge of security, depends for its information almost entirely on the French intelligence services, which have been put under the direction of the U. S. Army. However, lack of personnel, knowing the country or even the French language, make this direction purely nominal and exposes the U. S. Army to clever intrigues and unintended mistakes.

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(a) Knowledge of French. Lt. Col. Parsons does not speak French. He depends for his liaison with Frenchmen on one Bourgoin, who is well known for his unreliability as an intelligence agent, though he is a firm United Nations sympathizer.

(b) Hervoit, chief of the French Security Service, was one of the firmest friends of the United States before the occupation and remains so at the present time. Nevertheless, the U. S. intelligence service, with its lack of knowledge of the local scene, came to distrust Hervoit through unreliable denunciations.

(c) Frontier Control. Close control over the Spanish-French frontier was established only after six weeks of fumbling. Spaniards, suspected of being in Axis employment, passed the frontier freely. A Moslem chief south of Larache smuggled Axis agents across the frontier unmolested by French authorities. At the present time these abuses have been corrected. American control officers have been placed at the important frontier posts. A close passport control has been instituted. The active road patrol, established by the French on February 1, has proved effective.

(d) Liberation of Axis Sympathizers. Many of the active pro-Axis agents in Morocco were arrested in November, but soon liberated by the higher authorities because of "lack of evidence."

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(e) Communications with Vichy. Both Noguès and Admiral Michelier are known to communicate with Vichy via Spain. Spanish consuls in Casablanca, Rabat, Fez, and Oujda are suspected of working for the Axis. The lack of an adequate intelligence service makes it difficult to control or to stop these activities.

Comment: The inexperience of the U. S. Army intelligence service has been responsible for most of the difficulties. Local O.S.S. personnel could have furnished the knowledge of the local scene so important to intelligence work. O.S.S. men, however, were consulted only in an occasional advisory capacity. Since the security of an occupied country as a base for operations depends largely on the efficiency of its intelligence service, it seems indicated that in any future operations careful preparations will be made to furnish the occupying force with an experienced personnel able to check the local intelligence services and to carry on its own activities.

(C) Inability to explain directly to the local population the reasons for shortages. Contact with the local French and native population can be established only through French officials who often fail to counteract false rumors and in some cases even initiate them. In general U. S. troops are blamed for most local shortages. This situation is doubly serious because of the corruption revalent in the French civil

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service. Since all official actions from marriage licenses to judicial decisions have their price, the U. S. Army is liable to receive the blame for misgovernment which is beyond its control.

(a) Fez meat shortage. All meat sales in Fez were frozen for two weeks and, though the U. S. Army had not bought as much as one pound of meat at that time, the occupying forces were held responsible for the existing shortage.

(b) Wheat shortage. The sub-prefect of Sidi-bel Abbes told a women delegation which complained about the local rationing of flour: "You wanted the Americans and now you see what you get."

(c) Germans and Americans. French officials have often been heard to remark: "Germans or Americans, it's all the same."

Comment: The natural inclination of local public officials to blame outsiders for their misgovernment makes it doubly necessary to establish close supervision over the local administration. Only by such a safeguard can continued good relations between the occupying forces and the local population be maintained.

(D) Lack of control over propaganda instruments. The difficulties arising from the failure to control local propaganda in Morocco are too well known to be recounted in full. In February most of the flagrant abuses had been corrected,

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but the old pro-Axis personnel still remained in key positions.

(a) Richard, the chief editor for Radio Maroc, is now writing for the United Nations, though he has been notorious in the past for his pro-Axis attitude.

(b) Pierre Mas, the owner of the Depeche Marocaine and four other newspapers, has been an ardent Vichyite, but still remains in control of his newspapers which now have changed their editorial policy to conform with the new situation.

(c) Petain. Though no new pictures of Petain are put up, many old pictures are still publicly displayed and the French Legion houses still carry in huge letters the inscription: "Vive le Marechal!"

Comment: Propaganda instruments in times of total war cannot be left with impunity in the hands of the local officials of an occupied country--no matter how friendly. Close supervision by an experienced personnel from the beginning of the occupation seems to be indicated by the North African experience. Such personnel should be able to serve as a guide to the U. S. Army command so that unfavorable repercussions to local actions would be avoided in the occupied area and the local psychological warfare activities would be closely coordinated with the over-all U. S. plan.

(E) Inability to replace those of doubtful loyalty in the local civil service by personnel friendly to the United Nations. The continued presence in power of officials who

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have been known in the past for their pro-Axis sentiments not only creates constant difficulties in administration, but also facilitates Axis propaganda, discourages United Nations sympathizers, and increases the divisions within the country. Moreover, the failure to reward properly pro-Ally sympathizers is liaible to make O.S.S. operations much more difficult in other countries. In North Africa the result of this policy has been the loss of many friends without the gain of new ones.

It is generally agreed that many of the key officials, especially those who still continue their relations with Vichy, cannot be depended upon under adverse conditions. Either desiring or fearing an Axis victory, these officials are at present collaborating with the U. S. Army as little as possible, building up their own power, and keeping United Nations sympathizers out of office.

(a) Disgrace of active United Nations sympathizers. General Béthouart and his staff were released only after repeated requests and many of the less conspicuous members stayed in prison for several weeks. None were reinstated. Béthouart and Molle were sent to Algiers. Most of the others were sent to remote posts without active command: Souard to Kasba Tadla; Merglin and Marcilli to other places in the south. Commandant Champeau had to wait two weeks for his amnesty. Commandant Breitel (Service des Renseignements) and Capitain Didot (Counter-espionage) were transferred for cooperating with

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United States agents. Janes, an engineer for the Ministere des Postes, Télégraphes, et Téléphones, was fired for giving information directly to the U. S. Signal Corps. (He has now been reinstated.) Rey, a port pilot at Casablanca, was discharged after 15 years of service, for "not reporting to a doctor when sick." The chief pilot of the Port [illegible] was reinstated upon his return only after the U. S. Navy [illegible] great pressure. The sub-prefect of Tiaret in Algeria, [illegible], was removed to Bône for his courageous pro-Ally action during the occupation. A list of 40 United Nationals, [illegible], have been transferred or demoted since November 10, [illegible] compiled.

(b) Mobilization as an anti-Ally instrument. In general French officials have been unable or unwilling to arouse enthusiasm for the reentry of French North Africa in the war. Moreover, officials under the influence of the Legion, have exempted many firm Vichyites from service and mobilized pro-Ally men in many important positions. Notable examples of this policy are the mobilization of the [illegible] harbor police (now replaced by new men not knowing their job) and of personnel of the electric light and water services in Casablanca (leaving Italians in control of these important public utilities).

(c) The Corps Franc. This army unit formed expressly to fight by the side of the Allies has been constantly hoped

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by officials. Frenchmen who volunteer for this unit are instantly mobilized into the regular army. Since Jews have not been mobilized by the French, they are permitted to join this unit, which thus has become predominantly Jewish. The Corps Franc has been refused buildings in Casablanca, on the excuse that the U. S. Army has requisitioned all suitable buildings.

(d) Sabotage. Though sabotage has so far been only a minor difficulty in North Africa, the presence of firm pro-Ally officials in power might reduce the number of small fires and explosions in Casablanca and prevent such incidences as the failure to move a Titan floating crane to the inner harbor when a gale was blowing up (the crane was wrecked).

(e) Relief. Ill-considered publicity on the amount of food to be sent to North Africa gave antagonistic Frenchmen a chance to proclaim that the United States as usual promises, but does not deliver. With sympathetic officials in control, relief could have been better coordinated and friendly publicity could have given the United States its proper credit.

Comment: Firm control is especially needed in countries where the population is largely indifferent to the war and follows the attitude of the local government. An experienced personnel which knows the people and the country would be able to purge the civil service of trouble-makers without upsetting the government. Such a personnel would know

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whether decisive action or friendly negotiation was preferable. With such a personnel pro-Ally sympathizers would obtain their proper reward for the dangers and sufferings they had to undergo for their opinions.

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